Now, as regards what we have said in the preceding
chapter, the following difficulties might be raised by way of
[Note N1]: B inserts here a preliminary statement of the
three objections which follow, and then repeats them
each in its place, as in the text.
First, if motion is not the cause of the passions then why is it
possible, nevertheless, to banish sorrow by the aid of certain [N1]
means, as is often done by means of wine? To this it serves
[as an answer] that a distinction must be
made between the soul's awareness, when it first becomes aware
of the body, and the judgment which it presently comes to form
as to whether it is good or bad for it. [N2]
[Note N1]: A has geene [no] but this was crossed out by
Monnikhoff and replaced by eenige [some, or certain].
[Note N2]: That is, between understanding considered
generally, and understanding having special regard to
the good or evil of the thing.
Now the soul, being such as just [N1] stated, has, as we have
already shown before, the power to move the [vital] spirits
whithersoever it pleases; but this power may, nevertheless, be
taken away from it, as when, owing to other causes [arising
out] of the body generally, their form, constituted by certain
proportions [of motion and rest], disappears or is changed; and
when it becomes aware of this [change] in it, there arises
sorrow, which varies with the change which the [vital] spirits undergo.
This sorrow results from its love for, and union with, the body. [N2]
[Note N1]: A: nu mediate, possibly a slip for immediate, that
is, "immediately [above]." B: nu onmiddelijk [immediately].
[Note N2]: Man's sorrow is caused by the thought that some evil is
befalling him, namely, through the loss of some good; when
such a thought is entertained, the result is, that the [vital] spirits
gather about the heart, and, with the help of other parts, press it
together and enclose it, just the reverse of what happens in the
case of joy. Then the soul becomes aware of this pressure, and is
pained. Now what is it that medicines or wine effect? This,
namely, that by their action they drive away the [vital] spirits from
the heart, and make room again, and when the soul becomes
aware of this, it receives new animation, which consists in this,
that the thought of evil is diverted by the change in the
proportion of motion and rest, which the wine has caused, and
it turns to something else in which the understanding finds more
satisfaction. But this cannot be the immediate effect of the wine
on the soul, but only of the wine on the [vital] spirits.
That this is so may be easily deduced from the fact that this
sorrow can be alleviated in one of these two ways; either by
restoring the [vital] spirits to their original form that is by
relieving him of the pain, or by being persuaded by good
reasons to make no ado about this body. The first is
temporary, and [the sorrow] is liable to return; but the second is
eternal, permanent, and unchangeable.
The second objection may be this: as we see that the soul,
although it has nothing in common with the body, can yet
bring it about that the [vital] spirits, although they were about to
move in one direction, nevertheless move now in the other
direction, why should it not also be able to effect that a body
which is perfectly still and at rest should begin to move itself? [N1]
likewise, why should it not also be able to move in whatever
direction it pleases all other bodies which are already in motion?
[Note N1]: Now, there is no difficulty here as to how the one mode,
which is infinitely different from the other, yet acts on the other:
for it is a part of the whole, since the soul never existed without
the body, nor the body without the soul. [N1N1] We arrive at
this [conclusion] as follows:
1. There is a perfect being, page --. [N1N2]
2. There cannot be two substances, page --.
3. No substance can have a beginning, page --.
4. Each is infinite in its kind, page --.
5. There must also be an attribute of thought, page --.
6. There is no thing in Nature, but there is an Idea of it
in the thinking thing, resulting from its
essence and existence in
conjunction, page --.
7. Consequently, now:
8. Since their essence,
without their existence, is implied in the
designations of things, therefore the Idea of the essence cannot be
regarded as something separate; this can only be done when there is
both existence and essence, because then there is an object, which
before was not. For example, when the whole wall is white, there is
no this or that in, &c.
9. Now, this Idea, considered by itself, and apart from all other
Ideas, can be no more than a mere Idea of such a thing, and it cannot
be that it has an Idea of such a thing; [add] moreover, that such an
Idea, thus regarded, since it is only a part, can have no very clear
and very distinct conception of itself and its object, but only the
thinking thing, which is the whole of Nature, can have this; for, a
part considered without its whole, cannot, &c.
10. Between the Idea and the object there must necessarily be a union,
because the one cannot exist without the other: for there is no thing
whose Idea is not in the thinking thing, and no Idea can exist unless
the thing also exists. Furthermore the object cannot change without
the Idea changing also, and vice versa, so that there is here no need
for a third thing that should bring about the union of soul and body.
It is to be remarked, however, that we are speaking here of such
Ideas which necessarily arise from the existence of the things
together with their essence
in God; but not of the Ideas which the
things now actually present to us, [or] produce in us. There is a great
difference between these: for the Ideas in God do not arise as they do
in us by way of one or more of the senses, which are therefore almost
always only imperfectly affected by them; but from their existence
and their essence,
just as they are. My idea, however, is not yours,
although one and the same thing produces them in us.
[Note N1N1]: B omits the rest of this note, but adds here the
next note: *For,* it is clear ...
But if we recall what we have already said before concerning the
thinking thing, it can remove this difficulty for us quite easily. Namely,
we then said that although Nature has various attributes, it is, all the
same, but one only Being, of which all these attributes are predicated.
Besides this we have also said that the thinking thing, too, was but one
only thing in Nature, and is expressed in infinite Ideas, in accordance
with the infinite things which exist in Nature; for if the body
receives such a mode as, for example, the body of Peter, and again
another such as is the body of
Paul, the result of this is that there are in the thinking thing two
different Ideas: namely, one idea of the body of Peter, which
constitutes the Soul of Peter, and another of [the body of] Paul,
which constitutes the Soul of Paul. Now the thinking thing can well
move the body of Peter by means of the Idea of the body of Peter,
but not by means of the Idea of the body of Paul; so that the soul
of Paul can well move its own body, but by no means that
of another, such as that of Peter. [N1] And for this reason
also it cannot move a stone which rests or lies
still: because the stone, again, makes another
Idea in the Soul. Hence also it is no less clear
that it is impossible that a stone, which is
perfectly at rest and still, should be made to
move by any mode of thought, for the same
reasons as above.
[Note N1N2]: The number of the page (in notes 1-6) is not given
in the MSS. See Commentary.
[Note N1]: It is clear that in man, because he had
a beginning, there is to be found no other attribute
than such as existed in Nature already before. -- And since
he consists of such a body of which there must
necessarily be an Idea in the thinking thing, and the Idea must
necessarily be united with the body, therefore we assert without fear
that his Soul is nothing else than this Idea of his body in the thinking
thing. And as this body has a [N1N1] motion and rest (which has its
proportion determined, and [N1N2] is usually altered, through external
objects), and as no alteration can take place in the object without
occurring also immediately in the Idea, the result is that people feel
(idea reflexiva).[N1N3] Now I say, as it has *a certain measure or*
proportion of motion and rest, because no process can take place
in the body without these two concurring.
[Note N1N1]: B: has a certain measure of ...
The third objection may be this: We seem to be
able to see clearly that we can, nevertheless,
produce a certain stillness in the body. For,
after we have kept moving our [vital] spirits
for a long time, we find that we are tired;
which, assuredly, is nothing else than a certain
stillness in the [vital] spirits brought about
by ourselves. We answer, however, that it is
quite true that the soul is a cause of this
stillness, but only indirectly; for it puts a
stop to the movement not directly, but only
through other bodies which it has moved, and
which must then necessarily have lost as much as
they had imparted to the [vital] spirits.[N1] It
is therefore clear on all sides that in Nature there is
*only* one and the same kind of motion.
[Note N1N2]: B omits these five words.
[Note N1N3]: B: that people have "reflexive" ideas.
[Note N1]: B: The Answer is that, although it may be
true that the Soul is a cause of this rest,
still it does not bring it about immediately,
but only through other bodies, which
necessarily impart to the moving [vital]
spirits just as much rest as they receive
motion from them.