[Note N1]: The modes of which Man consists are ideas, differentiated as Opinion, true Belief, and clear and distinct Knowledge, produced by objects, each in its own way.
belief (which belief arises either from experience, or from hearsay), (2) or, in the second place, we acquire them by way of a true belief, (3) or, thirdly, we have them as the result of clear and distinct conception.
The first is commonly subject to error.
The second and third, however, although they differ from one another, cannot err.
[Note N1]: These ideas of this Belief are put first on page [ST202]; here and there they are also called opinion, which they really are.
Some one [N1] has just heard it said that if, in the Rule of Three, the second number is multiplied by the third, and then divided by the first, a fourth rumber will then be obtained which has the same relation to the third as the second has to the first. And notwithstanding the possibility that he who put this before him might have been lying, he still made his calculations accordingly, and he did so without having acquired any more knowledge of the Rule of Three than a blind man has of colour, so that whatever he may have said about it, he simply repeated as a parrot repeats what it has been taught.
[Note N1]: This one merely forms an opinion, or, as is commonly said, believes through hearsay only. [B omits this note.]
[Note N1]: This one thinks or believes not simply through hearsay, but from experience: and these are the two kinds of people who have [mere] opinions. [B omits this note.]
[Note N1]: This one is certain through true belief, which can never deceive him, and he is properly called a believer.
[Note N1]: But this last one is never [merely] of opinion, nor a [mere] believer, but sees the things themselves, not through something else, but through the things themselves.
[Note N2]: A: "and"; B: "in."
[Note N3]: B adds here, in the body of the text, the substance of the above two notes on the third and fourth kinds of knowledge.