We arrived in Panama November 30, 1922, with one 11 months old baby and about four suitcases at least 11 years old.
We were met at Balboa by General R. E. Callan (he had been my instructor in Math at West Point, and was the best one I had ever had), who was in command of the Panama Canal Coast Artillery District, with Headquarters at Fort Amador, and who insisted that we come and stay with them until we could move into our quarters there. We discovered some months later that Mrs. Callan (they had no children) was more than surprised when we arrived with a baby -- a circumstance which she apparently had had no reason to foresee. However she was a good sport and was most hospitable to us all during our stay of perhaps a week with them.
We finally moved into a very nice set of quarters, which had been equipped with the very limited amount of QM furniture then allowed. However, we had no great worry as we expected our own furniture to arrive within a few weeks. As a matter of fact no transport arrived for over four months -- for what I suppose was a very good reason, although even at the time it was not entirely clear to me just what it was.
General Callan had graduated 4 in his class (1896) at West Point. He had a remarkably analytical mind and the ability to express himself clearly and lucidly. He was the outstanding Gunnery expert in the Army. The period of nearly three years that I spent under his command was one of the most interesting and instructive of my service.
He told me that he had assigned me to the Harbor Defenses of Balboa,with station at Fort Amador, with the idea in mind that I should become Executive Officer and should take charge of the schools for the young officers for the particular purpose of giving them a thorough grounding in Gunnery for Coast Artillery. He personally conducted a critique after each target practice and his comments on the Gunnery technique employed in the practice were an education in themselves. I prepared a booklet on Gunnery (which was later used as the basis of a similar one at the Coast Artillery School) and broadened the scope of their instruction as much as possible.
The Commanding Officer of the Harbor Defenses was Colonel John T. Geary. When I reported to him he said: " There are four or five islands, all fortified, in the Harbor Defense. I have been here only about two months and I haven't yet had time to learn what their names are. You have arrived at a very opportune time. We are to have a Tactical Inspection by the Department and District Commanders in about two weeks, and I want you to take complete charge of the preparations for this inspection."
I went out to Naos Island to inspect the Battle Command Station, which was located there. This was probably the finest fortification in the world. The island consisted of a solid rock and was about 200 feet high. A tunnel, in which was located the switchboard room and all the power plants, several hundred feet long led to an elevator which went up to the top of the island, passing the magazines which were carved out of the rock under the batteries (a 12" Gun Battery and a 12" Mortar Battery). The Battle Commander's Station was located on the flank and rear of the Gun Battery. It was a single room about ten feet square, and on the walls there were some 13 telephones, with direct lines to each searchlight, Group Commander, etc. The enlisted man in charge told me there had been no drill for several months.
When I returned to Headquarters I asked the Adjutant if there existed any Battle Orders for the Harbor Defense. He stated that he was quite sure there were some such orders, and after a long search he finally found a copy, covering about half a sheet of letter size paper, which he gave to me. There were, as I recall it, five sectors in the field of fire (Taboga, Taboga Left, etc.). There were five Battle Orders. The first one read "Battle Order No. 1. The enemy has been located in Taboga Sector. Battery Commander's Action." Battle Order No. 2 read "The enemy has been located in Taboguilla Sector. Battery Commander's Action," and so on for the remaining three sectors. This was all, in the nature of Plans, orders or doctrines for Battle Action that existed for my guidance at the tactical inspection in two weeks. I began daily communication drills to train all personnel at least in the use of the telephone; there was but little time for anything else.
I shall never forget that first Tactical Inspection. At the appointed hour the Department Commander and the Coast Artillery District Commander, each with about half a dozen staff officers, entered the station (there was Standing Room only). General Callan then handed me a sheet of legal size paper, filled with single space typing and headed "Special Situation." Since it set forth just what enemy ships were supposed to be visible from the stations, I decided that all the various commanders should be advised as to its contents, in order that if, as I expected, certain telephone lines were ruled out of action during the action, the commanders concerned could still conduct independent action. So I announced to the 13 telephone operators: "All stations prepare to copy Special Situation". Then I began reading it, a sentence or less at a time, while the 13 telephone operators repeated it. The noise and confusion during each transmission enabled me to visualize much more realistically than I had ever been able to do so before just what the Tower of Babel must have been like.
As time passed, with very lagging feet, (it must have taken ten minutes to complete the message), the perspiration began to run down my back and I heaved (mentally) a sigh of relief when quietness finally reigned in the station. While I was valiantly struggling to get a second wind I heard one of the telephone operators say, "What did you say? I can't understand you. Talk a little bit slower, etc., etc." The two Generals and their staffs were listening attentively when the telephone operator, with a look betokening great pride in his success in finally being able to understand the man at the other end of his telephone line, broke the silence that enwrapped the station, and, while everyone was listening with rapt attention, said "This here guy says to repeat that last message." I decided that the best thing I could do, under the circumstances, was not to hear the man, and fortunately, while I was doing my best not to hear him, General Callan, who entirely understood the situation, came to my rescue by giving me some further directions. I never was more embarrassed than at this Inspection. The Department Commander and his staff, however, apparently thought all the noise and confusion was normal Coast Artillery procedure and seemed to be very favorably impressed.
I made up my mind that the next Tactical Inspection would be different. The fortifications of the Panama Canal were the most modern and the most elaborate in our service. The Fire Control system, however, was basically the same as that used in the earliest days of the Coast Artillery. Thus separate and independent telephone lines ran from each command echelon to each of its lower echelons, from each station to its plotting room, and from each searchlight to its individual observation station, which controlled it. The system was entirely without flexibility. In an emergency it would be impracticable to utilize any observation station to serve the plotting room of any other battery, no searchlight could be controlled or directed by any station except the one to which it was connected by telephone, if the command post of any echelon were put out of action tactical control of the units of that echelon was entirely disrupted, and, in general, no element of the command knew what orders were being issued to any other unit. The Battle Command station was located on the rear edge of a concrete apron about 50 feet wide and one projectile ricocheting from this apron or making a direct hit on the station would have disrupted the entire tactical chain of command.
As the result of a careful study of the situation I decided that it was essential that the communications system be as flexible as possible, in order that any enemy fire might result in the minimum disruption of the tactical chain of command or in other essential communication lines. This involved practically a rebuilding of the entire communication system and the building of entirely new switchboards. The War Department Regulations provided that no change in the Fire Control installation as approved and installed could be made without specific approval of the War Department. I felt quite sure that any such radical changes as were proposed, in the latest fortification built, would not be approved, and that the funds required for the new switchboards could not be secured in the absence of such War Department approval. The Department Signal Officer, after being thoroughly briefed on the entire situation, agreed to utilize the Fire Control maintenance funds normally available to procure the slate panels, jacks, plugs, and other new parts required, and the new switchboards were constructed and installed by post labor, and the necessary changes were made in the communications themselves.
The new system allowed any line on the switchboard to be plugged in readily to any one or more lines desired. It also provided, at each echelon, a command or order net in which all commanders of subordinate units of the echelon would be, and were, connected. Thus the Battle Commander could, if he so desired, talk directly to all Group Commanders in a net, and any Action Orders to any one or more Groups would be understood by all the other Group Commanders, and in case the line from the Battle Commander's station to the switchboard were put out of service, the net of Group Commanders remained intact and the senior Group Commander could continue the action, without interruption.
Similar arrangements were made in each Group.
Concurrently with this work we were working on a simple system of four or five Action Orders which would enable the Battle or Group Commander to issue, in very few words, an order that would prescribe any kind fo fire distribution or concentration, on any number of targets, that he might desire, very much like the procedure employed for that purpose by the Navy.
All this work was completed before the time of the next Tactical Inspection, and the command was thoroughly drilled in the use of the new system.
In the meanwhile General Lassiter, one of the ablest Field Artillerymen in the Army, had become Department Commander. One night, about a month before the Tactical Inspection, we were guests of General Lassiter at dinner at his quarters at Quarry Heights, together with about half a dozen other people.
After dinner, while the men were having their coffee on the lanai, General Lassiter turned to me and asked how we were getting along in preparing for the Tactical Inspection. I told him that we had been working hard to get everything in shape. He then said, "I have witnessed a great many Coast Artillery target practices. In practically every case it has involved the fire of one battery on one target. They have done very well under these conditions. But these conditions are, in no way, similar to those that you would be confronted with in the case of action by an enemy fleet, where it would be necessary for the fire of all batteries to be distributed among the various ships of the enemy formation. I have never seen a practice where this was done, and, frankly, I don't believe it is possible for accurate fire to be delivered under such conditions." This put me on the spot before the other officers present, none of whom were Coast Artillerymen, and I felt that it was up to me to speak up for the Coast Artillery. So I brashly replied, "Well, General, I believe it can be done, and I will be personally responsible that it will be done at your Tactical Inspection if you will have the targets located within the field of fire so that simultaneous fire may be delivered by all the Groups of the command."
We then began frantically to develop an elaborate Spotting Service. Each Battery set up a terrestrial horizontal baseline, equipped for bilateral spotting direct to the Battery Plotting Room. We also got in touch with the Air Corps and got them to agree to furnish us one plane for spotting. At that time no radio had been installed in any of our planes, but there was one plane, at Panama, the pilot of which had installed some of his own equipment which, if everything went just right, would permit him to send and receive telegraph signals to and from the ground. The system that we used was that he reported, by using single letters, the distance each shot observed in sequence was over or short of the target. He made no attempt to identify the firing Battery or the caliber of the shot. His reports were received in a room where there was a man from each Battery. This man was notified by his plotting room when each shot was fired by that Battery and at the end of the time of flight he was told "Spot", at which word he reported the next spot received. At each Battery there was a Board upon which was recorded the land spot and the airplane spot for each spot, together with the correction, if any, applied as the result of the spotting. We had frequent drills with all personnel involved.
On the morning of the Inspection, at daylight our observers reported four pyramidal targets in the field of fire. The umpire advised us that these targets (which had been located, by General Lassiter's orders, so that the four groups of major caliber armament could fire at them) represented a battleship division approaching in line.
For the Inspection no one was allowed in the Battle Commander's station except me and the two telephone operators, one of whom was connected on the Group Commanders net.
Immediately upon being advised by General Lassiter as to the nature of the targets, I said, in an ordinary tone of voice, to the Order Net operator, "Action Order for Groups one, two, three and four -- Action four -- Commence Firing." In about a minute all Batteries began firing, and it was apparent to all observers that each target was under fire. At the end of about ten minutes all the firing was finished. The finish was quite spectacular as the last shot fired was a direct hit on one of the targets, which was destroyed.
This Inspection had been quite different from the preceding one, and General Callan had observed it with much satisfaction.
Immediately after the conclusion of the practice I reported to General Lassiter that the firing was completed. He replied, "I should like to inspect each Battery Commander's station to observe the records kept during the practice." In every case the Blackboard showed that every shot fired had been spotted by both the terrestrial and the aerial spotters, and that the corrections that had been applied as the result of the spotting had resulted in an excellent adjustment of fire. The odds against every shot being spotted successfully by both methods used were astronomically great, and no one was more surprised -- or pleased -- than I was, although I made no comment to General Lassiter.
He then directed that all the officers be assembled. When this was done he said, "I have stated that I did not believe it possible for the fire of all Batteries to be delivered simultaneously and to be observed and corrected effectively. I wish to say that no one could have observed this practice without being compelled to admit that it can, and has been, done today."
I have probably bored you beyond words by this long dissertation. My only excuse is that, as I look back, this was perhaps the outstanding day of my career as a Coast Artillery officer.
About this time the construction of a new 16" battery at Bruja Point was authorized, and I was President of the Board to recommend the types and locations of the Fire Control stations and searchlights (mostly on Taboga and Taboguilla Islands) and the details of the Fire Control installation. The system recommended by the Board conformed closely to that which we had recently installed throughout the Harbor Defense, and after careful consideration by the War Department it was adopted, with some minor changes, as the standard Fire Control system for future installations.
About this time also there was another interesting development. One of the General Staff officers at Department Headquarters (Colonel Mm. (sic) Ennis, a rabid Field Artilleryman, realizing that Fort Amador, one of the most desirable posts in the Army, was occupied by the Coast Artillery, while the Field Artillery was stationed at a much less desirable post in the interior of the Canal Zone, and having in mind the fact that General Lassiter had stated that he considered that any probable enemy attack on the Canal would probably be in the nature of a landing party with the mission of blowing up the locks, he recommended to General Lassiter that the Coast Artillery be replaced by Field Artillery, whose guns were more suitable for repelling a landing attack than the major caliber armament manned by the Coast Artillery. This recommendation was given serious consideration by General Lassiter, and he said something to me about it. I had previously heard of the recommendation and had been giving the matter much thought. I told General Lassiter that there existed no reason why the Coast Artillery personnel at any fixed battery should not install a battery of 155 millimeter GPF guns, or one of 75 mm. guns in the immediate vicinity of the fixed guns or the Field guns, depending on the nature of the attack, employing the same Plotting Room for both, and that we had, in reserve storage, 24 155 mm. guns and a number of 75 mm. guns which could be used for this purpose. This plan of "Dual Assignments" was adopted and I had charge of the emplacing of these guns. (On Naos Island this involved lifting the 155 mm. guns about 200 feet vertically, an operation that, with the equipment available involved some danger to the personnel involved.) In order to afford the 155 mm. guns a wide field of fire, I had constructed a concrete base which would permit a 155 mm. gun to fire readily in any desired direction. This mount, known as a "Panama mount", became standard for all 155 mm. guns in the Harbor Defenses. In might perhaps be said that in this case "necessity was the daughter of intentions" -- that is of Colonel Ennis's intentions.
In addition to my other duties I was Mine Commander throughout my stay at Fort Amador. While I was at the Torpedo Depot I had, with the approval of the Chief of Coast Artillery, had built, by the E. W. Bliss Company, twenty submarine mines of a submergence controllable type, under the patent of Captain Leon, of the Swedish Navy, to be tested for possible use at the Pacific entrance to the Panama Canal, where the daily tidal range is about eighteen feet (as compared with eighteen inches on the Atlantic side.) It was somewhat of a coincidence that it fell to my lot to be the one to make the final test on those mines. As the result of an extended test, I reported that they could not be used satisfactorily at Panama on account of the fact that in that tropical climate, in a short time marine growths attached themselves on the exposed drum on which the mooring rope was wound to such an extent as to prevent its proper functioning.
Our three years tour of duty at Fort Amador has always been remembered as about the most enjoyable of our entire service.
It was, however, saddened for me by the fact that my father, on August 16th, 1924, died, from a heart attack, while in route home, with my brother Drew, from the Mayo. Clinic, where he had gone for consultation.
Shortly afterwards (Father was buried in the Forest Park Cemetery, in Fort Smith) my brother Dan went to Fort Smith and moved my mother, with Father's books and papers, to his home in St. Helena, California. These books and papers he stored in his barn, and, some time later, the barn was burned to the ground. The books included the old Family Bible, which contained the only existing Register of Marriages, Births and Deaths pertaining to my family -- a loss that I have deeply regretted since reaching an age when such data would have been most interesting.