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Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being:
Part 2, Chapter 20.

    Now, as regards what we have said in the preceding chapter, the following difficulties might be raised by way of objection. [N1]
[Note N1]: B inserts here a preliminary statement of the three objections which follow, and then repeats them each in its place, as in the text.

    First, if motion is not the cause of the passions then why is it possible, nevertheless, to banish sorrow by the aid of certain [N1] means, as is often done by means of wine? To this it serves [as an answer] that a distinction must be made between the soul's awareness, when it first becomes aware of the body, and the judgment which it presently comes to form as to whether it is good or bad for it. [N2]
[Note N1]: A has geene [no] but this was crossed out by Monnikhoff and replaced by eenige [some, or certain].

[Note N2]: That is, between understanding considered generally, and understanding having special regard to the good or evil of the thing.

    Now the soul, being such as just [N1] stated, has, as we have already shown before, the power to move the [vital] spirits whithersoever it pleases; but this power may, nevertheless, be taken away from it, as when, owing to other causes [arising out] of the body generally, their form, constituted by certain proportions [of motion and rest], disappears or is changed; and when it becomes aware of this [change] in it, there arises sorrow, which varies with the change which the [vital] spirits undergo. This sorrow results from its love for, and union with, the body. [N2]
[Note N1]: A: nu mediate, possibly a slip for immediate, that is, "immediately [above]." B: nu onmiddelijk [immediately].

[Note N2]: Man's sorrow is caused by the thought that some evil is befalling him, namely, through the loss of some good; when such a thought is entertained, the result is, that the [vital] spirits gather about the heart, and, with the help of other parts, press it together and enclose it, just the reverse of what happens in the case of joy. Then the soul becomes aware of this pressure, and is pained. Now what is it that medicines or wine effect? This, namely, that by their action they drive away the [vital] spirits from the heart, and make room again, and when the soul becomes aware of this, it receives new animation, which consists in this, that the thought of evil is diverted by the change in the proportion of motion and rest, which the wine has caused, and it turns to something else in which the understanding finds more satisfaction. But this cannot be the immediate effect of the wine on the soul, but only of the wine on the [vital] spirits.

    That this is so may be easily deduced from the fact that this sorrow can be alleviated in one of these two ways; either by restoring the [vital] spirits to their original form that is by relieving him of the pain, or by being persuaded by good reasons to make no ado about this body. The first is temporary, and [the sorrow] is liable to return; but the second is eternal, permanent, and unchangeable.

    The second objection may be this: as we see that the soul, although it has nothing in common with the body, can yet bring it about that the [vital] spirits, although they were about to move in one direction, nevertheless move now in the other direction, why should it not also be able to effect that a body which is perfectly still and at rest should begin to move itself? [N1] likewise, why should it not also be able to move in whatever direction it pleases all other bodies which are already in motion?
[Note N1]: Now, there is no difficulty here as to how the one mode, which is infinitely different from the other, yet acts on the other: for it is a part of the whole, since the soul never existed without the body, nor the body without the soul. [N1N1] We arrive at this [conclusion] as follows:

1. There is a perfect being, page --. [N1N2]
2. There cannot be two substances, page --.
3. No substance can have a beginning, page --.
4. Each is infinite in its kind, page --.
5. There must also be an attribute of thought, page --.
6. There is no thing in Nature, but there is an Idea of it in the thinking thing, resulting from its essence and existence in conjunction, page --.
7. Consequently, now:
8. Since their essence, without their existence, is implied in the designations of things, therefore the Idea of the essence cannot be regarded as something separate; this can only be done when there is both existence and essence, because then there is an object, which before was not. For example, when the whole wall is white, there is no this or that in, &c.
9. Now, this Idea, considered by itself, and apart from all other Ideas, can be no more than a mere Idea of such a thing, and it cannot be that it has an Idea of such a thing; [add] moreover, that such an Idea, thus regarded, since it is only a part, can have no very clear and very distinct conception of itself and its object, but only the thinking thing, which is the whole of Nature, can have this; for, a part considered without its whole, cannot, &c.
10. Between the Idea and the object there must necessarily be a union, because the one cannot exist without the other: for there is no thing whose Idea is not in the thinking thing, and no Idea can exist unless the thing also exists. Furthermore the object cannot change without the Idea changing also, and vice versa, so that there is here no need for a third thing that should bring about the union of soul and body. It is to be remarked, however, that we are speaking here of such Ideas which necessarily arise from the existence of the things together with their essence in God; but not of the Ideas which the things now actually present to us, [or] produce in us. There is a great difference between these: for the Ideas in God do not arise as they do in us by way of one or more of the senses, which are therefore almost always only imperfectly affected by them; but from their existence and their essence, just as they are. My idea, however, is not yours, although one and the same thing produces them in us.

[Note N1N1]: B omits the rest of this note, but adds here the next note: *For,* it is clear ...
[Note N1N2]: The number of the page (in notes 1-6) is not given in the MSS. See Commentary.

    But if we recall what we have already said before concerning the thinking thing, it can remove this difficulty for us quite easily. Namely, we then said that although Nature has various attributes, it is, all the same, but one only Being, of which all these attributes are predicated. Besides this we have also said that the thinking thing, too, was but one only thing in Nature, and is expressed in infinite Ideas, in accordance with the infinite things which exist in Nature; for if the body receives such a mode as, for example, the body of Peter, and again another such as is the body of Paul, the result of this is that there are in the thinking thing two different Ideas: namely, one idea of the body of Peter, which constitutes the Soul of Peter, and another of [the body of] Paul, which constitutes the Soul of Paul. Now the thinking thing can well move the body of Peter by means of the Idea of the body of Peter, but not by means of the Idea of the body of Paul; so that the soul of Paul can well move its own body, but by no means that of another, such as that of Peter. [N1] And for this reason also it cannot move a stone which rests or lies still: because the stone, again, makes another Idea in the Soul. Hence also it is no less clear that it is impossible that a stone, which is perfectly at rest and still, should be made to move by any mode of thought, for the same reasons as above.
[Note N1]: It is clear that in man, because he had a beginning, there is to be found no other attribute than such as existed in Nature already before. -- And since he consists of such a body of which there must necessarily be an Idea in the thinking thing, and the Idea must necessarily be united with the body, therefore we assert without fear that his Soul is nothing else than this Idea of his body in the thinking thing. And as this body has a [N1N1] motion and rest (which has its proportion determined, and [N1N2] is usually altered, through external objects), and as no alteration can take place in the object without occurring also immediately in the Idea, the result is that people feel (idea reflexiva).[N1N3] Now I say, as it has *a certain measure or* proportion of motion and rest, because no process can take place in the body without these two concurring.

[Note N1N1]: B: has a certain measure of ...
[Note N1N2]: B omits these five words.
[Note N1N3]: B: that people have "reflexive" ideas.

    The third objection may be this: We seem to be able to see clearly that we can, nevertheless, produce a certain stillness in the body. For, after we have kept moving our [vital] spirits for a long time, we find that we are tired; which, assuredly, is nothing else than a certain stillness in the [vital] spirits brought about by ourselves. We answer, however, that it is quite true that the soul is a cause of this stillness, but only indirectly; for it puts a stop to the movement not directly, but only through other bodies which it has moved, and which must then necessarily have lost as much as they had imparted to the [vital] spirits.[N1] It is therefore clear on all sides that in Nature there is *only* one and the same kind of motion.
[Note N1]: B: The Answer is that, although it may be true that the Soul is a cause of this rest, still it does not bring it about immediately, but only through other bodies, which necessarily impart to the moving [vital] spirits just as much rest as they receive motion from them.
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