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CORRESPONDENCE WITH REALITY
I. Three Theories Our problem here is “What is truth?” Many philosophers advocate the correspondence theory. One possible formulation of it is as follows: (A) A proposition is true if and only if it corresponds with an actual state of affairs; that is, there is a unique state of affairs with which it corresponds and that state of affairs is an actual one. Two other theories of truth which have also traditionally been put forward are the coherence theory and the pragmatist theory. They might be formulated by means of the following two definitions: (B) A proposition is true if and only if it coheres with some (large set of) other propositions that are generally accepted. (C) A proposition is true if and only if it works, i.e., is instrumental in the solution to some problem. One advantage to these other theories, it is said, is that they each provide a criterion or test for truth, whereas the correspondence theory does not. In reply, correspondence theorists may maintain that their theory at least accurately answers the question “What is truth?” even if it does not provide criteria or tests for truth. To support the correspondence theory against these other theories, I shall mention a single type of example. Consider these two propositions: (1) There are life forms on other galaxies at least as advanced as humans. (2) There are no life forms on other galaxies at least as advanced as humans. Intuition directs us to say that one of these propositions is true. Yet neither of them coheres with any body of generally accepted propositions and neither of them is instrumental in the solution of any problem. It follows that we have here a counter-example to both definition (B) and definition (C), for we have a proposition which is true (either (1) or (2), we do not know which), yet which does not meet the conditions of truth put forward by either of those definitions. In what, then, does the truth of the given proposition consist? Putting it in a crude way, I would say it consists in its correspondence with a certain actual state of affairs that obtains in our universe. Either there are life forms on other galaxies at least as advanced as humans or there aren’t. Whichever it is, that is what makes proposition (1) (or proposition (2), whichever it is) true. The same objection could be posed using many other pairs of contradicting propositions. Here is another pair: (3) On the morning of July 22, 1825, Abraham Lincoln ate at least one egg. (4) On the morning of July 22, 1825, Abraham Lincoln ate no eggs. Again, intuition tells us that one of these must be true; either Lincoln ate an egg or he didn’t, but no one knows which proposition is the true one. Yet we can see that neither the coherence theory nor the pragmatist theory applies to the truth of that proposition (the true one, whichever it is). Hence, those theories must both be rejected. II. Can Definition (A) Be Adequately Defended? Although (A) is better able to deal with such examples as (1)-(4) than are definition (B) or definition (C), there are still other problems that confront it. Some of them are the following: Q1: What is a proposition supposed to be? Q2: Are there other truth bearers than propositions? Q3: What is a state of affairs supposed to be and how is it connected with a proposition? That is, what is it for a proposition to correspond with a unique state of affairs? Q4: Are there propositions which do not correspond with any unique state of affairs? Q5: Are there states of affairs that have no proposition corresponding to them? Q6: By what criteria might actual states of affairs be distinguished from non-actual ones? Q7: There seem to be exceptions to the definition in the form of truths which do not correspond with any actual states of affairs. Some examples of such truths are the following: (a) Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo. (b) People will celebrate when the year 2050 arrives. (c) If I had been decapitated yesterday, then I would have died. (d) 1 + 1 = 2. For each of these, there is a true proposition but there seems not to be any actual state of affairs to which we can point and say, “That is what makes the proposition true.” How is the definition to deal with such cases? I shall take a stab at trying to answer these seven questions. Q1: What is a proposition? I would say that it is an ordered set of communal concepts of a certain kind. By “communal” concepts, I mean concepts which do not exist within any one particular mind, but which can be contemplated by different minds. A proposition is that particular type of ordered set of concepts which constitutes the attribution of some property or relation to some thing or set of things. An example would be the proposition that snow is white. There are the communal concepts of snow and being white. The attribution of the property of being white to snow constitutes a certain ordered set of those concepts and that ordered set is what the given proposition is. This notion of a communal concept as something (a single, abstract thing) which can be contemplated by different minds is admittedly unclear, but I shall let that pass for the time being. Q2: Are there truth bearers other than propositions? I would say that propositions are the only primary truth bearers, but that others can be defined derivatively in terms of propositions. For example if there is a sentence token that expresses some unique proposition, then I see no harm in calling that sentence token “true,” provided that the proposition it expresses is true. As for beliefs, assertions, supposals, etc., they are nothing more than propositions. Beliefs are propositions that are believed. Assertions are ones that are asserted. Supposals are ones that are supposed. And so on. Thus, on a very basic level, propositions are the only truth bearers that there are. Q3: What are states of affairs? They are situations or, in other words, they are things being a certain way. Wherever something has a property or some set of things has a relation, there is a state of affairs. For every proposition there is a state of affairs. Thus, corresponding to the proposition that snow is white there is the state of affairs (or situation) of snow being white. And corresponding to the proposition that 1+1=2, there is the state of affairs of 1+1 equaling 2. (Sometimes the word “facts” is used for actual states of affairs, though I prefer not to use that term in that way since it has other uses as well, which might cause some confusion.) Some states of affairs, like snow being white, are actual, whereas other states of affairs, like snow being black, are non-actual. The actual ones obtain, or are “out there,” whereas the non-actual ones don’t obtain and are not “out there.” Q4: Are there propositions which do not correspond with any unique state of affairs? I would say No. There is a problem of how to deal with vagueness. Consider, for example, the sentence “John is tall.” It is a vague sentence because there is no precise cutoff between being tall and not being tall. What proposition does the sentence express and what state of affairs does that proposition correspond with? I am not sure what the best method is for dealing with vagueness. It might be suggested that the given sentence expresses an infinite number of propositions, each of them specifying an exact height. In that case, each of the propositions would correspond with a unique state of affairs. Only one of those states of affairs, each having to do with John’s exact height, would be actual and all the others would be non-actual. This approach seems defective because when one says, “John is tall,” there is no exact height specified for John and so the actual state of affairs that is relevant should not be one which involves an exact height. If we do not say that the sentence expresses an infinite number of propositions, we seem to be committed to saying that it expresses just one, a vague one. But how can propositions themselves be vague? And if there were a vague proposition, whatever that might be, how could it correspond with a unique state of affairs? It seems senseless to say of states of affairs that they are vague. Reality has to be sharp and precise, not vague. Whatever vagueness there is, it must lie in our minds or in our language, not in reality. I am not sure how to deal with the problem of vagueness and am still working on it. Another admittedly problematic case is that associated with the Paradox of the Liar. One way to formulate it is as follows. “Consider the following proposition (call it “P”): (P): This very proposition, (P), is false. If (P) is true then it is false, and if (P) is false then it is true, which leads to a contradiction.” One attempt to deal with the paradox is to deny that proposition (P) has any truth value at all and to deny that it corresponds with a unique state of affairs. My own preference is to deny that there is any proposition there at all. I think that sentences can be self-referential, but I do not think that propositions can be. But let us not pursue this issue for it is too much of a digression. It does not seem that the correspondence theory of truth will stand or fall on the sole basis of the Paradox of the Liar. Q5: Are there states of affairs that have no proposition corresponding to them? I would say Yes, for I think of propositions as mind-dependent things. Thus, if there were to be a state of affairs that is as yet undiscovered and not thought of by any mind, then it would be one with which no proposition would correspond. Of course, I cannot directly supply an example of such. But it seems obvious that there are an infinite number of states of affairs which have never been thought of by any mind. Consider, for example, our proposition (4), above. That is the proposition that on the morning of July 22, 1825, Abraham Lincoln ate no eggs. It seems quite possible that that proposition might be true, but before I thought of it, no one had ever thought of it, not even Abe Lincoln himself on the given date. In that case, there would have been a state of affairs there that was actual, but which did not as yet have any proposition corresponding with it. The difference between a proposition and a state of affairs that allows one to be mind-dependent but not the other is as follows. A state of affairs is merely the possession of some property by something, whereas a proposition is the attribution of some property to something. Thus, for there to be the state of affairs of snow being white, all that is needed is for snow to possess the property of whiteness. And presumably it could do that quite independently of minds. But for there to be the proposition that snow is white, the property of whiteness needs to be attributed to snow. And for that to occur, there needs to be some mind contemplating the given state of affairs. I do not want to say that propositions exist within particular minds, for they consist of communal concepts, not particular concepts. However, in order for there to be communal concepts at all, there needs to be some sort of mental activity, and so in order for propositions to exist, minds must also exist. That is how propositions are mind-dependent things, whereas states of affairs aren’t. It must be granted, however, that this view of matters makes propositions into a rather strange type of entity. Q6: By what criteria might actual states of affairs be distinguished from non-actual ones? There are all sorts of states of affairs, and which criteria of actuality would be relevant would depend on which particular sort is in question. If the states of affairs involve material objects, then presumably the criteria of actuality would have to do with observation and experiment. If they, instead, involve pure relations among numbers, then the criteria of actuality would have to do with the principles of arithmetic. Each general subject matter has its own objective criteria. It might be suggested that there are no objective criteria and that reality is relative: we each carry around our own separate reality. That is a position known as “epistemological relativism.” It claims that there is no such thing as absolute truth because there is no single reality that is common to all sentient beings. Rather, each individual sentient being has his/her own separate, independent reality (and truth), with all the different realities (and truths) being of equal value. The standard view is that each person has what might be called "a phenomenal world," which consists of all of the person's experiences, but there is also, in addition to all those “phenomenal worlds,” a “public world.” However, according to epistemological relativism, there is no “public world,” only the “phenomenal worlds,” and no one of them is any more real (or true) than any other. I do not think that such an outlook is coherent. In order for people to communicate with one another, there needs to be a “public world” about which they may do so. And since people do indeed successfully communicate with one another, it follows that such a world must exist. Hence, epistemological relativism is false. Another objection is that the epistemological relativist makes the claim that there is no “public world” (and no absolute truth). But that claim must itself be intended as a claim about some “public world” (and to be an absolute truth). Otherwise, it would make no sense and have no point. Thus, epistemological relativism is self-defeating and incoherent. Just to state the position is to presuppose its own falsity. Q7: How might the correspondence theory deal with examples of propositions for which there seems not to be any state of affairs that we directly apprehend in any way? Statements about the past or future, counterfactual conditionals, and necessary truths seem to be of that sort. Consider, for example, mathematical formulas like 1+1=2 and other necessary truths. How can their truth be a matter of correspondence with reality? We do not experience such things in reality. We know what it would be to observe that there are two people in front of us or that John is taller than Bill, but we do not know what it could be to observe that 1+1=2 or that if John is taller than Bill then Bill is shorter than John. This latter relationship (which is a relation between propositions, not a relation between John and Bill) is too abstract to locate anywhere in the physical world. How, then, can it be a state of affairs that obtains out there? My reply is perhaps dogmatic. I say: let us just allow that some states of affairs obtain even though they are not observable by sense perception. Then we can include necessary states of affairs in that group. Also included would be such non-observable states of affairs as the past facts that Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo and that it did not snow in Cuba in July of 1842, the future facts that people will celebrate when the year 2050 arrives and that it will not snow in Cuba tomorrow, and the counterfactual-conditional facts that if I had been decapitated yesterday then I would have died and that if the temperature outside had dropped to freezing last night then I would have had the heat come on in my house this morning. It might be objected that the idea of a necessary state of affairs, for example 1+1 equaling 2, is a very obscure idea. What is accomplished by clinging to such a difficult notion? It seems to me that two things are accomplished. First, some coherent way of treating the problems of necessary truth is provided without going to such lengths as to deny the very existence of necessary truth. And second, truth can then be defined by some version of the correspondence theory. Both of these results are intuitively satisfying. It is plausible to maintain that there definitely are necessary truths, and it is also in accord with our intuitions about truth to define it as some sort of correspondence with reality. After all, what is truth? Truth is when you tell it like it is; everyone knows that! Despite my attempt to answer all seven questions Q1-Q7, the result is not particularly satisfying. There are many things I have not worked out as yet, including among other things the problems of how to clarify the nature of propositions and how to deal with vagueness. I do not wish to say that the problems with definition (A) are insoluble, but they are indeed formidable, and my attempts to solve them may rightfully appear to be rather feeble. III: An Alternate Approach There is another reply to the difficulties that might be made here and that is to abandon version (A) of the correspondence theory, formulated above, and go instead with another version as follows. Call it definition (D): (D) A proposition is true if and only if it is the attribution of some property or relation, Y, to some thing or things, X, and X does indeed have Y. An example to illustrate the application of definition (D) would again be the proposition that snow is white. That proposition is the attribution of the property of whiteness to snow. Thus, snow would be the “X” referred to and the property of whiteness would be the “Y.” And since in that case X does indeed have Y, the proposition is a true one. The earlier problems that have to do with states of affairs do not arise in connection with definition (D), since it does not make any appeal to states of affairs. Of course, it is only in a broad sense that (D) is any version of the correspondence theory at all, for it makes no reference to correspondence. However, (D) does seem to embody the “spirit” of the correspondence theory and for that reason the label may be applied to it. Whether or not (D) is called a version of the correspondence theory is not a particularly important issue. The main question is that of whether or not it is an adequate definition of truth. What we need to do is to consider possible objections to it. The main difficulty with definition (D) seems to lie in its application to complex propositions. Consider for example the following: (5) If John believes that either Lincoln ate an egg on the morning of July 22, 1825 or else there are life forms on other galaxies at least as advanced as humans, then he is a rather gullible chap. The question might be raised as to how, exactly, definition (D) might be applied to proposition (5). That is, what are the “properties or relations” which it attributes and to what, exactly, are they attributed? It is a bit difficult to sort all that out, because of the frequent reference to propositions within other propositions, but it does not seem impossible to do so. There do seem to be certain relations ascribed to some thing or things in (5) and its truth could be said to lie in whether or not that thing or those things do indeed have the relations in question. I would say that (5) is the attribution of the “if-then” relation to two propositions the first of which is a disjunction and the second of which is the proposition that John is a rather gullible chap. The first disjunct in the given disjunction is the attribution of the relation of “believes” to the ordered pair composed of John and the proposition that Lincoln ate an egg on the morning of July 22, 1825. The second disjunct is the attribution of “believes” to the ordered pair composed of John and the proposition that there are life forms on other galaxies at least as advanced as humans. Each of the propositions mentioned here could itself be shown to be the attribution of some property or relation to some thing or things. Assuming all of that can be adequately worked out, we can say that definition (D) provides us with an answer to the question “What is truth?” It would be an answer that is both free of the difficulties that plagued definition (A) and applicable to such problematic cases as truths about the past and future, truths in the form of counterfactual conditionals, and necessary truths. IV: Ontology: Some Questions What must exist in order for there to be a correct and completely adequate theory of truth and reality? Consider, for example, each of the following items: (a) physical objects, (b) mental particulars (such as images and sensations), (c) fictional objects (like unicorns), (d) colors, (e) physical properties (like mass), (f) relations (such as being larger than), (g) concepts (such as the concept of a house or the concept of a unicorn), (h) propositions (such as the proposition that the sun is larger than the moon or the proposition that the sun is smaller than the moon), (i) states of affairs (such as the state of affairs of the sun being larger than the moon or the state of affairs of the sun being smaller than the moon), (j) events (such as George W. Bush flying in an airplane on Sept. 6, 2001), (k) times (such as noon EDT on Sept. 6, 2001), (l) places (such as the White House in Washington, D.C.) (m) sets (such as the set of houses or the set of unicorns), (n) numbers (integers, rational numbers, real numbers, etc.), and (o) supernatural entities (such as Santa Claus, elves, demons, angels, God, etc.) For each of these, should it be included in Reality? If it is included, then what is it, exactly, and what, if anything, might its constituents be? These are enormously difficult questions of ontology, which is a branch of metaphysics, which is a branch of philosophy. I am still working on these (and other) questions. Copyright
2004 Theodore M. Drange
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