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There are three ways in which Church Law (also referred to as "canon law") recognizes that a true and valid marriage does
not exist in a previous union:
1) where there was a lack or defect of what is called "canonical form."
2) where there was an impediment to the marriage.
3) where there was a defect in the consent exchanged between the partners (the most significant in the majority of cases).
I. LACK OR DEFECT OF CANONICAL FORM
All persons who have been baptized in the Catholic Church, or who have been received into the Catholic Church after baptism
in another Christian denomination, and who have not left the Catholic Church by a formal act, are bound to "canonical form."
Canonical form means that the parties were married in the presence of a properly delegated priest or deacon and two witnesses,
following the rites of the Catholic Church.
Thus if a Catholic entered marriage before a justice and peace (or even before a Protestant minister) without obtaining permission
(called a "dispensation") from the bishop of the diocese, then that marriage would not be recognized as valid by the Catholic
Church because of a "lack of form." The one exception to this is marriage before a priest of an Orthodox church (e.g. a Greek
Orthodox priest). Since the requirement of canonical form is a law of the Catholic Church, it applies only to Catholics. It
is important to remember, however, that the Church recognized as valid the marriage of two persons who are not Catholic, whether
they are non-Catholic Christians or non-Christians, whether they marry in their own church or another church or with a civil
ceremony. The only requirement for the marriage of non-Catholics is that there be some legitimate ceremony, that is ceremony
which the laws of this country would recognize. Therefore, if Catholic's wedding was solely a civil ceremony, or ritual performed
in another faith without the Church's permission, then the union can be declared invalid.
II. IMPEDIMENTS TO MARRIAGE
Impediments are circumstances of a person or of the couple that mean they are not free to enter certain marriages. Impediments
exist in both canon and civil law. For example, if either party is below the minimum legal age (in canon law, this is 14 years
old for the female and 16 years old for the male; in civil law, this minimum varies according to the State and country like
the Philippines I think it's 18 and 21)at the time of the wedding, then the marriage, regardless of the couple's good intention,
remains invalid. Marriage of every close relatives by blood or by marriage we invalid unless a dispensation is given. for
example, a dispensation would not be given for a brother to marry his sister; a person cannot marry a deceased partner's parent
or child. There are about a dozen impediments noted in canon law, all of which should be reviewed by the priest or deacon
preparing a couple for marriage. The impediment of ligamen (meaning a "prior bond" exists) affects many unions. The Catholic
cannot recognize the remarriage of a person during the lifetime to a former spouse, unless the former marriage has been declared
null by an ecclesiastical tribunal or dissolved by the authority of the pope (according to certain conditions). Such an authorized
remarriage ca therefore, be declared invalid because of the impediment of a prior bond. the ecclesiastical laws concerning
impediments, therefore, protect the rights of the individuals seeking to enter marriage, as well as safeguard the Church's
teaching concerning the indissolubility of marriage.
III. DEFECT OF CONSENT
Having received the sacrament of Holy orders, bishops, priests and deacons are empowered to confer the sacraments. Ordination,
for example, requires the imposition of hands by a bishop, while bread and wine truly become the Body and Blood of Christ
at the celebration of the Eucharist through the words and actions of a priest. Baptism, while normally conferred by a priest
or deacon, can be administered by anyone in case of emergency. The sacrament of marriage, however, remains unique because
it is the one sacrament not conferred by the clergy in any circumstance. At a wedding, it is not the priest or deacon who
marries the couple, but rather the bride and groom who marry each other by their words of consent. The priest or deacon is
necessarily present as an official witness who represents the community and receives the vows of the parties in the name of
the Church. It is the consent of the couple, or their marriage vows, therefore, that makes the marriage, while the priest
or deacon serves as the necessary ecclesiastical witness. This is important to remember because no priest, indeed, no human
power can supply this consent of the bride and the groom where it is lacking. Thus, if the consent is seriously defective,
the marriage is invalid.
Unlike a lack of canonical form or the presence of an impediment, both of which can most often be proven through documents,
the defect of consent may not be immediately obvious at the time of the wedding. The question revolves around the consent,
particularly the internal consent, of the parties. Since "consent makes a marriage," that is, freely and knowingly saying
"yes" to all that marriage involves with this other person, the content of this "yes" is a key issue. To put it simply, were
the parties ready to consent, willing to consent, and able to consent?
First, when they said their vows, did both parties have sufficient use of reason to consent to marriage? if a person is incapable
of the logical thought necessary to enter into marriage (such as in epileptic seizures), then that marriage is invalid.
Second, when they said their vows, did both parties freely accept and clearly understand the lifelong commitment they were
making? Marriage is the most serious and weighty decision that a person may ever make. It is not a decision that is made immediately,
just for the present, which will eventually be discarded or forgotten. It is a lifelong choice, and in many ways both obvious
and subtle, it is different from any other decision we make routinely. In order to consent to marriage, there must be both
the freedom to consent, and some assessment of what is being consented to.
The consent must be free. Pressure, whether external (imposed from the outside by someone else in order to obtain consent,
as in the case of the so called "shotgun marriage") or internal (even where no one else is forcing a person to marry), significantly
reduces the person's freedom to consent or undermines their judgment. The classic example of this lack of freedom is the teenage
prenuptial pregnancy. The girl rightly refuses an abortion, but she does not want to give the baby up for adoption, either.
The boy feels trapped. He may have all of the right intentions (wanting to "do the right thing," to give the child a name,
etc.), but he feels that marriage is the only way out. Is this decision a free, mature choice of a lifetime partner; or is
it a hurried and pressured short-term solution to a problem?
The consent must also be an informed consent. This does not mean that a person must know ever}'thing about what he or she
is getting into when marrying. No one knows what they are getting into when they marry'. One always learns more about the
other person after marriage than before, for this is the manner in which the human personality gradually reveals itself. However,
there must he some assessment and weighing of the obligations, responsibilities and expectations of marriage before one consents.
This is not just the case with marriage in general (since, after all, no one gets married in general"), hut more importantly
with this marriage in particular; with this particular spouse. what about the consent of the teenager, infatuated with the
only person ever dated, '~in love with love" rather than with the person he or she consents to marry? This is compounded in
the case of older persons, perhaps in their 30s or more, who are not yet married and panic at the thought of becoming "old
maids:' Or consider the young person, with no critical appraisal of the character of the intended partner; and a meager appreciation
of the financial responsibilities of marriage and the burdens of parenthood. Add to these pictures, perhaps, the desperate
need to escape from an unhappy home life marred by alcoholism, quarrels and fights, or abuse. How would one assess the consent
of the man recently widowed and still grieving? Suppose he remarries in haste because he has a demanding job and is concerned
for his young children. Is he giving prudent, thoughtful consent to marrying a spouse for life, or acquiring a housekeeper
and stepmother for his children?
The judgment necessary to enter marriage is different from the judgment necessary for other actions. One may, for example,
be mature enough and responsible enough to hold down a job and fulfill basic obligations, and still not be ready to get married.
The tribunal must weigh the judgment of the parties with respect to the object of that judgment (that is, marriage), and not
be content with a general and nonspecific assessment of the maturity or immaturity of the party.
There is no automatic answer to any of these questions about the quality of the consent elicited in these examples. A more
thorough investigation on the part of the marriage tribunal may support the conclusion that one or both of the parties did
not freely, maturely and with discernment choose to marry at the time they exchanged consent externally.
Third, when they said their vows, did both parties have the personal capacity to assume and fulfill their consent, to carry
out the essential obligations of the partnership of marriage with this person? St. Thomas Aquinas enunciated the principle
on which this question is based quite briefly when he stated that "what one could not do, one did not do."
Even though a person goes through a marriage ceremony in good faith and with the very best of intentions, if that person does
not have the capacity to assume or fulfill the vows taken, then a true marriage has not come into existence. What could cause
a person to lack the capacity for marriage? This incapacity is not merely the presence of incompatibilities. No two people
are exactly identical, and it is the rarest of persons who is so mature that there are no failings or imperfections to work
through. The basically mature person tries to be honest and admit mistakes, be open to the advice of trusted friends and be
willing to receive God's grace. If this is the case even with ordinary friends, how much more is it the case with marriage!
That two people may occasionally have disagreements, or that a couple have grown apart does not necessarily mean that their
marriage is invalid, or that either of them was incapable of entering marriage.
However with some persons, psychological problems have become the compelling and motivating force of life. The sense of alienation
or inadequacy, self-depreciation, hostility, sexual problems, impulsiveness or selfishness can he pervasive and chronic. It
is most unlikely that such a psychologically burdened individual can establish and maintain the close, empathetic, cherishing
relationship with a spouse which provides for mutual growth and the proper rearing of children. To put it briefly, a marriage
can be annulled if the person entering marriage does not "have what it takes" to develop the community of life and love that
is the substance of the marital pledge.
For some time now, the Church has recognized that psychoses, and such disintegrative mental illnesses as schizophrenia and
manic depression, can so impair mental and emotional stability that one's consent to marriage lacked the necessary discernment
or capacity. More recently, using further insights, the Church acknowledges other dysfunctions of personality that may make
a particular marriage union impossible. It is impossible to make general statements about such matters, because the human
personality is so complex and the circumstances of each marriage vary widely. But with that caution, it can be asserted that
conditions such as homosexuality and alcoholism often undermine the capacity for a permanent union.
Another group of emotional disturbances are called "personality disorders". These may not show the acute episodes or the bizarre
features of psychoses, but they are marked by deeply ingrained maladaptive patterns of behavior, usually with roots in early
life, and often evident by the time of adolescence. Such persons may function quite well in their work be excellent providers,
efficient household managers, or spectacular entertainers. But they are psychologically unable to meet one essential criterion
of marriage: the close and intimate personal relationship of mutual support and affection.
In many cases, the signs of later problems were evident before the panics married, but were ignored or denied by the other
person. There was an unrealistic hope or romantic expectation that one party could "change" the other after the marriage.
This seems to be the case quite regularly where the abuse of drugs or alcohol is involved, or where there is some other form
of abuse. Yet the consent to marriage binds both of the panics together in a lifelong union that may turn into a living hell.
The stress, discord, tension, abuse and violence that is often present in these unions is hardly compatible with the Church's
definition of marriage as a community of life and love.
The precise clinical labels of these disorders is not important here, and the personality descriptions may seem harsh. Yet
they are sketches of truly handicapped persons. In their early years, often through no one's fault, they were shortchanged
on the love and stability needed for self-esteem and security, and from which later mature independence and relationships
develop. The failure of their marriages, and even their lives, is often more due to weakness than any malice.
In the exchange of consent, exclusion of any essential part of marriage also invalidates the marriage. A person who is willing
to marry, but at the same time reserves from that consent remain elements of the relationship, engages in what is known as
"stimulation." The most important reservations are the intention against having children (reserving the right to exclude children
from the marriage), the intention against indissolubility (reserving the option to divorce if things do not work out), and
the intention against fidelity (reserving the right to have sexual relations with a person or persons other than one's spouse).
Occasionally there are incidents of "total simulation," in which one of the parties goes through marriage for an extraneous
reason, or substitutes for true marriage one's own idea of marriage. This is most evident in the so-called "greencard cases;'
in which one of the parties goes through a marriage ceremony principally and directly to gain resident status in this country,
but without intending to live together permanently in a marital union.
The tribunals of the Church never seek to assign blame for the breakup of the marriage. They seek only to understand a failed
marriage and determine whether either or both parties lacked the proper consent or the ability to carry out that consent.
In this respect, the person who presents the petition for the declaration of nullity is accusing the marriage of invalidity,
rather than the other party. Unlike the Anglo-American legal system, the canonical system is not adversarial; in many cases
the petitioner's former spouse may wish the annulment as much as the petitioner does (and thus becomes, in effect, a "co-petitioner").
In each case, a tribunal seeks to understand the circumstances, both external and internal, surrounding a failed marriage
to determine whether or not a valid bond was ever established. If it has been determined that no valid marriage ever took
place, then each participant is free to marry, as long as other impediments do not exist. In some cases, a moniturn (or warning)
is placed within a decree of nullity; stating that while a certain person may be free to marry, there is concern that this
person may not have the maturity or proper state of mind to enter a marital union.
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