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Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being:
Appendix 2.

    As man is a created finite thing, &c., it necessarily follows that what he has of Thought, and what we call the Soul, is a mode[N1] of the attribute which we call Thought, and that nothing else except this mode belongs to his essence: so much so that when this mode comes to naught, the soul perishes also, although the above attribute remains unchanged. Similarly as regards[N2] what he has of Extension; what we call Body is nothing else than a mode of the other attribute which we call Extension; when this is destroyed, the human body also ceases to be, although the attribute Extension remains unchanged.
[Note N1]: A: an attribute; B: a mode.

[Note N2]: B omits "as regards," and inserts "and" after "Extension."

    Now in order to understand what this mode is, which we call Soul, and how it derives its origin from the body, and also how its change (only) depends on the body (which to me constitutes the union of soul and body) it must be observed:

    1. That the most immediate mode of the attribute which we call thought contains objective the formal essence of all things; so much so, that if one could posit a real thing whose essence was not objective in the above-named attribute, then this would not be infinite, nor supremely perfect in its kind; contrary to what has already been proved in the third proposition. And since, as a matter of fact, Nature or God is one being of which infinite attributes are predicated, and which contains in itself all the essences of created things, it necessarily follows that of all this there is produced in Thought an infinite Idea,[N1] which comprehends objective the whole of Nature just as it is realiter.
[Note N1]: A: it necessarily follows that of all that which is produced in Thought there is an infinite Idea...; B: ...that there is produced in thought an infinite idea thereof...

    2. It is to be observed that all the remaining modes, such as Love, Desire, Joy, *&c.,* derive their origin from this first immediate mode; and that, too, in such wise, that if it did not precede, then there could be no love, desire, *nor joy,* &c. Whence it clearly follows that the natural love which prompts everything to preserve its body (I mean the mode)[N1] cannot have any other origin than in the Idea or the "objective" essence of such body which is in the thinking attribute. Further, since for the real existence of an Idea (or "objective" essence) no other thing is required than the thinking attribute and the object (or "formal" essence), it is certain, as we have said, that the Idea, or the "objective" essence, is the most immediate[N2] mode of the *thinking* attribute. And, consequently, there can be in the thinking attribute no other mode, that should belong to the essence of the soul of every[N3] thing, except only the Idea, which must be in the thinking attribute when its object exists: for such an idea brings with it the remaining modes of Love, Desire, *Joy,* &c. Now as the Idea comes from the existence of the object, therefore according as the object changes or perishes, so its Idea must change or perish, and such being the case, it is that which is united with the object.[N4]
[Note N1]: B omits the words in brackets.

[Note N2]: I call that mode the most immediate mode, which, in order to exist, requires no other mode in the same attribute.

[Note N3]: A: gelijken [like]; B: iegelik'n [every].

[Note N4]: B: ...so this idea of it must change or perish in the same degree or measure of change or annihilation, because it is thus united with the object.

    Lastly, if we should want to proceed and ascribe to the essence of the soul that through which it can be real, we shall be able to find nothing else than the attribute [Thought] and the object of which we have just been speaking; and neither of these can belong to the essence of the Soul, as the object has nothing of Thought, and is realiter different from the Soul.[N1] And with regard to the attribute, we have also proved already that it cannot pertain to the above-mentioned essence, as appears even more clearly from what we said subsequently;[N2] for the attribute as attribute[N3] is not united with the object, since it neither changes nor perishes, although the object changes or perishes.
[Note N1]: B: as the object of Thought has nothing thereof, but is realiter different from it.

[Note N2]: B: as will be seen from what we shall say later.

[Note N3]: B omits "as attribute."

    Therefore the essence of the soul consists in this alone, namely, in the existence of an Idea or "objective" essence in the thinking attribute, arising from the essence of an object which in fact exists in Nature. I say, of an object which in fact exists, &c., without more particulars, so as to include under this not only the modes of extension, but also the modes of all the infinite attributes, which have also each its soul, just as in the case of extension. And in order that this definition may be somewhat more fully understood, it should be borne in mind what I have already said when speaking about the attributes, which, I said, are not different as regards their existence,[N1] for they are themselves the "subjects" of their essences; also that the essence of every one of the modes is contained in the above-named attributes, *and, lastly, that all the attributes are attributes* of One infinite Being. Wherefore also, in the ninth chapter of the First Part, I called this Idea a creation created immediately by God; since it contains objective the "formal" essence of all things[N2] without omission or addition. And this is necessarily but one, considering that all the essences of the attributes, and the essences of the modes comprehended in these attributes, are the essence of one only infinite being.[N3] But it has still to be remarked that these modes, now under consideration, [even when] none of them exists, are nevertheless equally comprehended in their attributes; and as there is no inequality whatever in the attributes, nor yet in the essences of the modes, there can be no particularity in the idea when there is none in Nature. But as soon as ever some of these modes take on their particular existence, and thereby become in some way different from their attributes (because then their particular existence, which they have in the attribute, is the "subject" of their essence), then there shows itself a particularity in the essences of the modes, and consequently in the "objective" essences of these which are necessarily comprehended in the Idea.[N4] And this is the reason why we said, in the definition, that the Idea[N5] arises from an object,[N6] which really exists in Nature. And with this we think we have sufficiently explained what kind of a thing the soul is in general, understanding by this expression not only the Ideas which arise from *the existence of* corporeal modes, but also those which arise from the existence of every mode of the remaining attributes.
[Note N1]: B omits the nine words that follow.

[Note N2]: B:...I called the thinking attribute, or the understanding in the thinking thing, a son, product, or creation created immediately by God, since it contains the "objective" essence of all things...

[Note N3]: B omits this sentence, and continues: For it has to be remarked...

[Note N4]: B: in the Thinking Attribute.

[Note N5]: B: the soul, the idea, or objective essence in the thinking attribute (which is all one to me) arises...

[Note N6]: B: from the essence of an object...

    But, since we have no such knowledge of the remaining attributes as we have of extension, let us just see whether, having regard to the modes of extension, we can discover a more special definition, and one that shall be more appropriate to express the essence of our souls, for this is the real task before us. Now we shall presuppose here, as something already demonstrated, that extension contains no other modes than motion and rest, and that every particular material thing is nothing else than a certain proportion of motion and rest, so much so indeed that, even if extension contained nothing else except motion only or rest only, then no particular thing could be shown or exist in the whole of extension; the human body, therefore, is nothing else than a certain proportion of motion and rest. Now the "objective essence" of this actual ratio *of motion and rest* which is in the thinking attribute, this (we say) is the soul of the body; so that whenever one of these two modes changes into more or less (motion or rest)[N1] the Idea *or the soul* also changes accordingly. For example, when the [amount of] rest happens to increase, while the [quantity of] motion is diminished, then there is produced thereby that pain or sorrow which we call cold; but if, on the contrary, this [increase] takes place in the [amount of] motion, then there is produced thereby that pain which we call heat.[N2] And so when it happens that the degrees of motion and rest are not equal in all the parts of our body, but that some have more motion and rest than others, there arises therefrom a[N3] difference of feeling (and thence arises the different kind of pain which we feel when we are struck in the eyes or on the hands with a cane).[N4] And when it happens that the external causes, which bring about these changes, are different from one another, and have not all the same effect, then there results from this a difference of feeling in one and the same part (and from this results the difference of feeling according as one and the same hand is struck with a piece of wood or of iron).[N4] And, again, if the change which occurs in a part restores it to its first proportion *of motion and rest,* there arises from this that joy which we call repose, pleasurable activity, and cheerfulness. Lastly, now that we have explained what feeling is, we can easily see how this gives rise to an Idea reflexiva, or the knowledge of oneself, Experience and Reasoning. And from all this (as also because our soul is united with God, and is a part of the infinite Idea, arising immediately from God) there can also be clearly seen the origin of clear knowledge, and the immortality of the soul. But, for the present, what we have said must be enough.
[Note N1]: B: whenever of these two modes, be it motion or rest, changes into more or less...

[Note N2]: B continues as follows: But if the proportion of motion and rest is not the same in all parts of our body, but some of them are provided with more motion or rest than the others, there arises thence a difference of feeling: such as we experience when we are struck with cane in the eyes or on the hands. Moreover, when the external causes happen to be different, and have not all the same effect, there results therefrom a difference of feeling in one and the same part: such as we experience when the same hand is struck with a piece of wood or of iron. But when the change which occurs in some part restores it to its previous proportion of motion and rest, there arises...

[Note N3]: A: the.

[Note N4]: A gives the words in brackets immediately after "happens."

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