General Henry W. Lawton
The Philippines
March 18 -December 19, 1899
During the months of November and December of 1898, Henry Lawton had a number of discussions with General Henry C. Corbin, the army adjutant general, President William McKinley, Secretary of War Russell and others in the War Department. Those discussions had to do with McKinley's objectives in the Philippines and Lawton's responsibilities. By all published accounts and reports from the War Department, Lawton's role was to assume command of ground forces in the Philippines, freeing General Elwell S. Otis to handle his responsibilities as military governor. McKinley held to a political objective of quickly resolving the Philippine situation militarily.
Unfortunately, the quality and style of communications in Washington left a great deal to desire. Orders were issued verbally, many of a critical nature were never committed to writing and individuals were left to wonder just what their areas of responsibility were. In the case of Lawton and Otis, Lawton had what he believed to be a clear mandate to sail to the Philippines and end the military operation as soon as possible. While Otis was his boss, Otis would handle administrative and diplomatic affairs and provide Lawton with the support needed to accomplish his assignment.
Otis, like Lawton was a veteran of the Civil War and Indian campaigns in the west. A well educated man who boasted several fine achievements in his career, he nevertheless became a pompous, irritable, control conscious individual who took it upon himself to agitate the Filipinos and provoke a war. He refused to share authority and despite his years campaigning in the Western U.S., failed to comprehend the fact that conventional warfare methods would not work in the Philippines. As such, he failed to appreciate the environment in which his subordinate generals had to operate and constantly meddled in their campaigns.
Like many people of the period, Otis had a strong bias against non-white, non-Christian societies and cultures. He had written in 1878 that the American Indian was inferior to the white in morals and intelligence, and continued to believe the same of the natives of the Philippines. Otis was in agreement with McKinley's objective of subduing and civilizing the Filipinos which included their conversion to Christianity. Otis however, had his own plan for accomplishing the task and misled McKinley with his reports. As a result, McKinley believed for some time that Otis was fulfilling his responsibilities in Manila even though he was not. After a period of time, McKinley became mystified with the fact that reports from Otis were favorable yet Otis was not able to bring the 'insurrection' to an end.
When Lawton arrived in the Philippines, ready for action, Otis had nothing for him to do for a period of time. The American press reported that the President and the War Department were waiting to see just how Otis would utilize Lawton and what action they would initiate. The failure to communicate clear orders to both men resulted in a sort of fencing game between Otis and Lawton that lasted the better part of the year. Perhaps the press in Manila blew the whole matter out of proportion to the extent that the American public came to believe a real feud was taking place between the two men. Yet it was the first time in Lawton's career that he became so frustrated that he openly criticized his superior officer.
Lawton, despite the mismanagement of his assignment by McKinley, quickly gained notoriety as the 'fighting general' in the Philippines. That is not to say he was alone in achieving excellent results under duress. The press, a majority in the army, and the American public though focused on him as a man of results. In contrast, his opponents looked upon him with some dread. When Emelio Aguinaldo was asked why he referred to Lawton as "the general of the night" he responded that he had been attacked so often at night by Lawton, he "never knew when he was coming."
While dreaded by his military adversaries, Lawton was admired and respected by the people of the Philippines as he worked quickly to establish local self government units and to turn control of the areas his forces occupied over to the native people. Lawton, along with a number of forward thinking officers established counter-insurgency methods that became a basis for today's army doctrine for dealing with insurgencies.
During Lawton's service in the Philippines, General William R. Shafter retired which opened a promotion vacancy at the brigadier general level-regular army. Theories and rumors were plentiful as to who would get the promotion, two candidates being Lawton and General Arthur MacArthur. The press seemed to favor Lawton as did a good many of the fighting men in the Philippines. At the same time, since Otis 'seemed' to favor MacArthur with the 'big' missions, he was the odds on favorite in the eyes of many in the military. There was the matter of a 'slip' on Lawton's part as military governor of Santiago but that turned out to be nothing more than rumor mongering among a few Lawton detractors.
President McKinley ordered the AG's office to process the promotion for General Lawton which was a clear vote of confidence in Lawton's service and his results in the Philippines. Sadly, as the promotion was being finalized, Lawton was killed in action at San Mateo. For posterity however, the regular army star was an affirmation of his outstanding record of service to the country. Moreover, his prominence and stature was left in no doubt in judgments later made by men such as Elihu Root when he wrote:
"It(the Army) has given to the country Grant and Sherman and Sheridan and Thomas and Meade and Hancock. It has given to our later memories Lawton and Liscum and Riley. "