...

From e-mail:

In fact, Federal legislation is not applicable to you unless such legislation specifically defines the term United States to include the 50 sovereign states. Typically, in Federal legislation, the word "State" means Washington D.C., Guam, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, American Samoa and other 'Federal Territories & Enclaves'. It does NOT include the 50 sovereign states.

The Supreme Court has ruled as follows:

"It is a well established principle of law that all federal legislation applies only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States unless a contrary intent appears." -- Foley Brothers Inc. vs. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1948)

"The laws of Congress in respect to those matters [outside Constitutionally delegated powers] do not extend the territorial limits of the states, but have a force only in the District of Columbia and other places that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the national government." -- Caha vs. U.S., 152 U.S. 211

...

"Each law enacted in the Legislature shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall be briefly expressed in the title; and no law shall be amended or revised by reference to its title only; but in such case the act, as revised, or section, as amended, shall be re-enacted and published at length." (Florida Constitution, Art. 3, s. 16) [Fine v. Moran, 77 So. 533, 538]

This constitutional provision "was designed to prevent the surprise or fraud on the legislators and on the people that might result from provisions hidden in the body of the statute and not indicated by its title. * * * Thus, where provisions in a statute constitute a broader or essentially different subject that is not properly connected with the stated subject of the act, such provisions are inoperative as violative of the constitution." (Fla. Jur. 2d, Statutes, s. 62)

"The constitutional provision that statutes must embrace a single subject and matter properly connected therewith, which subject must be expressed in the title, applies to * * * all forms of legislative enactment". (Fla. Jur. 2d, Statutes, s. 65)

"Two subjects of legislation cannot be germane where it is necessary to change the meaning of words to place them in the same class or category, and where provisions applicable to the one are incongruous when applied to the other." (Beary v. Narrau, 37 So. 961, 962)

"But such amendment should be limited in its scope to the subject-matter of the section proposed to be amended. "In such case the introduction of any new substantive matter not germane or pertinent to that contained in the original sections cannot be regarded as an amendment thereto, but must be regarded as independent legislation upon a matter not expressed in the title of the act, and therefore void. The amendment of an act in general, or a particular section of an act, ex vi termini implies merely a change of its provisions upon the same subject to which the act or section relates." State v. Sugar Refining Co., 106 La. 565, 31 South. 181." (Beary v. Narrau, supra.)

"If, in legislating to amend sections expressed in the title, the lawmakers cannot alter the subject-matter of other sections not expressed therein, for a stronger reason they cannot ingraft in the sections to be amended provisos on a subject-matter not embraced in any section of the prior act." (Beary v. Narrau, supra.)

"Where a court is confronted with a statute, a literal construction of which would render it unconstitutional, the court must adopt such a construction, when reasonably possible, as will save the statute and at the same time save every savable provision or term in it." (Teche Lines, Inc. v. Danforth et al., 12 So. 2d 784, hn. 5)

"Where the words used have a definite and precise meaning, the courts have no power to go elsewhere in search of conjecture in order to restrict or extend the meaning. Black on Interpretation of Laws, 37. Courts cannot correct supposed errors, omissions, or defects in legislation. 'The object of interpretation is to bring sense out of the words used, and not to bring a sense into them.' Black on Interpretation of Laws, supra." (Fine v. Moran, supra, 536)

"All laws should receive a sensible application. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the Legislature intended exceptions to its language, which would avoid results of this character [technical violation]. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter. * * * It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers." (Teche Lines, Inc. v. Danforth et al., 12 So.2d 784, 786, quoting Boyd v. Coleman, 146 Miss. 449, 111 So. 600)

Titles of laws cannot be "so worded as to mislead an ordinary mind as to the real purpose and scope of the enactment." (Butler v. Perry, 66 So. 150, 240 US 328)

"The test of whether a title misleads is whether it would deceive the mind of an ordinary person used to the common meaning of language, not the mind of a precisionist used to technical refinements of terms. (Ison v. Zimmerman, 372 So. 2d 431)" [Fla. Jur. 2d, Statutes, s. 63]

A statute is not operative as law until the date at which it takes effect. No one can be charged with notice of it until this date. (Sammis v Bennett (1893) 32 Fla 458, 14 So 90. State ex rel. Stuart Daily News, Inc. v Lee (1935) 120 Fla 858, 163 So 135.) Thus, a statute passed to take effect at a future date is to be understood as speaking from the time it goes into operation, not from the time of passage. Until it goes into operation, it has no force whatever. (Neisel v Moran (1919) 80 Fla 98, 85 So 346.) Yet, the date of the passage of an enactment is not without relevance in certain situations. (* * *)

The Constitutional provides that each law shall take effect on the 60^th day after adjournment sine die of the session of the legislature in which enacted, or as otherwise provided therein. It further provides that if the law is passed over the veto of the Governor, it shall take effect on the 60^th day after adjournment sine die of the session in which the veto is overridden, on a later date fixed in the law, or on a date fixed by resolution passed by both houses of the legislature. (Fla. Const. Art 3 ¤ 9 (1968)) This provision is designed to afford the public an opportunity to ascertain the existence of the statute and to inform themselves concerning it. (Sammis v Bennett (1893) 32 Fla 458, 14 So 90.)

When given immediate effect:

But it clearly permits the legislature to fix the date when a law that it enacts is to become effective. (White v Ballinger (1948) 159 Fla 905, 33 So 2d 157.) Thus it may postpone or advance the date at which an enactment is to take effect. (See, for example, State ex rel. Gibbs v Couch (1939) 139 Fla 353, 190 So 723, holding that it "shall take effect immediately upon its passage and approval by the governor, or the State of Florida, or become a law without such approval," it provides for two contingencies under either of which it would become immediately effective.) However, the authority of the legislature to provide that a statute is to take effect immediately should not be resorted to unless justified by some special exigency. (Thompson v State (1908) 56 Fla 107, 47 So 816.)

A statute that is silent as to the time when it is to take effect does not take effect until the 60-day period has elapsed from the final adjournment of the legislative session. (Jacksonville Gas Co. v Lee (1933) 110 Fla 61, 148 So 188, holding that when s statute does not state when it shall take effect, the provisions of the Constitution control.) Where the statute provides that it is to take effect immediately on its approval by the Governor, but with no mention of time in the event the Governor does not give his approval, the constitutional provisions govern absent the executive approval, and the statute does not take effect until the 60-day period has lapsed. In such a case, the legislature is regarded as having made the question of whether the act shall go into effect immediately dependent on its approval by the Governor. (Thompson v State (1908) 56 Fla 107, 47 So 816. State ex rel. Stuart Daily News, Inc. v Lee (1935) 120 Fla 858, 163 So 135.)