Another Fine Mess We've Gotten Into:
What to Do With Yugoslavia

"Listen, your friends have been broken
  They tell us of your poison; now we know.
  Kill them! Give them as they give us,
  Slay them! Burn their children's laughter on to hell."
                -"The Gates of Delirium", Jon Anderson, Yes

"Somewhere in history, you were wronged . . .
 Tell all your family, tell all your friends
 Teach your children to avenge . . .
 It carries on."
            -"A Few Words for the Dead", Steve Hogarth, Marillion
 

Well, finally with a little chance to think about something other than law, I can turn my attention to what is going on in Yugoslavia.  As an historian it would probably benefit me to do some research into the area, but I don't have the time.  I have a general idea of what had gone on there, so I hope my opinions are somewhat informed.  I've divided this up into four sections, each addressing a different issue.  Without further ado . . . 
I.  Should we be there?

Some people no doubt consider this to be a moot point, and in terms of preventing anything that's been caused by our intervention they're correct.  However, that doesn't mean we shouldn't examine the situation completely. 

I personally think that we should not have begun this bombing campaign, at least not yet.  It appears that we went in before we really knew why and without any real plan.  I can think of at least one option that could have and indeed should have been considered.  Would it have worked?  Maybe, maybe not.  But it would have been worthwhile to try, even if it only gave NATO more time to plan its campaign. 

The option I can imagine is a truly effective embargo plan which could have been imposed on Yugoslavia.  There are UN sanctions in effect, but they've been largely ineffective.  Of course, there's no one on the borders trying to keep stuff out!  Through the UN, agreements should have been struck with Yugoslavia's neighbors to allow troop from UN nations to effectively seal Yugoslavia off from the outside world. 

How would we get their cooperation?  If there's one things the nations around Yugoslavia is they are all unstable and poor.  UN aid to help prop up their economies, and thus also those in power, would probably offset any fear of retribution from Yugoslavia.  Besides, with troops all around, and a credible threat of using those troops to hit back if attacked, Milosevic would probably not be disposed to strike outside his borders. 

A second component to this blockade/embargo would be a serious public relations blitz.  I hate to say "propaganda" because that implies lies and bullshit, which I do not advocate.  Instead, ring Yugoslavia with broadcast towers capable of beaming the BBC and CNN directly into Yugoslavia.  Such over the air broadcast would be hard to prevent.  Using the Net would be a good idea as well, but I'm not sure how that would work.  Hopefully, armed with information about what really goes on in Kosovo, the Yugoslav people themselves will finally get fed up with Milosevic and get rid of him.  Until public will turns against him, NATO has no chance of a successful resolution to this crisis. 
 

II.  Are we there for the right reasons?

As I said, the above idea is largely moot, as we are involved in Yugoslavia now and no amount of second guessing can change that.  So, the question then becomes are we at least doing this for the right reasons?  Is NATO justified in bringing force to bear against Yugoslavia? 

A few different reasons have been advanced to justify the current campaign.  A primary one is that action must be taken to prevent a humanitarian crisis i Kosovo.  I find that explanation weak at best and complete fiction at worst.  I don't contend that things aren't bad over there or that we should try to do something to eliminate the plight of the Kosovar refugees.  But I simply cannot believe that humanitarian interests alone were important in making the decision to commence Operation Allied Force. 

To be honest, the US doesn't give a damn about humanitarian things in the rest of the world.  Hell, it could be argued that we don't give a damn about humanitarian concerns in our own country!  It has been pointed out by numerous commentators that there have been other recent human catastrophes which did not generate any interest in US administrations. I do not argue that if we don't intervene in Rwanda that we then cannot intervene in Kosovo.  But how can Clinton or anyone else look the American public in the face and claim a humanitarian justification when we still grant most favored nation trade status to China, which is awash in human rights violations?  So, while humanitarian goals are laudable and play some part, they weren't the thing that most compelled our involvement. 

Another reason forwarded by NATO for intervention is that the Kosovo crisis may destabilize the entire Balkan region and could lead to a wider conflict.  Seeing how war itself is generally a bad thing, to avoid a larger conflict makes some sense.  I'm not sure that such destabilization would have happened, however. 

As I said earlier, Yugoslavia's neighbors are largely poor and unstable, still reeling from years of Communist rule.  About the worst thing that could happen to them is exactly what is happening now: a large number of refugees in need of not only a home but also economic aid themselves.  Now, the refugees would have come anyway, so bombing would hardly have stopped that (nor has it hastened the flow, directly anyway).  A comprehensive plan to deal with refugee absorption and relocation would have been a superior alternative to a military campaign. 

Others may argue that Milosevic himself would move the war outside of Yugoslavia.  I don't necessarily buy that argument.  His current target, Kosovo, is near and dear to the hearts of Yugoslavian Serbs, and therefore is a territory worth possessing.  I don't know of any other such areas in the area.  Milosevic showed in Bosnia that he was willing to let territory go if not historically tied to the Serbs.  Milosevic, in spite of Clinton's rhetoric to the contrary, is NOT Hitler and does not seek to take over Europe.  Therefore, such concerns cannot justify military action. 

One side note here.  Some have claimed that a widened conflict would draw in NATO members Greece and Turkey (another abuser of human rights) on opposing sides.  In addition to my thoughts above, this is contrary to public comments of those nations, who claimed to have discussed the issue and agreed to not become involved.  Seems like a non-starter to me. 

So, for my money, the reasons we've been given aren't really compelling when it comes to using force in Yugoslavia.  But, now that we're in it are we accomplishing anything? 

III.  The campaign so far

The story so far is one of abject failure, in my opinion.  We are no closer to accomplishing any goals of this campaign.  The refugee exodus has increased, not because of the NATO attacks directly, but because the Yugoslavs now have a motivation to finish up as quickly as possible.  Nearby nations are being pressured by the refugee crisis.  Milosevic is stronger than ever.  And to top it all off, NATO is moving along a pattern escalation which draws us farther in with little idea of how to get out. 

How did this happen?  Number one, the whole subject of ground forces has been handled miserably from the start.  I can sympathize with Clinton and other NATO political leaders who wanted to get public support for the campaign, support which would have been slower to come, if at all, if ground troops were involved.  However, in doing so, NATO has all but assured that Milosevic will be safe in the end.  No war has ever been won from the air.  Someone in the end has to go in and occupy land.  If placing peace keepers in Kosovo after refugees return is a goal, then someone will need to go in and eject the Yugoslav military from the province.  Or at least Milosevic needs to believe that.  Air power alone can't do that.  One need only to look as Saddam Husein in Iraq to see the folly of a bomb only strategy. 

From the beginning, Clinton and pals should have simply deflected questions about ground troops.  "We will not discuss military contingencies ahead of time," or words to that effect, would have sufficed.  Even if NATO had no intention to introduce infantry troops, the threat would still be there and be credible to Milosevic. 

Recently, NATO has been placed in the awkward position of explaining civilian casualties, first with the accidental bombing of a train and then the attack on a civilian convoy.  Our response to those mistakes has baffled me.  Of course the US and NATO do not want to be seen as targeting civilians, even incidentally.  But the almost wholesale apology for these accidents sends the wrong message.  Yes, they are unfortunate.  Unfortunate things happen in war, however.  There is one person who has the power to stop this whole thing and thereby save the Yugoslav public from any further incident: Slobodan Milosevic.  Until he does, any unintended civilian casualties are squarely on his head. 

IV.  What next?

Well, all of what's above is basically pissing in the wind, right?  So what should we do now that we are in this fight? 

Do we finish this operation?  By that I mean do we find a goal, make it primary, and do everything necessary to achieve it.  If that means full mobilization and war, so be it.  I would counsel against that.  There are diplomatic deals to be made, I am sure.  One thing is for certain, however: a constant bombing campaign is not going to accomplish anything. 

One problem right now is just what goal should NATO set for itself in the conflict?  There are several options.  One would be a removal of Slobodan Milosevic from power.  That would certainly require a ground campaign, one which would run all the way to Belgrade.  That may be a long and bloody campaign.  In addition, most commentators agree that those who would step into the void left by Milosevic are even worse than he. 

Another option is some sort of change in status for Kosovo, either as an autonomous province or an independent republic.  That is not very viable, either, unless NATO is willing to draw lines which would almost certainly result in future conflict.  If Kosovo is lopped off of Serbia, it will surely go down as one more slight of the Serb people, aggravating a well developed victim mentality.  Would they, after all is said and done, just reinvade Kosovo? 

That problem swings both ways.  The original peace plan called for a peacekeeping force in Kosovo.  But such a force would have so leave, sometime.  When that happens, there is no reason to believe that the Kosovars, still nursing the wounds of this conflict, would not turn on the minority Serb population?  What does NATO do then? 

The bottom line is that the situation in Yugoslavia is a mess.  I'm not certain that NATO's campaign has helped clear things up in any way, nor will it.  The Kosovo situation demands attention, and Milosevic should certainly not be left alone to slaughter defenseless people.  How that's prevented, I'm not sure.  I'm just fairly confidant that we're going about it the wrong way. 
 

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Written 4/17/99