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This paper examines the role of the individual in the process of communication. It proceeds at that task by looking at the philosophical foundations which lead step-by-step to communication between and among the individual selves comprising human society. The nature of reality and human consciousness and the relationship between the two; the way in which concepts function; the meaning of knowledge and how it is obtained; the nature of human volition and causality; all must be established before the questions of "Why do people communicate?" and "How does that activity operate?" can be answered and understood.
A philosophical framework based on 1) an objective reality, 2) a correspondence view of truth, and 3) a discovery view of concepts is offered as one way to answer these queries. This discussion is followed by a chronological consideration of seven major theories developed from a different philosophical base and that have had a major impact on work in the field of communication. Following that presentation comes an evaluation of a number of apparent dichotomies that have plagued philosophy in general and social science in particular. After suggesting ways to resolve these seemingly contradictory views, the paper ends with a summary section describing a minority view of the communication process which builds on the philosophical perspective presented at the beginning of the discussion.
In seeking to understand communication, as with any subject, it is important to be aware of the assumptions forming the foundation for one's inquiry. The process of communication is originated and conducted by individual people. Culture, society, groups, and even dyads are, in the final analysis, nothing more than abstract descriptions of the relationships between and among the unique "selves" of single human beings. These human animals, however, communicate on a level shared by no other creatures: the conceptual level.
Conceptual thought -- cognition -- is, however, neither an irreducible primary nor a level of consciousness or process that is achieved without effort. The material providing the grist for the communication mill is processed by individual consciousnesses. The pleasures and pains, rewards and punishments that can result from communicative interactions are experienced by solitary selves. "Society" feels no discomfort during an argument that ends in screaming and tears. A "dyad" does not rejoice at the excitement of love and sexual fulfillment. The selves constituting these relationships -- the individuals who conduct these communicative exchanges -- are who reap the benefits or suffer the consequences of the communication choices they make or fail to make. No matter how close two individuals become, no matter to what the extent their lives are shared, each must ultimately think and feel and experience alone.
But what is this "material" that is the fuel for cognition? Where does it come from? How do people work this material, process it, and deliver it for consumption? Exactly how much choice does an individual self have in what it thinks, what it does, and what it feels? How are the acts of cognition and communication related? What impact do the other individuals who form a society, its culture, and its institutions have on these processes?
As is clear from study of the seven theories discussed below and the alternative given to them, the answers offered to these questions can have a profound influence on what is counted as communication, on the limits -- if any -- of what we can learn about it, on the way the phenomena of communication will be interpreted, and on the direction which should be taken in examining it. The context underlying research is often forgotten in the welter of day-to-day problems. Yet whether acknowledged or not, the too-often uncritically accepted frameworks we adopt influence how we as communicators and/or researchers conduct our lives and our work. The relationships defined by such frameworks help to direct and mold what we communicate about, how we will communicate, and how we will judge the results.
This paper will examine the linkages binding together ancient and modern thought about the world and our place in it. The divergent philosophical foundations that have arisen from such forefathers as Plato and Aristotle and that have been adopted across this span of time lead to equally distinct views concerning the nature of science, society, and self.
The acceptance of a certain metaphysical position (for example, is there such a thing as an "objective reality"?) will lead to a certain type of epistemology (what is the role of "reason" and "logic"?) which entails consequences for our understanding of ourselves, others, and the environment in which we exist. Philosophical questions about the primacy of consciousness or existence (does the world exist in us or we in it?); about the nature and validity of perception (are the objects of our knowledge constituted by our means of knowing them or is our knowledge constituted by those objects?); about the nature of truth (is it coherence among ourselves or correspondence to an objective reality?); and about the relationship between humans and causality (are we moved by "action," "motion," or neither?) will form the underpinnings for our theories of communication. Communication occurs within a context and by certain means. In reality, the nature of that context and those means will determine the nature of communication itself. Conceptually, the way we view communication is dependent upon and derived from the answers we give to the questions asked above.
To explore how these notions have affected views on the nature of the self and how that self functions in the communicative process, we will examine in the order in which they were developed seven theories of the past half century. While only two of these theories or constructs (self-monitoring and rhetorical sensitivity) were developed specifically in the field of communication, all have had a major impact on communication research. Many of the later theories build upon those that came before (for example, Rogers on Mead; Snyder on Goffman). More importantly for the purposes of this paper, all of these theories reflect the philosophical framework most prevalent in social science and communication today. These theories are: George Herbert Mead's social behaviorism and symbolic interactionism (1934), Carl Rogers's theory of self (1951, 1961), Leon Festinger's social comparison and cognitive dissonance theories (1954, 1957), Erving Goffman's dramaturgical metaphor (1959), Mark Snyder's self-monitoring concept (1974), Charles Carver and Michael Scheier's theory of self-consciousness (1977), and Roderick Hart, Robert Carlson, and William Eadie's explication of rhetorical sensitivity (1980).
In describing these theories, we will look at the ways the self is presented in relation to its environment, the metaphysical and epistemological concepts providing the basis for the theoretical claims, and the differences and similarities characterizing these conceptualizations of the nature of communication. The alternative view of these issues as offered in this paper will lead to a different and, hopefully, more consistent understanding of our selves, our place in the world, and of the communication process itself.
As noted earlier, the self is the locus of experience and analysis. All knowledge -- whether perceptual or conceptual -- is processed knowledge. On the perceptual level, the processing is done automatically by our sensory organs in combination with our nervous system and brain. These perceptions (in the physical and philosophical sense of the word) form the raw material processed on the conceptual level (Rand, 1967).
This view of perceptual awareness is a realist or causal view of perception (Kelley, 1986; Machan, 1989). (Representational and idealist views hold that our awareness is of sensory states or of consciousness rather than of objects [Peikoff, 1967].) The raw material of such awareness is provided by an objective reality, a reality that exists independently of our own existence, of our thoughts, wishes, or desires. The primacy of existence means that our consciousness is not constitutive. We do not "create" the objects of our awareness. We do not in any literal sense "construct" reality so that what exists depends secondarily upon us. Metaphysically, things simply are what they are (expressed by Aristotle's Law of Identity: A is A) (Windelband, 1901). The function of consciousness is epistemological, i.e., it is the identification of the things in reality. We all perceive the same reality. We may, however, have different interpretations of that reality (Branden, 1969; Rand, 1967).
Of course, a consciousness is also part of reality, but it is secondary to it. The content processed by consciousness ultimately originates outside of it (including bodily states). This material can be further processed and transformed by conceptual thought, but even cognition directed inward is the awareness of one's psychological actions in relationship to some external existent. These actions can be perceiving, thinking, evaluating, remembering, feeling, or imagining, but no matter how far afield such introspection may range, it is, in the last analysis, traceable to some aspect of objective reality. To remove the distinction between the perceived and the perceiver is to accept the primacy of consciousness and the subjectivity of all of our perceptions and identifications (Kelley, 1986; Rand, 1967). Such philosophers as Descartes and Kant were, perhaps, the most influential proponents of this view (Jones, 1952; Oldroyd, 1986). Descartes expressed this view in his famous quote, "I think, therefore I am." Kant believed that we could never know reality as it is and offered the distinction between the noumenal ("things in themselves") and phenomenal ("things as perceived") worlds.
Given these foundations, the discovery theory of concept formation (Kelley, 1984; Rand, 1967) states that our concepts are classifications of observed entities according to their relationships to other entities. They have their origins in real world referents. Our concepts are formed from the integration of our perceptions and thus are linked to them. Through our perceptions, our concepts are tied to objective reality. In this view, the meaning of a concept is its referents. It is, therefore, misleading to state that "meaning" is in people, not in things. The identification of what something means is a function of human consciousness, but the meaning itself of that referent is not.
This distinction is not a trivial one. To state that meaning lies within people is implicitly to endorse the primacy of consciousness and the notion that reality depends upon us. This latter view implies that there is no standard external to oneself to judge the accuracy of one's thoughts and judgments; that there is nothing "out there" to indicate when one is getting close to the truth. In contrast to a construction theory of concept formation (which states that concepts are social or arbitrary constructions) (Peikoff, 1967), a discovery view of concepts holds that the function of concept formation -- as an extension of consciousness -- is epistemological rather than metaphysical as Plato's "realist" theory of universals would state. Along with an epistemological perspective on concepts comes a view of definitions as a means of identifying and condensing our concepts rather than composing them (Kelley, 1988; Rand, 1967).
It might be argued that the whole idea of "meaning" assumes a conscious and organizing mind and that the concept of "meaning" is itself meaningless without a mind to create it; that by definition it cannot exist in things but only in persons. As alluded to above, this is view is not necessarily "wrong" but -- in discussing the nature of concepts -- it is misleading. Part of the problem arises from using the same word -- "meaning" -- as a label for related but different concepts. There is the "meaning" that some "X" has to or for someone (X's salience, relevance, and/or significance or importance to that individual; the way "X" is interpreted or analyzed); a "meaning" which can differ from person to person. For example, if spouses were to argue, the husband might see such conflict as a normal event in a relationship and think little of it while the wife might view it as behavior threatening that relationship. Two different people and perspectives; two different "meanings" regarding what happened.
The danger comes in applying this sense of "meaning" to the nature and function of concepts (as a construction view of concept formation would). If the "meaning" of concepts is not composed of those things in reality we classify in a certain way by means of those concepts but is instead merely something existing in us, our concepts are severed from any connection to reality. If the concept "apple" does not refer to the fruit we eat but instead only to some action of our consciousness, then there is no reason why one day "apple" could not "mean" something we eat and the next day "mean" something we sleep in.
If concepts (as opposed to the word or words labeling them) are merely constructions of our minds, their "meanings" become potentially as numerous as the number of minds that exist. In the event of a disagreement between any two groups of people (or even any two individuals!) as to what a "constructed concept" means, there is nothing external to oneself or other individual selves to which one could appeal for an answer as to which meaning is correct. For example, there would be no basis for saying that the Nazi concept of "justice" (which might declare that it was "just" to exterminate Jews) was any worse -- or better -- than the American concept of "justice" which holds that "all men are created equal." Only when the meanings of our concepts are tied to an objective reality is conceptual chaos avoided. Only then is it possible to make any knowledge or truth claim, at all. A construction view of concepts leads ultimately to a kind of solipsism in which concepts -- the means we use to think, classify reality, and communicate -- cease to function as a reliable framework within which to operate as individual or social beings.
As a final illustration of these conflicting views, there's an old riddle that asks, "If you were to call a tail a leg, how many legs would a donkey have?" A person who believed in a construction view of concepts would probably answer, "Five legs." Someone who believed in a discovery view of concepts would answer, "Four legs. It doesn't matter if you call a tail a leg. It's still a tail." Or as Aristotle might say, "A is A. A thing is what it is" -- independently of human consciousness.
The principles of an objective reality and a discovery theory of concept formation in conjunction with a realist view of perception require a correspondence view of truth where truth is seen as an identification of the facts of reality within the total context of one's current knowledge. (In contrast, the coherence view of truth holds that we say something is "true" if it is merely consistent with ideas the majority of people believe [Oldroyd, 1986; Tomlin, 1963].) This identification is accomplished and validated by a process of reason using the principles of logic (resting on the Law of Identity). These principles, in turn, were originally discovered/identified by a conceptual analysis of the direct perception of reality. They are true because they are inherent in the nature of reality and constitute the basis for any understanding. They are epistemological primaries that are not "logically" provable since they form the foundation for all logical proofs (Peikoff, 1967; Rand, 1967). Again, the touchstone is objective reality.
In a sense, no one "decides" what is true or false. Reality simply "is." It is the (often difficult) task of people to observe and to identify what is there. Metaphysically, the final arbiter is reality; epistemologically, it is one's own mind. To identify accurately what "is" requires processing the contents of consciousness by a process of reason in accordance with logic. Thus objectivity refers both to the nature of metaphysical reality and to proper epistemological identification (Rand, 1986). In this context, to say that "X" is true is equivalent to saying that "X" exists (that it "is"). To say that "X" is false is equivalent to saying that "X" does not exist (that it "is not").
Misidentification of some part of reality may occur due to false premises, incomplete knowledge, or a fault in one's logical argument. But the existence of error presupposes the notion that there does, in fact, exist something independent of our identification that serves as a standard for judging when our identification is incorrect.
Since people are neither omniscient nor infallible (if they were, there would be no need for reason or logic), all knowledge is contextual in nature. "Noncontradictory identification" means that there is no contradiction with any available empirical evidence or logical extensions of that evidence. Because of this fact, it is important in any attempt to reach a knowledge claim that there be no context-dropping or evasion of any relevant knowledge one already possesses. (The contextual nature of knowledge assumes a crucial role when one seeks to increase one's understanding of others or to get them to understand oneself through a process of communication. Each individual's perspective and personal context forms a part of the overall communication context and thus must be taken into account if one desires to achieve one's communicative goals.) Gaining knowledge requires that any person seeking such an end must decide to focus his/her consciousness on the goal of full, conceptual awareness (Rand, 1967). As will be shown below, the very nature of human consciousness will provide us with the answer to the question, "Why do people communicate?"
It is the decision to focus (or not) -- the fundamental choice underlying all others -- that forms the essence of human volition (Branden, 1969; Rand, 1961). Free will is not the ability to take any action we want. It is not even to think anything we want. It is the choice we make whether to evade knowledge available to us -- to ignore the full context of our knowledge -- or to set ourselves the purpose of grasping to the full extent possible all the relevant facts of internal and external reality according to the principles of reason and logic. We can listen to our emotions, our "intuition" or hunches, but those indicators are signposts only. Only logic and reason can provide us with conceptual knowledge; can determine whether or not our emotional responses or half-formed impulses are truly consonant with reality.
Here, also, is the root of human causality, that is, the kind of causal principle applicable to human actions. Inanimate objects only react to forces around them. Animals can originate a process of physical motion. Humans, however, can originate a process of conceptual thought (Branden, 1969). Human behavior is not deterministically set by external forces or even by the biological processes of our minds (the "motion" view of human behavior). Nor is it non-causal and divorced from any natural regularity or principles (the "action" view of behavior) (Harré, 1985; Littlejohn, 1983).
Volition does not violate the concept of causality. As indicated earlier, it is a type of causality, the type unique to human beings. The nature (or identity) or an entity determines what it can or cannot do. For human beings, this ultimate freedom resides in the choice to focus (Peikoff, 1967; Rand, 1964). Humans cannot violate the laws governing the physical world nor can they violate the principles governing the functioning of their own minds (Branden, 1969). The nature of human consciousness requires that we use reason and logic in order to survive and function properly. But since reason, logic, and abstract thought do not operate automatically but need to be initiated and sustained by an act of will, we are free to choose whether or not to focus and function on a fully conceptually level. But we are not free to escape the psychological consequences of any decision to engage in evasion or context-dropping.
Given these facts about human consciousness, successful human action requires the widest integration possible. Communication is one tool we possess to accomplish the goals we set ourselves. Communication is, therefore, the consequence of our cognition and concept-formation, not a cause of them. Cognition precedes communication (Rand, 1967). The better the cognition, the better the communication is likely to be.
Another way to look at this proposition is to ask, "Why do people communicate?" or "What is the cause of human communication?" In order to answer these questions, one must consider what it is about humans that leads to the consequence of communication (Madden, 1988). To do this, one must ask what it is about the nature or identity of human beings which is most relevant or important, i.e., what is the essential characteristic(s) of humans that epistemologically explains the most about them and metaphysically makes the greatest number of other characteristics possible. The identity of an entity determines what it can or cannot do. Casuality is the Law of Identity applied to action (Rand, 1961). For humans, the conditions meeting the above criteria and separating us from other animals are that we possess volitional consciousnesses operating on the conceptual level and requiring the use of reason or rationality to function properly (Adler, 1990; Branden, 1969; Rand, 1967).
Communication requires a common frame of reference. This frame of reference is an objectively perceivable reality. To deal with this reality, we use concepts (i.e., classifications of observed entities according to their relationships to other entitites) tied to reality by means of our perceptions. As an extension of consciousness, concepts thus function in an epistemological capacity. They provide us with a mental context for grasping and classifying the aspects of reality we observe (Kelley, 1984; Rand, 1967).
Language provides us all with perceptual concretes (i.e., words) we use as shared symbols to denote these concepts and to implement this common system of classification. Language is thus a conceptual tool in much the same way that concepts are a tool of cognition, i.e., concepts are the means by which our type of consciousness classifies reality, and language is the particular means we have agreed to use in labelling and representing those concepts. Communication -- whether verbal or nonverbal -- presupposes something to communicate. For humans, that "something" (whether in full awareness or not) is organized by our concepts (Rand, 1967). As mentioned earlier, cognition (on some level) comes prior to an act of communication. We can have cognition without language, words, or communication (for example, "knowing" something but not having the words -- labels -- to describe that knowledge adequately), but we cannot use language, words, or communication without cognition. It is through communication that we share our thoughts with others. The other -- important! -- functions of communication such as permitting social interaction come secondarily to this primary purpose (Madden, 1988) .
One goal of communication is to influence those around us. While the idea of social influence is usually applied at a group or mass level, it has direct relevance to and importance on the dyadic level. Many studies of social influence utilize the concepts of expectancies and values. If taken to include processes occurring on subconscious as well as conscious levels, these expectations (about what actions are possible to us and what the results of such actions are likely to be) and the evaluations we make of them as to their (intensity of) positive or negative impact upon us, these expectancies and values can explain any human behavior above the reflexive level.
There are a number of assumptions about human behavior serving as the foundation for these concepts of communication and social interaction. They include:
1. People have a frame of reference for interpreting specific relationship events and for choosing how to respond to those events.
2. People differ in their sensitivity to both internal states and external situational factors. They also differ in their ability and desire to bring aspects of their inner and outer worlds into focus or awareness.
3. People differ in their ability and desire to recognize logical relationships among life events and to reconcile apparent or real incongruencies and contradictions among those events, i.e., to achieve an integration of those events.
4. People evaluate and rank objects, events, and persons in terms of perceptions of the benefit or detriment to self of those objects, events, and persons.
5. A person's tendency to react in accordance with habituated responses changes in a curvilinear way according to the level of experienced stress, i.e., the tendency to engage in an habituated behavior is greatest at low and high levels of stress. (Madden, 1989)
As we shall see, explanations as to how these assumptions are actualized and their relative importance in the realm of human interaction differ according to the theory considering them. The general philosophical framework evident in the seven theories discussed in the next section is representative of the mainstream of thought in the social sciences regarding the relationships existing among individuals, the stimuli to which they are exposed, and the nature of their subsequent cognitions and communication. As will be evident to the reader, these theories differ to greater or lesser degrees with the foundations for communication presented above and that will be summarized in the final section. By the conclusion of this paper, the reader will be in a position to compare these two divergent positions/frameworks and decide for him- or herself which better describes the way the world, people, and communication work.
In Mind, Self, and Society (1934), George Herbert Mead's views on the relationship between the individual and society were presented posthumously. His observations and conclusions have exerted considerable influence in the realm of the social sciences. His assumptions have found their way into the work of a host of subsequent scholars.
For Mead, there was no such thing as a mind independent of society. Indeed, he believed that the existence of a social context was essential for the very existence of the mind and the self of the individual. Though he envisioned the development of the self as interdependent with and inseparable from society, in many ways his work leads to the primacy of society over the self.
In seeking to understand human social behavior, Mead contended that it was improper to consider people as mere reactors to external stimuli as the strict behaviorists would have us believe. People have intentions that influence their actions and it is impossible to deal adequately with those actions if one refuses to study -- let alone acknowledge -- the consciousness each of us possesses as a human being.
According to Mead, what distinguishes people from animals is not consciousness, as such, but rather the kind of consciousness we have. That essential difference is our ability to engage in reflective thinking. This includes the capacity to break away from the constraints of the present and to envision the future as it might be. Such an ability is crucial for the perspective taking that forms the basis for social cooperation. Social acts involve actions taken by an individual, the responses that behavior elicits from the other who receives it, and the perceptions of each actor concerning those actions. To engage in this process effectively requires that possible (future) responses be anticipated and dealt with according to the demands of the situation.
It is through communication that we carry out these actions. Mead held that not only communication, but our very thought processes require the use of symbols. The interpretation of these symbols constitutes the essence of communication. When we share meaning, we are making use of what Mead termed a significant symbol, that is, we are aware of the meaning that a symbol holds for the other person(s) with whom we are communicating.
It is during communicative interaction that one's self is developed. That self is perceived indirectly from the views of other people in the group(s) in which we exist daily or in society as a whole. This generalized other -- the collective viewpoint of a social group or community -- provides us with a vision of how others see us, or in Mead's terminology, creates the "me" of the self. The roles we take in society -- the view we hold of how others see us -- lead to the particular concept of self we adopt. Mead contends, however, that this does not lead to a deterministic view of human behavior. There is still the "I" which can resist the socially derived view and provide us with the qualities of imagination, creativity, and unpredictability. People are free to respond in ways inconsistent with societal norms.
Still, it is language that permits the coordination of that social activity without which we could not exist. For Mead, the primary function of language is initiation of that social action. The objects forming the content of our language do not exist apart from people and their definitions of the ways those objects can be used now and in the future. The symbols we use and the processing by and the interaction of those symbols in human consciousness are what make objects what they are. "Things" (the real) and the meanings we assign to them are, according to Mead, social constructions. Every perception involves an attitudinal component that helps to create the meanings providing the means for human communication. Our concepts thus indicate the meanings which elements of a class have for us as perceivers.
Carl Rogers was influenced by Mead's framework and presented his own theory of self in Client-Centered Therapy (1951) and On Becoming a Person (1961). For Rogers, the most important reality for the self is the one that is perceived rather than any notion of an "objective" reality existing independently of the individual. It is this internal "reality" that provides the most direct linkage to one's resultant behavior.
According to Rogers, the totality of one's experience equals the phenomenal field which provides the basis for one's existence. The "self" is formed by the perception of an "I" or "me" as a part of that phenomenal field. Along with this differentiation comes an awareness of that self in relation to the rest of that field (including one's physical and social environment), and the values attached to those factors. Rogers believes we each have a perception of our actual self and also of an ideal self or that self we would like to be and which we feel we should be.
In Rogers's view, human behavior is goal-directed. The ultimate goal we are naturally moved to pursue is self-actualization or an increase in personal autonomy and growth; a realization of our potentials as human beings. (The notion of self-actualization was developed in greater detail by Maslow [1970].) Rogers believed that this natural progression can only occur, however, given certain conditions. These requirements include: the presence of unconditional affection from those with whom we interact; the acceptance of one's self along with holding to internal standards of judgment regarding one's self; and a permissive environment that will encourage one's actions and journey towards self-actualization. When these conditions hold, there will be a congruence between one's conscious self and the phenomenal field within which one exists. Without this consistency, we will suffer from stifled growth and psychological distress.
In order to overcome inconsistent or contradictory views we have collected and to help others overcome their own difficulties in this realm, we need to communicate with our partners in a non-judgmental, positive fashion and have them reciprocate in their own communicative interactions with us. Rogers maintained that doing so will not only allow us to accept ourselves more easily and smooth the path towards self-actualization, such an approach to communication will also encourage us to accept others more readily, as well. Greater empathy and understanding and diminished defensiveness will result from such a view of our selves and the others who engage with us in interpersonal interactions. Our relationships will exhibit increased mutual satisfaction and more accurate communication along with greater individual psychological adjustment.
Leon Festinger's development of social comparison theory (1954) and cognitive dissonance (1957) has had a major impact on the field of communication (Berger & Metzger, 1984). Like Rogers, Festinger's views of the relationship between self and others echoes the positions offered by Mead.
According to Festinger, all people experience a drive to have their opinions and abilities judged by others. By seeking a social comparison for our views, we are asking the people with whom we communicate to evaluate the beliefs we hold and the kinds of actions we feel lie within our capacity to perform.
The ultimate self-evaluations at which we arrive are formed by comparing our selves to those others around us. It is by means of verbal and nonverbal communication that this process occurs. In carrying out this judgment, Festinger believes that we choose others who are similar to ourselves and who will thus be most useful and/or informative in helping us arrive at our goal. In a fashion similar -- though not identical -- to Mead, then, he contends that "who we are" is primarily a result of the social groups in which we exist. The final source of validation of our image of self resides not in our selves but in others.
In order to smooth this process, we tend to avoid situations where others very dissimilar to us are present. Festinger feels that people need to have consistency in their thoughts. When we think or feel something that does not fit within the framework which has been created during the process of our socially constructed self, dissonance occurs and results in psychological discomfort. This dissonance functions as a motivator inducing us to act to reduce that dissonance in some way or to avoid entirely the situation and/or people creating the discrepancy we find so disturbing.
While Festinger acknowledges the importance of a physical, social, or psychological reality to which we try to map our thoughts, the dissonance and consonance he speaks of is concerned first and foremost with our own attitudes and thoughts and not with any kind of objective reality. Cognitive dissonance serves primarily as a motivator to reduce the inconsistencies we are experiencing and not as a way to bring our thoughts and attitudes into correspondence with reality.
Erving Goffman (1959) developed his dramaturgical (theater) metaphor of human communicative interaction within the tradition of role theory. This framework operates from the premise that, like actors, we each play many roles during the course of our social encounters. And also like actors, the role we present may not accurately reflect who we really are. The way we present ourselves varies considerably according to the different situations in which we find ourselves. The kind of role we will adopt is determined according to the kind of audience in front of which we are "performing."
In any such encounter, we need to accomplish two goals: to present to the other person(s) information about ourselves and, likewise, to gain information about those others. According to Goffman, it is this that forms the function of communication. We observe behavior and are observed as we stride across the ever-changing stage upon which we live.
Our performances are, in essence, instances of impression management, that is, efforts to control the impressions people have as to what we are "really" like. In doing so, we may frequently be called upon to act in ways inconsistent with how we actually feel. Curiously, though, Goffman also believes that that "self" is, in fact, determined by the presentations we make; that it is a product of the scene we act out and does not cause that scene itself.
Given this perspective, Goffman links the individual to the community by postulating that society itself arises from the maintenance of a definition of a scene and the place one experiences within it. The role one offers is thus simultaneously a function of one's own definition of the situation and also how others view one's proper role within that scene. Those others will resist any attempt on our part to escape from the confines of the role in which we are cast. To succeed in such an attempt should, according to Goffman, result in not only disruption of society but of our own sense of self. Our frontstage behaviors are those we offer in situations that are less intimate and carry more risk of negative response to unexpected actions on our part. In contrast, backstage behaviors occur in more secure environments, usually with those with whom we are intimate. They might be considered more "natural," yet given Goffman's contention that there is no true, ultimate self, by what standard could one determine which behaviors were "natural" and which "artificial"?
Snyder's (1974) construct of self-monitoring was developed with specific reference to the monitoring of expressive behavior and self-presentation. In this way, it is very similar to Goffman's efforts. According to Snyder, people differ in the degree to which they can observe and control these actions of self. Concern for the social appropriateness of one's behaviors varies across individuals and leads to differential reliances on social cues as guides on how to respond in a particular situation. The original presentation of this construct contrasted self-monitoring with non-self-monitoring people. The former is now identified as a high self-monitor. The latter type of person is designated a low self-monitor.
A high self-monitor is highly attuned and responsive to the cues of other people and uses those interpersonal and social signals to determine how best to manage his or her own presentation. This orientation is primarily a pragmatic or strategic one (McCann & Higgins, 1988). In addition to a focus on the actions of other people and a desire to mesh with those people, a high self-monitor may strive to fit a prototypic image that is elicited by a certain situational categorization (Cantor, 1981; Cantor, Mischel, & Schwartz, 1982). The behavior of such people should show considerable cross-situational inconsistency as the cues attended to by the high self-monitor change according to the altering contexts.
In contrast to this, low self-monitors exhibit behavior that is relatively stable from situation to situation. In determining appropriate actions, they look to themselves first. Such people see themselves as principled individuals who seek correspondence between their public behaviors and their visions of their inner selves and attitudes (Gollwitzer & Wicklund, 1985; Snyder, 1981). They are less concerned with the social consequences of their actions (Berger & Roloff, 1982) and may rely on a schema which says that they will do something only if they feel like doing it (Kruglanski & Klar, 1985).
One question that arises in regard to high versus low self-monitors is whether or not high self-monitors are simply better, more competent communicators than low self-monitors. (The debate over the nature of "competence" -- whether it should be judged from the perspective of the individual or according to the attributions made by others -- will have to be referred to another forum.) Some authors would answer in the affirmative (Athay & Darley, 1982; Berger & Douglas, 1982) and describe low self-monitors as lacking a wide range of social skills (Giles & Street, 1985). Snyder is equivocal on this issue. In the original conceptualization (Snyder, 1974), he indicates that low self-monitors do not have well-developed skills for monitoring self and others. A more recent description of the low self-monitoring construct (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986) suggests another alternative: that there is a lack of motivation rather than a deficient ability that explains the behavior of a person with this orientation. The distinction between unmotivation to perform a specific behavior and an inability to engage in that behavior is not trivial. Studies by Shaffer, Smith, and Tomarelli (1982) and Shaffer, Ogden, and Wu (1987) indicated that both high and low self-monitors are equivalent in the accuracy of their assessment of the intimacy and openness of a partner's self-disclosures. Thus each type of person processes the available social cues in similar fashions but uses that information in dissimilar ways due to their divergent motivations.
While the differences between high and low self-monitors have considerable empirical support (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986), Snyder's failure to more fully highlight and develop the distinction between motivation and ability in his construct's description echoes a similarly fuzzy and confusing usage of his original nomenclature. As Carver and Scheier (1981) point out, high self-monitoring involves as much (if not more) monitoring of the environment as of self. The self that high self-monitors are actually focusing on is a public self presented for the benefit of others. Following Snyder's views, low self-monitors should monitor their (inner) selves as much if not more than so-called high self-monitors in order to accomplish their goal of portraying to others who they actually are.
A more accurate nomenclature reflecting the behaviors of such people might substitute high other-monitors for high self-monitors and switch high self-monitors to those currently called low self-monitors. The other-directed focus of the high self-monitor in determining appropriate social behavior was anticipated by Rand (1943, 1961, 1964) who coined the term second-hander to describe those whose source of motivation for action resides in other people's behaviors and attitudes. In a similar vein, Branden (1969) developed the idea of social metaphysics to cover people whose behavior results primarily from the expectations, values, and demands of others. These others become the reality (form the metaphysics) of these social metaphysicians. While these are more apt labels, given the longevity of the self-monitoring construct, the confusing labels of high and low are probably here to stay.
While more psychologically oriented then the self-monitoring construct, self-consciousness (Carver & Scheier, 1981) offers a similar yet more complex view of the relationship between self and environment. Self-consciousness is the general disposition an individual has to be attentive to the self. It is composed of two aspects of awareness and one of response to that awareness. Private self-consciousness deals with one's awareness of one's inner thoughts, emotions, and motivations. Public self-consciousness reflects one's tendency to attend to the self as an object of public awareness and how one is viewed by other people. Carver and Scheier consider these to be distinct dimensions. One could be high or low on either one or both private and public self-consciousness.
The third aspect of this self-consciousness concept is social anxiety. This refers to one's reaction to being focused on the self, especially when that focus is on one's public self.
For Carver and Scheier, one's perception of the environment is what is represented in consciousness rather than that environment itself. Self perception results from a focus inward on one's self. They find this somewhat problematic since the distinction between environmental and self focus is, in their view, blurred because awareness of the external world is determined to an extent by what stored records we possess in consciousness; that is, perception of what something is (environmental focus) is intrinsically bound with the implications for self (self-focus) of what is perceived. Their approach to dealing with this conceptual blurring is a pragmatic one. They simply accept that the distinction exists and move on from there.
In the field of communication, Hart, Carlson, and Eadie's (1980) conception of rhetorical sensitivity (building on the work of Hart and Burks, 1972) combines concern for self, other, and situation in determining communication choices. Rhetorical sensitives recognize that their communication partners possess complex personalities; are flexible in their responses; are highly conscious of the parameters of an interaction; are aware that not all ideas or feelings should be communicated; and are tolerant of the fact that different individuals prefer different ways of communicating the same ideas.
Hart, Carlson, and Eadie also make use of two other types of communicators described by Darnell and Brockriede (1976). Noble selves are those who will not deviate from their personal positions in order to accommodate the needs of others in a communicative situation. Rhetorical reflectors are essentially the polar opposite of the noble selves. Rhetorical reflectors offer a different self for every new person and every new situation.
Hart, Carlson, and Eadie see the construct of rhetorical sensitivity as one primarily of role taking. For them, there does not exist any single, "real" eternal self. The situation or context calls forth different aspects of one's personality. In a way, there is no "I" to which one can point. It is the act of communication that largely defines who we are and the behaviors we will perform. In fact, one of the most important aspects of the construct of rhetorical sensitivity is acceptance of Goffman's notion of interaction consciousness. It is that awareness which guides action and expression of self.
One of the appealing aspects of rhetorical sensitivity is that it is one of the few constructs regarding the self in this field developed exclusively from communicative assumptions.
As a comparison of the framework presented at the beginning of this chapter with the eight theories subsequently discussed indicates, there is a considerable divergence between them in regard to the nature of perception, the criteria for knowledge, the relationship between the individual and others, and the characteristics of the communicative process. To a considerable extent, these differences result from a number of dichotomies that have been placed in opposition throughout the course of recorded philosophy.
Rationalism holds that we can gain knowledge of the world simply by "reflecting" on the logical connections among selected propositions. In contrast, empiricism contends that the only things we should consider in deciding what we know are those aspects of the world that are directly observable. For example, since we cannot directly see "personality" or "attitudes," we should not even use them in our discussions of human behavior.
In effect, this results in a split between our minds and our bodies. One school maintains that only logic and one's mind are necessary to gain knowledge. The other camp believes that nothing which our bodies cannot directly perceive through one of our senses should be admitted to any study of what is known.
In contrast, the framework offered at the beginning of this chapter maintains that there is no split between one's mind and body. Each is necessary for successful inquiries into the nature of the universe. Similarly, there is no dichotomy between logic and empirical data. The latter forms the foundation for our knowledge, but by using the method of logic, our rational minds can extend what is observable through our senses into highly abstract realms and admit to knowledge things which can never be directly observed. But given an ultimate connection to an objective reality and sensory data and with the proper use of logic, these unobservables are just as real as any rock we can heft or facial expression we can see.
Many philosophers and social scientists maintain that what we know is nothing more than a matter of human agreement. "Knowledge" is what we say it is. It can vary from one society to another in a relativistic way. Each is said to be equally valid. On the other hand, some say that knowledge is only that known with eternal certainty and fitting into a perfect, logical hierarchy. Since there is very little meeting these criteria, again we are left with a vast amount of information we use which we cannot be said to "know."
The integrative framework presented here, however, would state that such views ignore the nature of human consciousness and cognition. Knowledge is not relative, but it is contextual. This means that in making a judgment as to what qualifies as knowledge and what of that knowledge can be said to be known with certainty, we must consider the widest context available at the time to us. Nothing relevant must be ignored or evaded in making such decisions. To require that to be accepted as knowledge, something must be eternally unchangeable and known with perfect certainty is to accept the criteria of omniscience and infallibility as the measure of knowledge. Yet people are neither. If human knowledge is to have any meaning, it must be considered in human terms. Knowledge must be contextually absolute but not relative and mutable when shifting among concurrent perspectives.
Probably all of the theorists presented in this chapter would accept the notion that "objectivity" does not exist, or if it does, we cannot know it since we each experience it through means of our unique, subjective viewpoint and through the supposed "filter" of our senses. Thus, the subjective becomes the ultimate fodder for their research and discussions.
Yet there is no reason to suppose that because our sensory apparatus does not perceive everything about the universe or that we can make errors in interpreting the information our senses offer us that what we do perceive is invalid or unreliable or that we must be in error in the evaluations we make of what we perceive. The "objective" does not equate with the "observable." A non-public, nonobservable viewpoint can be as objective as any consideration of some physical phenomenon (Branden, 1969). The criteria for determining objectivity remain the same. Despite the positions of the majority of social scientists, we are aware of the world and not the means by which we perceive that world.
Our subjective experiences are simply one aspect of an objective world; one more set of factors that must be considered in providing us with that widest perspective which will give us the basis for making knowledge claims about ourselves, our fellow humans, and the universe in which we exist. The subjective viewpoints people bring to their encounters with the realms of the physical and the social -- whether those orientations correspond with known facts or evade, ignore, or distort them -- those subjective evaluations, judgments, and interpretations are themselves objective facts of reality. As such, they must taken into consideration if one hopes to obtain any reasonably accurate and complete understanding of communicative exchanges.
It is frequently asserted that there is an inescapable tension between rationality/logic and emotions; that emotions are inherently "illogical" and "irrational." Yet emotions are not primaries. An emotion is "an automatic psychological response, involving both mental and physiological features, to our subconscious appraisal of what we perceive as the beneficial or harmful relationship of some aspect of reality to ourselves" (Branden, 1983, p. 142). An emotion is a value response, a type of judgment or discrimination. As such, it is the result of a process of thought (on some level). The (conscious or subconscious) thought processes leading to an emotional reaction may be rational/logical or not, but the emotion itself simply is. To change an emotion requires a rethinking of our evaluation (for example, convincing oneself -- over a period of time! -- that as an adult there is no need to continue being afraid of a dictatorial parent). To suppose that there is an adversarial relationship between rationality/logic and emotion is to misconstrue the role of emotion as a primary motivator of human behavior and interaction.
Following from the points made above is the often stated position that bias is inevitable and must necessarily interfere with or distort an attainment of the "truth" (however that is defined). Related to this is the question of whose perspective we should, as researchers, "believe" when studying human behavior: one partner or the other or our own as a third party and outside observer.
Again, the dilemmas offered are false ones. If one accepts the notion that knowledge is determined by the widest context available, then the perspectives of all participants in a communicative exchange must be considered if we are to understand the interaction to the fullest extent possible. We may not possess all the information, but that does not necessarily invalidate the facts we do possess and the inferences we can make from those facts. Nor does having a "bias" or viewpoint automatically negate the truth of what we say or believe. Neither does it inevitably prevent us from recognizing the truth about ourselves or others.
Sensory data, logic, the contextual nature of knowledge, the relationship between reason and emotion, objectivity and subjectivity: in order to understand human behavior in general and communication in specific, all of these must be considered and integrated to the largest extent possible.
Given the points made above, the process of human behavior and communication -- from stimulus to interaction -- can be seen to require consideration of five areas or stages. On a simple level, these stages would operate in a linear fashion. However, in most normal human interaction, feedback loops can and do alter the flow of the process and perhaps even short-circuit it before action occurs. For ease of understanding, one complete cycle will be discussed. (This discussion owes much to Miller, Wackman, Nunnally, and Saline, 1982.)
The first step is the gathering of sense data that are organized into our perceptions (in the physical sense of the term). This can include information external to ourselves as well as data regarding our own internal states. This forms the "what" which will be further processed.
The second step involves the thoughts or interpretations we make about what we have perceived: what does this sense data mean? This is when we engage in identification of some aspect of reality, and it is here that the "how" of our conceptual knowledge enters in, i.e., the role of reason and logic.
The third step is an evaluation of what we have identified as to whether it is good or bad for us along with some judgment as to intensity. The result of this evaluation is some type of emotional response (that includes both physiological and psychological components). Inherent in the experience of emotions is an action tendency (to avoid or approach the object of evaluation).
This leads to the fourth step or the formation of intentions (as understood in a broad sense to include our wants and goals as well as our desires for self, other, and relationship). These intentions can be very specific goals or more general plans of action.
The fifth step deals with actions we take to actualize or achieve our intentions. In seeking a highly integrative perspective, one would consider past, present, and possible future actions.
While these five steps are presented as a linear process, most behavior and communication will operate within this framework with feedback among the various steps. In addition, some stages will receive more emphasis or be more in awareness than others.
Step 1 follows from the fact that consciousness requires awareness of an external reality. Information about that reality is provided by means of our senses. Step 2 follows from the epistemological nature of consciousness, i.e., we use our consciousness to identify the objects of our awareness. Step 3 reflects the fact that we need to evaluate the positive or negative aspects of reality and assign some intensity to that evaluation in order to decide whether those aspects of reality are supportive or diminishing of our lives. Since emotions operate as motivators, Step 4 follows as we decide on the goals our emotions urge us to obtain and the actions necessary to achieve those goals and satisfy our desires. While Step 5 may not always occur (i.e., we may fail to take the actions required to reach our goals), there are many actions which must be taken in order simply to ensure survival and growth. Awareness of this stage would include one's past, current, and possible future actions.
Difficulties in communication may occur when someone is not properly aware of one or more of these steps that lead to some particular communication (i.e., action). For example, failure to be aware of or understand the sources of one's own emotions may result in an incorrect communication choice, or, failure to be aware of or to state the perceptual evidence for one's interpretations (when relevant) may result in the misunderstanding of one's communication on the part of the receiver. Effective communication is more likely to occur when one has appropriate awareness and use of all of these five stages.
A person with a highly integrative perspective (Madden, 1989) is one who takes into consideration as many relevant present, past, and future factors as possible and necessary in deciding what action to take in any given situation. These factors include one's own perspective, that of the partner, and those of relevant third parties (as well as facts about the physical world in which we exist). The more accurately the relevant/necessary factors are identified and the more fully they are integrated into a consistent, noncontradictory whole, the more likely one will be to achieve success in communication.
Such a process is not easy to practice nor is the resultant value easy to achieve. Yet those very facts should make their attainment all the more precious to us. Whatever the consequences of our actions, it is our individual selves which must choose and hold the ultimate responsibility as the prime causal movers in our lives. For it is only our selves that make human interaction possible and which are capable of experiencing the pleasures that can come from this highest form of interaction.
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