|
when |
who |
what |
| 1980's |
Pakistan |
- nuclear program flourished
- military and intelligence forces were working closely with the
U.S. to repel Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
|
| 1985 |
North Korea |
- signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
- opened of most of its nuclear sites to international
inspection
|
| early 1990's |
American intelligence
and
international inspectors |
- North Koreans were reprocessing more spent fuel than they had
declared
- Might have separated enough plutonium to fabricate one or two
nuclear weapons
|
| 1994 |
North Korea |
Entered into an agreement with the Clinton
Administration:
- Stop the nuclear-weapons program.
- Obtain economic aid and the construction of two light-water
nuclear reactors
|
| 1994 |
North Korea |
Unknown if it had begun to build
warheads |
| |
| 1997 |
North Korea |
Trying to produce weapons-grade uranium from
natural uranium-with Pakistani technology |
1997
and later |
Pakistan
to
North Korea
(As outlined in CIA
report below. Unclear
when U.S. intelligence
first knew about these
activities.)
|
- Economy had foundered
- "No more money" to pay for North Korean missile support
- Paid for missile systems in part by sharing its nuclear-weapons
secrets
- Provided data on how to build and test a uranium-triggered
nuclear weapon
- Helped North Korea conduct a series of "cold tests," simulated
nuclear explosions, using natural uranium, which are necessary to
determine whether a nuclear device will detonate properlyGave the
North Korean intelligence service advice on from American
satellites and U.S. and South Korean intelligence agents.
- Centrifuges:
- Sent prototypes of high-speed centrifuge machines
- "Chopped many years off" the North Korean development
process
- With a few thousand centrifuges, could have enough fissile
material to manufacture two or three warheads a year
- Pakistani centrifuges:
- Slim cylinders, roughly six feet in height, that could be
shipped "by the hundreds"
|
| |
A. Q. Khan
Director of a Pakistani weapons-research lab |
At least thirteen visits to North Korea |
| |
| 2001 |
North Korea |
Began to enrich uranium in significant
quantities |
| |
Pakistan |
There are close ties between some scientists
working for the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and radical
Islamic groups |
| ~25 Sep 2001 |
Bush |
Lifted the sanctions that had been imposed on
Pakistan because of its nuclear-weapons activities |
| Jan 2002 |
John Bolton
Under-Sec. of State for Arms Control |
Declared that North Korea had a covert
nuclear-weapons program and was in violation of the
nonproliferation treaty |
| Feb 2002 |
3 members of Congress |
Urged Bush to withhold support for the two reactors
promised to North Korea |
| May 2002 |
John Bolton |
Accused North Korea of failing to
coöperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency |
| Jun 2002 |
CIA
report:
National
Intellegence
Estimate
|
- Separate and contradictory estimates from C.I.A., the Pentagon,
the State Department, and the Department of Energy regarding the
number of warheads that North Korea might have been capable of
making
- Provided no consensus on whether or not the Pyongyang regime is
actually producing them
- Predicted that North Korea, if confronted with the evidence of
unanium-enrichment program:
- Would not risk an open break with the 1994
agreement
- Would do nothing to violate the nonproliferation
treaty
|
| 5 Jul 2002 |
Condoleezza Rice |
Letter to the congressmen:
Bush Administration would continue providing North Korea
with:
- Shipments of heavy fuel oil
- Nuclear technology for the two
promised energy-generating reactors
|
| early Oct 2002 |
James A. Kelly
Assistant Sec. of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs |
- Flew to Pyongyang with a large entourage for a showdown over
the uranium-enrichment program
- Kelly authorized to tell the Koreans that the U.S. had learned
about the illicit uranium program
- No room for Kelly to negotiate.
- Scripted message:
- Written in the N.S.C."-the National Security Council-"by
hard-liners.
- North Korea must stop the program before any negotiations could
take place
- Former intelligence official: "When it came time to confront
North Korea, we had no plan, no contact-nothing to negotiate with.
... but we let it all fall apart."
|
Kang Suk Ju
First Vice Foreign Minister of North Korea |
- Seemed to confirm the charge when he responded by insisting
upon his nation's right to develop nuclear weapons.
- Sccused the United States of "threatening North Korea's
survival"
- Produced a list of the United States' alleged failures to meet
its own obligations under the 1994 agreement
- Offered to shut down the enrichment program in return for:
- An American promise not to attack
- A commitment to normalize relations
|
| James A. Kelly |
Constrained by his instructions, could only
re-state his brief: the North Koreans must act first |
| 16 Oct 2002 |
Bush admin. |
Informs the public about North Korea
situation, five days after Congress voted to authorize military
force against Iraq |
| late 2002 |
American policy |
Alternated between tough talk in public-vows
that the Administration wouldn't be "blackmailed," or even meet
with North Korean leaders-and private efforts, through third
parties, to open an indirect line of communication with
Pyongyang |
| North Korea |
- Expelled international inspectors
- Renounced the nonproliferation treaty
- Threatened to begin reprocessing spent nuclear fuel
- Insisted on direct talks with the Bush Administration
|
| 2003 |
North Korea |
Still unknown if it has begun to build
warheads |
| early Jan 2003 |
Bush |
- Agreed to consider renewed American aid in return for a
commitment by North Korea to abandon its nuclear program
- Still resisting direct negotiations with the Kim Jong Il
government
|