[Note N1]: The reason is this, since Nothing can have no attributes, the All must have all attributes; and just as Nothing has no attribute because it is Nothing, so that which is Something has attributes because it is Something. Hence, the more it is Something, the more attributes it must have, and consequently God being the most perfect, and all that is Anything, he must also have infinite, perfect, and all attributes.
2. That there are not two like substances.
3. That one substance cannot produce another.
4. That in the infinite understanding of God there is no other substance than that which is formaliter in Nature.
[Note N1]: Once we can prove that there can be no Finite Substance, then all substance must without limitation belong to the divine being. We do it thus:
1. It must either have limited itself or [N1N1]some other must have limited it. It could not have done so itself, because having been infinite it would have had to change its whole essence. Nor can it be limited by another: for this again must be either finite or infinite; the former is impossible, therefore the latter; therefore it [i.e., the other thing] is God. He must, then, have made it finite because he lacked either the power or the will [to make it infinite]: but the first [supposition] is contrary to his omnipotence, the second is contrary to his goodness.[N1N2]
2. That there can be no finite substance is clear from this, namely, that, if so, it would necessarily have something which it would have from Nothing, which is impossible. For whence can it derive that wherein it differs from God? Certainly not from God, for he has nothing imperfect or finite, &c. So, whence then but from Nothing? Therefore there is no substance other than infinite. Whence it follows, that there cannot be two like infinite substances; for to posit such necessitates limitation. And from this, again, it follows that one substance cannot produce another; thus: The cause that we might suppose to produce this substance must have the same attribute [N1N3] as the one produced, and also either just as much perfection [N1N4] or more or less.
The first supposition is not possible, because there would then be two like [substances].
The second also not, because in that case there would be a finite [substance].
Nor the third, because something cannot come from nothing. -- Moreover, if the finite [N1N5] came from the infinite, then the infinite [N1N6] would also be finite, &c. Therefore one substance can not produce another. And from this, again, it follows that all substance must exist formaliter, for if it did not exist, there would be no possibility for it to come into existence.
[Note N1N1]: B inserts here 2.
[Note N1]: To say to this that the nature of the thing required such [limitation] and that it could not therefore be otherwise, that is no reply: for the nature of a thing can require nothing while it does not exist. Should you say that one may, nevertheless, see what belongs to the nature of a thing which does not exist: that is true as regards its existence, but by no means as regards its essence. And herein lies the difference between creating and generating. To create is to posit a thing quo ad essentiam et existentiam simul [i.e., to give a thing both essence and existence]; while in the case of generation a thing comes forth quo ad existentiam solam [i.e., it only receives existence]. And therefore there is now in Nature no creation but only generation. So that when God creates he creates at once the nature of the thing with the thing itself. He would therefore show ill-will if (from lack of will, and not of power) he created the thing in such a way that it should not agree with its cause in essence and existence. However, what we here call creation can really not be said ever to have taken place, and it is only mentioned to indicate what we can say about it, if we distinguish between creating and generating.
[Note N1]: B: I.
[Note N1]: B has or, and omits are
(1) from the infinite power of God, since in him there can be no cause by which he might have been induced to create one sooner or more than another;
(2) from the simplicity of his will;
(3) because he cannot omit to do what is good, as we shall show afterwards;
(4) because it would be impossible for that which does not now exist to come into existence, since one substance cannot produce another. And, what is more, in that case there would be more infinite substances not in existence than there are in existence, which is absurd.[N1]
From all this it follows then: that of Nature all in all is predicated, and that consequently Nature consists of infinite attributes, each of which is perfect in its kind. And this is just equivalent to the definition usually given of God.
[Note N1:] B omits this sentence.
[Note N1]: That is, whenever we make them argue from this admission, namely, that God is omniscient, then they cannot but argue thus.
[Note N1]: B: an Infinite.
[Note N1]: That is, if there were different substances which were not connected in one only being, then their union would be impossible, because we see clearly that they have nothing at all in common, it is so with thought and extension of which we nevertheless consist.
[Note N1]: That is, if no substance can be other than real, and yet existence does not follow from its essence, when it is considered by itself, it follows that it is not something independent, but must be something, that is, an attribute, of another thing, namely, the one, only, and universal being. Or thus: All substance is real, and when a substance is considered by itself its existence does not follow from its essence; therefore, no existing substance can be known through itself, but it must belong to something else. That is, when with our understanding we consider substantial Thought and [substantial] Extension, then we consider them only in their essence and not as existing, that is [we do not consider] that their existence necessarily pertains to their essence. When, however, we prove [of each] that it is an attribute of God, we thereby prove a priori that it exists, and a posteriori (as regards extension alone) [we prove its existence] from the modes which must necessarily have it for their subjectum.
(1) that part and whole are not true or real entities, but only things of reason, and consequently there are in Nature [N1] neither whole nor parts.
(2) A thing composed of different parts must be such that the parts thereof, taken separately, can be conceived and understood one without another.
Take, for instance, a clock which is composed of many different wheels, cords, and other things; in it, I say, each wheel, cord, &c., can be conceived and understood separately, without the composite whole being necessary thereto.
Similarly also in the case of water, which consists of straight oblong particles, each part thereof can be conceived and understood, and can exist without the whole; but extension, being a substance, one cannot say of it that it has parts, since it can neither diminish nor increase, and no parts thereof can be understood apart, because by its nature it must be infinite. And that it must be such, follows from this, namely, because if it were not such, but consisted of parts, then it would not be infinite by its nature, as it is said to be; and it is impossible to conceive parts in an infinite nature, since by their nature all parts are finite.[N2] Add to this still: if it consisted of different parts then it should be intelligible that supposing some parts thereof to be annihilated, extension might remain all the same and not be annihilated together with the annihilation of some of its parts; this is clearly contradictory in what is infinite by its own nature and can never be, or be conceived, as limited or finite. Further, as regards the parts in Nature, we maintain that division, as has also been said already before, never takes place in substance, but always and only in the mode of substance. Thus, if I want to divide water, I only divide the mode of substance, and not substance itself. And whether this mode is that of water or something else it is always the same.[N3]
[Note N1]: In Nature, that is, in substantial Extension; for if this were divided its nature and being would be at once annihilated, as it exists only as infinite extension, or, which comes to the same, it exists only as a whole.
But should you say: is there, in extension, no part prior to all its modes? I say, certainly not. But you may say, since there is motion in matter, it must be in some part of matter, for it cannot be in the whole, because this is infinite; and whither shall it be moved, when there is nothing outside it? Therefore it must be in a part.[N1N1] My answer is: Motion alone does not exist, but only motion and rest together; and this is in the whole, and must be in it, because there is no part in extension. Should you, however, say that there is, then tell me: if you divide the whole of extension then, as regards any part which you cut off from it in thought, can you also separate it in nature from all [other] parts; and supposing this has been done, I ask, what is there between the part cut off [N1N2] and the rest? You must say, a vacuum, or another body, or something of extension itself; there is no fourth possibility. The first will not do, because there is no vacuum, something positive and yet no body; nor the second, because then there would exist a mode, which cannot be, since [N1N3] extension as extension is without and prior to all modes. Therefore the third; and then there is no part but only the whole of extension.[N1N4]
[Note N1N1]: B omits this sentence.
[Note N2]: B: because all the parts would have to be infinite by their nature.
[Note N3]: B: when, therefore, I divide water I do not divide the substance,
but only that mode of the substance, which substance, however variously
modified, is always the same.
[Note N1]: B: And although the understanding, as the philosophers say, is a cause of its ideas, yet, since it is an immanent cause, &c.
external cause. But it is easy for us to reply to this; for we concede that, if body were a thing existing through itself, and had no other attributes than length, breadth, and depth, then, if it really rested there would be in it no cause whereby to begin to move itself; but we have already stated before that Nature is a being of which all attributes are predicated, and this being so, it can be lacking in nothing wherewith to produce all that there is to be produced.
[Note N1]: B: which may truly be called God's attributes.
[Note N2]: B: of the foregoing.
[Note N3]: B: of what we mean to say.