

Metaphysics: The branch of philosophy that deals with the general nature of reality: what are the most important things/sorts of things that exist, and (on a very abstract level) what are they like?

Ontology: Branch of metaphysics that deals with what exists.

Examples of things that might exist:

universals, physical things, minds/souls, God, numbers, sets, imaginary/fictional objects

The problem of universals:

- *Universal:* “That which may be predicated of many.” Note 2 aspects: (1) a universal is predicable; (2) a universal can be shared. Universals are what multiple things can “have in common.”
- *Particulars:* Things that aren’t universals. The ultimate subjects of judgements/propositions. Particulars cannot be ‘shared’; they can’t be present in more than one place at a time.
- *The metaphysical questions:*
 1. Do universals exist?
 2. If not, why does it seem like they do? (E.g., why do we have words & concepts that apply to multiple things; why do things seem to ‘have something in common’?)
 3. If so, is their existence dependent on particulars, or independent of particulars?
- *Famous positions:*
 - *Nominalism:* There are no universals.
 - *Realism:* There are universals. Two versions of realism:
 - a) *Transcendent (Platonic) realism:* And the universals are independent of particulars.
 - b) *Immanent (Aristotelian) realism:* And the universals are dependent on particulars.

Plato’s Theory of Forms:

- Extreme & bizarre form of Platonic realism. Incorporates the additional assumptions:
 - The ‘self-predication’ assumption: The form of F-ness is, itself, F.
 - The theory of recollection: Our knowledge of forms derives from acquaintance with them in a previous lifetime, before the soul was joined to the body. This knowledge was forgotten and needs to be recollected.
 - The inferiority of concrete reality: Plato thought concrete objects were mere pale imitations of, and somehow ‘less real’ than, concrete objects.
 - The form is *wholly present* in each particular instance.

The Parmenides:

- Plato’s criticism of his own theory. Questions and arguments:
 - Is there a form of mud? Or hair? (No.)
 - If the form is in many separate particulars, then it is separate from itself.
 - Nor could it be in many particulars in the way a sail is spread over many particulars. For consider the form of ‘largeness’, ‘equality’, or ‘smallness’.
- *The Third Man Argument:* (famous)

Suppose you have two men. They have something in common, so there is a form, the form of Man. But (by the self-predication assumption), this form is itself a third man. Hence, it has something in common with the first two men. Hence, there is another form . . . Leading to an

infinite series.

- Why Forms cannot be ideas/concepts:
 - “Is it an idea of something, or of nothing?” Something.
 - “And of something that exists?” Yes.
 - “And of some one thing that multiple things have in common?” Yes.
 - “And so you reintroduce the Form again.”
 - Second argument: “Then you would be saying that everything has ideas in it.”
- Why objects cannot resemble the Forms:

If they do, then they are like the Forms, and the Forms are like them. If so, they and the Forms have something in common. And what will that be? The Form? (Another form? The same Form again?)
- Why we cannot know the Forms:

Forms are only related to each other, not to things in our world; and vice versa. Ex.: A particular master is a master of a particular slave, not of Slavery (the form). Similarly, a particular person will have knowledge of particular things, not of forms.
- Why we can't reject universals either:

If we do, our discourse loses significance. [This probably means that all the general terms in our language would have to be meaningless, since there would be nothing for them to refer to, since there is nothing that their instances have in common.]

From last time: “universals”. Nominalism vs. realism. Transcendent vs. immanent realism. Arguments for and against the “Forms”.

Nominalism: Philosophical view which denies the existence of universals. Problem for nominalists:

- To explain how we group things together.
- Why there *appear* to be things in common between distinct particulars.

Forms of nominalism:

1. Predicate nominalism.
2. Concept nominalism.
3. Class nominalism.
4. Resemblance nominalism.
5. Tropes (fits with #4).
6. Ostrich nominalism (Quine).

Hume/Berkeley's nominalism:

- Hume's theory is concerned with 'abstract ideas': Ideas that (allegedly) represent *determinable* properties without representing any *determinates* falling under them.
- Hume held an imagistic conception of ideas: All 'perceptions' divide into (i) Impressions and (ii) Ideas. Ideas are faint 'copies' of impressions. Ideas are thus images in the mind.
- Why people believe in abstract ideas:
The concept “man” applies to all men, regardless of size, shape, color, etc. Therefore, it must (a) represent all possible sizes, shapes, etc., or (b) represent no particular size, shape, etc. (a) is absurd, so it must be (b).
- Why you shouldn't believe in abstract ideas: Three arguments:
 1. (a) The mind cannot conceive separately of what is not in principle separable.
(b) Determinates are not separable from their determinables.
(c) So the mind cannot conceive of a determinable separately from its determinates.
 2. (a) No impression is abstract.
(b) All ideas are just copies of impressions.
(c) So no idea is abstract.
 3. (a) The mind cannot coherently conceive of the (logically) impossible.
(b) An indeterminate object is (logically) impossible.
(c) So the mind cannot conceive of such an object.
(d) So the mind cannot form an abstract idea, for (?) such an idea would represent an indeterminate object.

- The alternative theory:
 - When we see a resemblance among objects, we apply the same name to them.
 - When we hear this word, it reminds us of some of the particular ideas of particular things the word applies to.
 - When we reason 'abstractly,' we are reasoning using a particular (non-abstract) idea, but we assert only things that also apply to the other ideas falling under the same category. We have a disposition to think of other cases when relevant.
 - A general term refers to multiple different particulars; it does not refer to an abstract item that the particulars share. "Ideas are particular in their nature, but general in their representation."
- Hume's theory seems to be a combination of:
 - Resemblance nominalism
 - Predicate nominalism
 - Concept nominalism

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Notes #3: Infinite Regress Arguments

The problem of universals according to Armstrong:

To explain what it is for something to have a property.

[A better formulation would be that the *questions* about universals are: (1) Do universals exist? and (2) If not, why does it seem like they do, e.g., why do we say multiple different objects have the same property? —mh]

- Realists claim that there is some universal that multiple objects can all share.
- Nominalists give some other sort of analysis—attempting to explain away the appearance of universals, while appealing only to particulars.

Predicate Nominalism:

a is F = a falls under the predicate 'F'.

Problems:

1. The *object regress*:

- The predicate-type 'F' appears to be a universal.
- To analyze this away, the pred. nominalist will have to say that what it is for something to instantiate the type *predicate 'F'* would be for it to fall under another predicate (presumably the predicate "the predicate 'F'").
- This leads to an infinite regress.

2. The *relation regress*:

- What is *falling under*? It appears to be a universal.
- To analyze this away, the pred. nominalist will have to say:
x *falls under* y = $\langle x, y \rangle$ falls under the predicate 'falls under.'
- This is either circular or leads to another regress.

Concept Nominalism:

a is F = a falls under the concept 'F'.

Problems: Same as above.

Class Nominalism:

a is F = a is a member of the set of F's.

Problems:

- No object regress, since the set of F's does not appear to be a universal.
- But still a relation regress, since 'being a member of' appears to be a universal.

Resemblance Nominalism:

a is F = a sufficiently resembles the paradigm F-things. For example:

a is red = a sufficiently resembles this fire engine, this apple, and this pool of blood.

Problems:

- Again no object regress, since the paradigm F things are particulars.
- But still a relation regress, since ‘resemblance’ appears to be a universal.

Generalization:

• No general analysis of ‘what it is for a thing/things to have a property/relation’ can succeed. For in order to say anything, the right hand side of the analysis must ascribe some properties and/or relations to something. The right hand side of the analysis cannot be just a list of particulars; then it would not even be a coherent statement. Thus, suppose:

$$a \text{ is } F = aR\Phi_F$$

- A relation regress ensues with the predicate ‘R’.
- Thus, *if the nominalist must accept Armstrong’s project* (analyzing talk about properties in terms that only mention particulars), then the nominalist clearly loses.

Platonism:

a is F = a partakes in the form of F-ness.

Problem:

- Object regress: The form of F-ness is a form, so it participates in the form of Form-hood. Which is itself a form, so it either participates in itself or participates in a higher-order form of Second-Order-Formhood. If it participates in itself, you get a version of Russell’s Paradox.
- Relation regress: ‘partaking’ seems to be a universal. So the analysis must hold:
x partakes in y = $\langle x,y \rangle$ partakes in the form of Partaking.
 - This is either circular or introduces a higher-level partaking relation, leading to an infinite regress.

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Notes #4: Armstrong's Realism

Armstrong's General View:

- Rejects nominalism & Platonism (see previous notes).
- The alternative is Aristotelian realism.
- Properties and particulars are interdependent: neither can exist without the other.
 - Corollary: the basic constituents of reality are 'thick particulars': objects-with-all-their-properties.
- Particulars are not *related to* their properties.

Objects are not bundles of properties:

- Assume properties are universals:
 - Then universals will be 'bundled' together when they stand in some relation. Call it the 'co-instantiation' relation.
 - If an object has P and Q, then P and Q (the universals) stand in this relation.
 - If an object has P but lacks Q, then P and Q (the universals) do not stand in this relation.
 - Thus, if there are two objects, and one has P and Q, while the other has P but not Q, then the universals P and Q both do and do not stand in the 'co-instantiation' relation.
- The trope view of properties doesn't work because it is a form of nominalism, which doesn't work. (See previous notes.)

Armstrong's Scientific Realism:

- What properties exist is an empirical, not a priori question. Leave it to the scientists.
- There are no uninstantiated properties.
- Rejects arguments from meaning:
 - "In order for a predicate to be meaningful, there must be a property for it to stand for." (The Empiricist "will regret that at present we seem to lack any satisfactory theory of meaning." —p. 149)
 - Even instantiated predicates need not correspond to single properties. (Could be, e.g., family resemblances.)
 - Non-synonymous expressions may denote the same property.

Other Alleged Kinds of Properties:

- There are no disjunctive properties.

For suppose *a* has F but lacks G, while *b* has G but lacks F. It seems laughable to conclude from these premises that *a* and *b* have something in common. Yet the disjunctive predicate "F or G" applies to both.
- There are no negative properties.
 - We don't need negative properties to explain how negative predicates apply to things. " \sim P" applies to a thing when it isn't P.
 - Use Occam's Razor.
- But conjunctive properties are ok.
 - Because there might be nothing but conjunctive properties.

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Notes #5: Quine on Ontological Commitment

From last time: Main points of Armstrong's scientific realism. Does he have good arguments against nominalism & Platonism? How much of his 'scientific realism' is supported by these or other arguments, and how much is unsupported?

I. Problems of ontology: Arguments for the existence of Pegasus

- Question: What is there?
- McX's theory:
 - Every meaningful noun corresponds to something (that exists).
 - It cannot be that Pegasus doesn't exist, for: (a) if so, "Pegasus" is meaningless, (b) and if so, then "Pegasus doesn't exist" is meaningless. Hence, Pegasus exists.
 - Quine cannot even say how he disagrees with me (McX), for then he would have to make mention of the entities he wants to deny exist.
 - Since there isn't a physical, flesh-and-blood winged horse, uh, Pegasus "exists in my mind," i.e., Pegasus is an "idea". Problem: confuses an idea of an X with an X.
 - McX is a fictional character (so he doesn't exist, right?) However, compare Meinong's famous doctrine that "There are some things of which it is true to say, that there are no such things."
- Wyman's theory:
 - Some things "exist" while others only "subsist." Existence = actuality. Mere subsistence = mere possibility.
 - *Existing* things just have an additional property ("actuality") that the merely subsistent entities lack.
 - *Problem:* How many possible fat men in the doorway are there? How many of them are bald?
 - Note: Is Wyman David Lewis?
 - *Problem:* What of the Round Square Cupola on Berkeley College (an impossible object)?
Answer: "round square cupola" is meaningless. *Further problem:* This leads to the rejection of the method of reductio ad absurdum.

II. A Russellian solution:

- Definite description: A noun phrase beginning with "the" that purports to refer to a unique thing.
 - Ex.: "the author of the *Waverly* novels", "the present King of France."
 - Notice that they function like nouns (or like names) in a sentence: "The King of France is bald" just like "George is bald."
- Russell's analysis of definite descriptions:
"The King of France is bald" = $(\exists x) [Kxf \ \& \ Bx \ \& \ (y)(Kyf \supset \ y=x)]$
or: $(\exists x) [Kxf \ \& \ (y)(Kyf \supset \ x=y)] \ \& \ (x)(Kxf \supset \ Bx)$
Read: There is something such that: it is a king of France, it is bald, and all kings of France are identical to it. Or: "There is at least one king of France, there is at most one king of France, and every king of France is bald."
 - *Note:* "the king of France" is not a singular term. It therefore is meaningful even if there is

no King of France. It only requires there to be a *predicate*, “being the king of”. Thus:
“The King of France doesn’t exist” = $\sim(\exists x) [Kxf \ \& \ (y)(Kyf \supset y=x)]$

- How to deal with “Pegasus”: Introduce a predicate “pegasizing” (perhaps defined as being a horse w/ wings?). Thus:
“Pegasus does not exist” = $\sim(\exists x) Px$

III. On the problem of universals:

- For universals: the one over many argument:
 1. *a* is red.
 2. *b* is red.
 3. Therefore, there is something that *a* and *b* have in common, viz. ‘redness’. Thus, there is at least one universal.
- *Reply*: Quine rejects the inference from 1+2 to 3. He agrees with *predicative* uses of “red” but refuses to accept the *noun* “redness”.
- The argument from meaning:
In order for “red” to be meaningful, it must have a meaning. Its meaning appears to be a nonphysical entity which is very much like a universal; perhaps it *is* a universal.
- *Reply*: Quine rejects the existence of ‘meanings’: he accepts only the *predicative* uses of “is meaningful” or “is synonymous with”, but not the *noun* “meaning”.
- McX: “What? Does *nothing* you can say commit you to the existence of universals?!”

Answer:

Quine’s Criterion of Ontological Commitment (important):

“To be assumed as an entity is ... to be reckoned as the value of a variable.” (p. 13)

Or: S is committed to the existence of F’s iff S makes a statement in which the bound variables must range over at least one F in order for the statement to be true.

- Examples:
 - “Some dogs are white”
 - “There are infinitely many prime numbers”
 - “There is no Pegasus”
- *Note*: This is not a criterion of *what exists* but of what a statement *says* exists.
- How to evaluate an ontology:
 - We should choose the simplest conceptual scheme that allows experience to be described and organized.
 - Q. hints that physical objects are a convenient “myth”, just like mathematical objects, just useful for predicting sense data.

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Notes #6: Ostrich Nominalism vs. Mirage Realism

I. Devitt:

The One-over-Many Problem:

- How can many things have a common nature? For instance, what makes (1) true?
(1) *a* and *b* have the same property, F-ness.

This is a pseudo-problem:

- Answer: (1) is explained by:
(3) *a* is F. = Fa
(4) *b* is F. = Fb
- There is no further need to explain (3) or (4).

Realism is a pseudo-explanation:

- Suppose (1) is explained by
(5) *a* has the universal, F-ness. = Raf
- (5) should need to be explained as well, leading to an infinite regress.
- Armstrong's claim that *a* and the universal F-ness are not related but some sort of organic unity is just obscure. How can we understand (5) unless it is of the form Raf?

Some real problems:

- The following statements may imply the existence of universals:
(6) Red resembles orange more than it resembles blue.
(7) Red is a color.
(9) The dresses were of the same color.
- Quine proposes to treat them in terms of sets or open sentences.

II. Armstrong:

The real one-over-many problem:

- We commonly say distinct particulars are 'of the same type' or 'have something in common.' What does this mean?
- The resemblance-nominalist answer: It is for them to have resembling properties.
- The realist approach: Takes the idea literally: there is something literally identical between distinct particulars. E.g., the color of *a* = the color of *b*.
- This is the question the Ostrich nominalist refuses to answer. (The question is not what (3) means.)

Applying Quine's criterion of ontological commitment:

- Quine fails to explain how he would account for sentences (6), (7), and (9) above.
- He considers:
(10) Humility is a virtue.
(10') Humble persons are virtuous.

- Problem: (10) is neither necessary nor sufficient for (10'). For:
 - Humility could be a virtue, but there could still be plenty of unvirtuous humble people.
 - If (10') implies (10), then (11') implies (11):
 - 11'. Tall persons are virtuous.
 - 11. Tallness is a virtue.
- Anyway, there is no reason to accept Q's criterion of ontological commitment.
 - Why not say use of predicates also involves ontological commitment?
 - Unclear how Quine should explain what "applies to" means without referring to properties. The semantic theory proposed by Devitt says:
 - 'Fa' is true iff there is some thing that 'a' refers to, and 'F' applies to that thing.
 - To explain the meaning of 'applies to,' fill in the ellipsis:
 - (x)(y) (Axy ↔ ...)
 - For the realist:
 - (x)(y) [Axy ↔ (∃z)(z is a property, x refers to z, and y has z)]

Problems for the Realist:

- "How are the two components [the substance and its properties] of a particular to be put together?" Two views:
 - Relational view — leads to infinite regress.
 - Fa = I(a,F)
 - = I(<a,f>, I)
 - = I(<<a,f>,I>, I)
 - ⋮
 - Non-relational view — obscure but seems required by failure of the relational theory.
 - Alternative: To hold that the regress exists but "isn't vicious." Compare:

The Instantiation Regress

$$\begin{aligned}
 Fa &= I(a, F) \\
 &= I(\langle a, f \rangle, I) \\
 &= I(\langle \langle a, f \rangle, I \rangle, I) \\
 &\vdots
 \end{aligned}$$

Armstrong says we should reject the first equivalence.

The Truth Regress

$$\begin{aligned}
 p &= p \text{ is true} \\
 &= \text{'p is true' is true} \\
 &= \text{"'p is true' is true" is true} \\
 &\vdots
 \end{aligned}$$

Should we reject the first equivalence here?

- When is a regress 'vicious' (bad)? When it implies an *impossible-to-satisfy* condition for a *true* statement, as:
 - When succeeding steps are preconditions for the earlier steps, and the series can't be completed.
 - When succeeding steps lead to more complex conditions, and there is a limit to the complexity of the condition that can be satisfied.

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Notes #7: Criticism of Quine's Criterion

What sort of dispute is that between the nominalist and the realist?

- It is not a factual dispute, for:
 - Both agree on the underlying facts. Both agree that Sam is bald.
 - The realist deduces from this that baldness exists, but the nominalist does not.
 - The realist says baldness would exist even if Sam were not bald:

Bs.	$\sim Bs$
$\therefore (\exists \phi) \phi s$	$\therefore (\exists \phi) \sim \phi s$
- Hence, the existence of baldness follows from the mere existence of a meaningful predicate, "is bald."
- Hence, the existence of baldness is nothing more than the meaningfulness of "bald." So a nominalist should not object to it.
- The dispute is semantic. If two philosophers agree on sentence "P", and one infers "Q" but the other does not, then either:
 - a. They mean something different by "P", or
 - b. They mean something different by "Q".
 - "There are no other possibilities." (106) [Why not the possibility that one of them makes a mistaken inference or fails to make a correct inference?]
- *Note:* If P is a tautology, then if Q follows from P, Q is also a tautology.

Criteria of Ontological Commitment:

Criterion 1: S is ontologically committed to F's iff S 'quantifies over' F's.

Criterion 3: S is ontologically committed to F's iff S says or implies that F's exist.

- Q: We can eliminate ontological commitments by paraphrasing statements into a notation which does not quantify over the unwanted entities. Ex.: "There are 4 miles between N and T" can be rewritten, "Distance in miles between N and T = 4," showing that we need not accept the existence of 'miles.'
- A: There are two possibilities:
 1. The paraphrase does not preserve the meaning of the original statement. In this case, it is an invalid paraphrase and does not indicate the true ontological commitments of the original sentence.
 2. The paraphrase has the same meaning as the original statement. In this case, the first cannot entail anything that the second does not. Thus, if the first entails the existence of miles, the second must do so also.

Either way, the paraphrasing procedure accomplishes nothing.

- Four interpretations of Quine's criterion: Sentence S implies the existence of F's iff:
 - 1a. S (as written) quantifies over F's.
 - 1b. There is *some* paraphrase of S which quantifies over F's.
 - 1c. *Every* paraphrase of S quantifies over F's.
 - 1d. "The correct" paraphrase of S quantifies over F's.

- 1a is wrong. For it implies that synonymous sentences can have different ontological commitments.
 - 1b is wrong. For it implies that ordinary statements contain commitments to universals.
 - 1c is wrong. For it implies that no sentence has any ontological commitments.
 - 1d seems to be wrong. For what is the “correct” paraphrase? How would that be determined?
- An illustration of the problem with 1c.
 - Let K = the conjunction into a single proposition of all human knowledge.
 - Let Px mean, “K, and x = this pen.”
 - Consider the statement: $(\exists x) Px$. This is a paraphrase of all existing human knowledge, and it quantifies over only this pen. (Only this pen need be in the domain of the variable “x” in order for the sentence to be true.)
 - Thus, 1c implies that all existing human knowledge is committed only to the existence of this pen.

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Notes #8: Numbers

Q: What are numbers, and do they exist?

I. A proof that 2 exists.

1. $2 > 1$. (premise)
 2. " $2 > 1$ " is a sentence of the form 'Rab.' (premise)
 3. The truth-conditions for a sentence of the form 'Rab' are that there be something that 'a' refers to, something that 'b' refers to, and that those things should stand in the relation denoted by "R". (premise)
 4. If "2" refers to something, it refers to 2. (premise)
 5. " $2 > 1$ " is true. (from 1)
 6. The truth-conditions for " $2 > 1$ " are that there be something that "2" refers to, something that "1" refers to, and that those things stand in the relation denoted by ">". (from 2, 3)
 7. There is something that "2" refers to. (from 5, 6)
 8. There is (there exists) 2. (from 4, 7)
- Premises 1-4 are all intuitively obvious. #1 is the least subject to doubt; even 3-year-old children know that.
 - The argument does not establish the nature of numbers, apart from the fact that they exist and can be greater than one another.

II. Are numbers properties of external things?

Objections:

- What is the number that belongs to this deck of cards? It is 1 (deck), 52 (cards), or 10^{23} (molecules). If numbers are properties, how can one thing have these different, seemingly contrary properties?
- What is 0 a property of?
- What is the object that the number belongs to? (The 'agglomeration.') What about in the case of "there are 4 ways to prove this theorem"?
- It's surprising that one property could apply to so many different kinds of things.

III. Are numbers subjective?

- The number of petals of a flower is just as factual as its color.
- "The objectivity of the North Sea is not affected by the fact that it is a matter of our arbitrary choice which part of all the water on the earth's surface we mark off and elect to call the 'North Sea.'"
- Arithmetic isn't psychology.
- If numbers were ideas, there could be conscious and unconscious numbers.
- There wouldn't be infinitely many numbers.

IV. Frege's theory of numbers

1. A number is a property of a *concept* (universal).
 - “Venus has 0 moons”: 0 belongs to the concept ‘moon of Venus.’
 - *Objection*: The number of inhabitants of Germany changes from one year to the next, but the concept ‘inhabitant of Germany’ suffers no alteration.
Reply: The following are two different concepts: ‘inhabitant of Germany in 1883’ and ‘inhabitant of Germany in 1884’.
 - Concepts are objective. (*Fregean ‘concepts’ are not ideas.*) Compare the sentence: “All whales are mammals.”
 - This is an objective fact.
 - It is an assertion about concepts. ‘Whale’ is not the name of any particular.
2. The identity conditions for numbers: We must define “the number which belongs to F is the same as that which belongs to G.”
 - *Equinumerate*:
The concept F is equinumerate with the concept G =_{df} It is possible to correlate the objects which fall under F one-to-one with the objects which fall under G. [*Or*: there is a one-one function from the extension of F onto the extension of G.]
 - *Extension of a concept*: The set of all objects that fall under it.
 - The number that belongs to the concept F =_{df} The extension of the concept, ‘equinumerate to the concept F.’ [*Or*: is the set of all concepts that are equinumerate with F.]
3. Definitions of individual numbers:
 - 0 = the number which belongs to the concept ‘not identical with itself.’ [*Note*: this is the set of all uninstantiated universals.]
 - 1 = the number which belongs to the concept ‘identical with 0.’ [*Note*: this amounts to the set of all singly-instantiated universals.]and so on.

Historical note: Less Platonic philosophers (Russell) were later to remove the talk of concepts in favor of sets only.

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Notes #9: Review, unit 1

Know what these things are:

Universals vs. particulars

Realism

Platonic, Aristotelian

Nominalism

Predicate, concept, class, resemblance

Tropes

Ostrich

the self-predication assumption

the Third Man argument

Know what these people thought, esp. about these ideas:

Plato

Hume. Including:

‘abstract ideas’

ideas & impressions

Armstrong.

The ‘problem’ of universals

The object regress

The relation regress. Incl.: the general argument against relational theories.

What this applies to.

Points in his ‘scientific realism’:

empiricism; disjunctive, conjunctive, negative properties; uninstantiated properties.

Quine.

McX’s argument for Pegasus

Russell’s analysis of “the K of F is bald”

Quine’s answer to McX re: Pegasus

Criterion of ontological commitment & how it applies to sentences

Devitt:

On the one-over-many problem

Armstrong’s response.

The “Humility is a virtue.” example.

Searle:

- On semantic disputes & tautologies.
- The Alston argument for why the paraphrase does not succeed in removing ontological commitments

The example of the commitment to “this pen.”

Frege

Concepts.

The argument from the deck of cards & what it shows.

Problems with 0.

Frege’s definitions:

equinumerate

extension of a concept

the number which belongs to a concept

0, 1, etc.