Kennesaw Historical Society, Inc.
c/o Southern Museum of Civil War and Locomotive History
2829 Cherokee St.
Kennesaw, GA 30144 

The Battle of Allatoona Pass: The Forgotten Battle of Sherman’s Atlanta Campaign

Written by Robert C. Jones

Kennesaw, Georgia

Published by The Kennesaw Historical Society, Inc.
Copyright 2004 by Robert C. Jones

 The Kennesaw Historical Society, Inc. is a registered non-profit corporation in the State of Georgia.
The Kennesaw Historical Society, Inc. is a 501(c)(3) organization, under IRS rulings.

 Kennesaw Historical Society, Inc.
c/o Southern Museum of Civil War and Locomotive History
2829 Cherokee St.
Kennesaw, Georgia  30144

jone442@bellsouth.net

http://www.mindspring.com/~robertcjones/khs/khs.htm

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Table of Contents

Introduction

Allatoona Pass in 1864

Background

The Battle (October 5, 1864)

Before 7:00a

7:00 – 9:00 a.m

French’s ultimatum

Corse’s reply

French’s report on the incident

9:00a-11:00a.

Fighting at the Star fort (11:00-3:00)

Eastern redoubt

French’s withdrawal

Why did French withdraw?

Results and Aftermath

Miscellany

Corse’s injuries

Sherman on Kennesaw Mountain

The battlefield today

“An Unknown Hero” grave

Allatoona Pass then and now

Bibliography  

WEB EXCLUSIVE - WHAT DOES "ALLATOONA" OR "ALTOONA" MEAN?

Introduction

The Battle of Allatoona Pass has received scant attention in most histories of the Civil War.  This is probably because it occurred after Sherman had taken Atlanta, but before Sherman’s March to the Sea.  Thus, it often escapes being noted in histories of either campaign.  

The battle was significant, though.  Some of the fiercest fighting of the whole War occurred there, with combined casualty figures over 30% (North: 706; South: 873).  The battle broke the back of John Bell Hood’s plan to significantly disrupt Sherman’s supply line from Atlanta to the north, and allowed Sherman to plan his march to Savannah with his Western & Atlantic supply line intact.

Library of Congress

Allatoona Pass in 1864

Harper’s, 1865

Allatoona Pass in the Fall of 1864 was a small town with eight homes, some small stores, a railroad depot, and Union supply warehouses.  The Western and Atlantic Railroad cut was built in the 1840s, as the W&A was built northward from Atlanta.  The cut is about 360 feet long, and 180 feet on each side.  90 feet from the top on each side is a flat “berm” to catch falling rocks, tree limbs, etc. 

Photograph taken by official Union photographer George Barnard, showing Allatoona Pass during the Civil War.  The columned house on the left (“Clayton-Mooney house”) still stands today.  The Star Fort was on the left hilltop, and the Eastern Redoubt (not pictured) on the right.  The building on the top of the hill at the right was the headquarters of the 4^th Minnesota. 

On the top of each hill were two earthwork forts (each about 75 ft. in diameter), designed by Sherman’s Chief of Engineers, Captain Orlando Poe.  The forts would prove impregnable during the battle.  Three other forts, including one that would later be known as Rowett's Redoubt were nearby.

Sherman was well aware of the natural defensive position posed by the Pass, as he noted in a report to Washington dated June 8, 1864 (referring to events of May 23, 1864):

“I knew the strength of Allatoona Pass, having ridden through it twenty years ago, and knew it would reduce our strength by forcing us to operate by the head of a single column. I determined not to attempt it but to pass the range by other more devious and difficult natural roads that would admit of more equal terms with the enemy should he attempt, to meet us.” (Official Record)

Sherman began establishing Allatoona Pass as a supply base and defensive position as early as June 6, 1864:

“I at once examined in person the Allatoona Pass, and found it admirably adapted to our use as a secondary base, and gave the necessary orders for its defense and garrison, and as soon as the  railroad bridge was finished across the Etowah, our stores came forward  to our camp by rail.” (Official Record)

The building of Federal fortifications at Allatoona Pass is described by Colonel Oscar Malmborg:

“I, on the arrival of the corps the following morning at Allatoona, again accompanied Captains Poe and Reese on a reconnaissance, with a view of locating works for the defense of that important pass, the immediate location and execution of which I was charged with by the chief engineer of the department. Owing to heavy rains and a very limited supply of intrenching implements, and, in fact, also to want of men (there being less than 800 effective men in the three regiments stationed at or near Allatoona, and one of them, the Fourteenth Illinois, having but one commissioned officer present), three days were consumed in staking out and fairly starting the work on the five redoubts decided upon as the result of the reconnaissance referred to…

On the 16th I again visited Allatoona, and returned the following day, having found the works so far advanced as to be in a defensible condition, notwithstanding the continual bad weather and the non-arrival of the intrenching tools ordered a week previous.

The five redoubts are located on commanding spurs of the Allatoona Mountains, at an average distance of about 500 yards apart, with the exception of Numbers 5, which is about 1,200 yards from Numbers 4, and about one mile and a half from post headquarters. Nos. 1, 3, and 4 are surrounded by dense woods, which are being cut down and will form excellent abatis. Taken altogether they will accommodate 800 infantry and 10 field pieces. Nos. 3 and 4 have each two embrasures; the others are intended for guns en barbette, but I have directed that from fifty to eighty sand-bags be kept in readiness in each to answer contingencies.”  (Report of Colonel Oscar Malmborg, Fifty-fifth Illinois Infantry, Chief Engineer, of operations June 6-21, Official Record)

Background

Library of Congress

William Tecumseh Sherman took Atlanta on Sept. 2, 1864, after soundly defeating Confederate General John Bell Hood in a series of battles in and around the city.  With Sherman firmly ensconced in Atlanta, Hood decided to move his troops to the north towards Chattanooga, with these goals in mind:

• To disrupt Sherman’s supply line on the W&A RR

• To force Sherman to backtrack on his North Georgia gains

•  To invade Tennessee

The first and second objectives would be only temporarily successful, and the third a disaster.

As it turned out, Sherman was well versed on the basic outline of Hood’s plan because of news accounts of a series of Jefferson Davis speeches.

Hood sets the stage

Between October 1-3, 1864, Hood’s forces tore up fifteen miles of track near Acworth/Big Shanty.  This action served as the preliminary for the battle at Allatoona Pass that was to come.

Sherman reacts

In response to Hood’s movements, Sherman had sent Brigadier General John Corse to defend Rome, and now marched half of his army (estimated between 50,000-55,000 men) towards Marietta.  By October 4, 1864, Sherman had learned that 3,276 troops under Confederate Major General Samuel French were headed towards Allatoona Pass.  Sherman ordered Corse from Rome to Allatoona, to join 890+ men under Lt. Colonel John Tourtellotte in defending the Pass, a vital Union supply depot.

Corse managed to ship 1,054 of his men from Rome to Allatoona Pass in time for the battle.  However, the railroad transit was fraught with difficulties:

“The train, in moving down to Rome, threw some fourteen or fifteen cars off the track, and threatened to delay us till the morning of the 5th, but the activity of the officers and railroad employees enabled me to secure a train of twenty cars about 7 p. m. of the 4th. Onto them I loaded three regiments of Colonel Rowett's brigade and a portion of the Twelfth Illinois Infantry, with about 165,000 rounds of ammunition, and started for Allatoona at 8.30 p. m., where we arrived at 1 a. m. on the morning of the 5th instant, immediately disembarked, and started the train back, with injunctions to get the balance of the brigade and as many of the next brigade as they could carry and return by day-light. They unfortunately met with an accident that delayed them so as to deprive me of any re-enforcements until about 9 p. m. of the 5th.” (Official Record)

French’s orders

Confederate Major-General Samuel French received his orders to march on Allatoona Pass on October 4.  His object – block the railroad cut, and move on to the Etowah River and destroy the bridge there.

“General Hood directs that later in the evening…your Third Division (say French's) shall move up the railroad and fill up the deep cut at Allatoona with logs, brush, rails, dirt, &c…General Hood thinks that it is probable that the guard at the railroad bridge on Etowah is small, and when General French goes to Allatoona, if he can get such information as would justify him, if possible move to that bridge and destroy it. General Hood considers that its destruction would be a great advantage to the army and the country. Should he be able to destroy the bridge, in coming out he could move, as has been heretofore indicated, via New Hope.” (Official Record)

Even today, with modern earthmoving equipment, it would be a major enterprise to “fill up” the Allatoona railroad cut!  To add to that, the cut was heavily fortified on both sides, a fact that French later pointed out was (possibly) unknown to his superiors:

“It would appear, however, from these orders that the general-in-chief was not aware that the pass was fortified and garrisoned that I was sent to have filled up.” (Official Record)

The Battle (October 5, 1864)

Before 7:00a

Lieutenant Colonel John E. Tourtellotte, who commanded the Eastern Redoubt, commented on the Union preparations for battle:

“My first unpleasant apprehensions were that the rebels would make a night attack, and, taking advantage of the darkness, deprive me of the advantage of position, the fortifications of this place all being on the high ridge while the stores are collected on the flat land at the hill's base and on the south side, from which direction the rebels were approaching. To prevent such approach I strengthened the grand guard, barricaded the roads to the south, and made preparations to fire a building which should so illuminate the site of the village and stores that my men could see, even in the night, to a considerable extent any approach of the enemy. In this way I hoped to hold the rebels till daylight, when we should have the full advantage of our superior position.

About 12 midnight I was not a little relieved by the arrival of General Corse with one brigade, Fourth Division, Fifteenth Army Corps. About 2 a. m. of October 5 the rebels charged upon my picket-lines and drove the outposts back upon the reserves.” (Report of Lieutenant  Colonel  John E. Tourtellotte, Fourth Minnesota Infantry, commanding post of Allatoona, Ga. Headquarters Post, Allatoona, October 7, 1864, Official Record)

French described his arrival at Allatoona, after procuring the services of a guide.  Darkness and unfamiliarity with the terrain prevented any significant action until daylight on October 5.

“I left Big Shanty about 3.30 p. m. [October 4, 1864] and marched to Acworth, a distance of six miles, arriving there before sunset. There I was detained awaiting the arrival of rations until 11 o'clock at night. As I knew nothing of the roads, the enemy's works, or position, it was important to procure a guide, and at last a young man, or rather a boy, was found who knew the roads and had seen the position of the fortifications at Allatoona, he being a member of a cavalry company…

 From an eminence near Acworth the enemy could be seen communicating messages by their night signals from Allatoona with the station on Kenesaw...

Citizens residing here informed me that there was a block-house with a garrison of about 100 men at the Allatoona bridge;  that at Allatoona there were two small redoubts with out-works, defended with four pieces of artillery and garrisoned with three and a half regiments of infantry.

About 11 p. m. the march was resumed. The night was very dark and the roads  bad. After crossing Allatoona Creek Colonel Adaire, with the Fourth Regiment Mississippi Volunteers and one piece of artillery, was left near the block-house, with instructions to surround it, capture the garrison, and destroy the bridge over the creek.

Continuing the march the Division arrived before Allatoona about 3 a. m. Nothing could be seen but one or two twinkling lights on the opposite heights, and nothing was heard except the occasional interchange of shots between our advanced guards and the pickets of the garrison in the valley below. All was darkness. I had no knowledge of the place, and it was important to attack at the break of day. Taking the guide and lights I placed the artillery in position on the hills south and east of the railroad, and the Thirty-ninth North Carolina Regiment, under Colonel Coleman, and the Thirty-second Texas were left as a supporting force, both under command of Colonel J. A. Andrews, commanding the latter regiment.” (Official Record)

7:00a–9:00a

Starting around 7:00, the Confederates opened an 11-cannon artillery barrage on the fortified Union positions.  French moved his forces into position for attack, with Brigadier General William Young and Brigadier General Francis Cockrell to the west and Brigadier General Claudius Sears to the north and east of the forts.

“Dispositions for the assault were now made by sending General Sears' brigade to the north side or rear of the works, General F. M. Cockrell's (Missouri) brigade to west with center on the ridge, while General W. H. Young, with the four Texas regiments, was formed in rear of General Cockrell. Major Myrick had opened on the works with his artillery, and was ordered to continue his fire until the attacking force should interfere, or until he heard the volleys of musketry. General Sears was to commence the assault on the rear, and when musketry was heard General Cockrell was to move down the ridge, supported by General Young, and carry the works by (as it were) a flank attack.”  (Official Record)

French’s ultimatum

Sometime before 9:00a, French, thinking that he had the forts surrounded, and significantly outnumbered (he didn’t) sent an ultimatum to General Corse to surrender – to prevent a “needless effusion of blood”:

Corse’s reply

General Corse records in his report in the Official Record that he received the ultimatum, and replied with a somewhat jaunty reply – “we are prepared for the 'needless effusion of blood' whenever it is agreeable to you”:

French’s report on the incident

However, French would later say in his report that he never received a reply from Corse, and thus initiated the attack. 

“So rugged and abrupt were the hills that the troops could not be got in position until about 9 a. m., when I sent in a summons to surrender. The flag was met by a Federal staff officer, and he was allowed seventeen minutes to return with an answer. The time expired without any answer being received, whereupon Major D. W. Sanders, impatient at the delay, a bearer of the summons, broke off the interview and returned. No reply being sent me, the order was given for the assault by directing the advance of Cockrell's brigade.” (Official report, emphasis added)

This modern map (TopoUSA Version 4.0) shows the deployment of forces at 8:30, as the main battle began.  Initial fighting was to the west of the Star Fort at Rowett’s Redoubt.

9:00a-11:00a

Sometime after 8:30a, the Confederates launched a fierce attack on fortifications to the west of the Star Fort, led by Brigadier General William H. Young and Brigadier General Francis M. Cockrell.  Corse described the early fighting, which resulted in a retreat of Union forces into the Star Fort.

“…the storm broke in all its fury on the Thirty-ninth Iowa and Seventh Illinois. Young's brigade of Texans, 1,900 strong, had gained the west end of the ridge and moved with great impetuosity along its crest till they struck Rowett's command, where they received a severe check, but, undaunted, they came again and again. Rowett, re-enforced by the Ninety-Third Illinois and aided by the gallant Redfield, encouraged me to hope we were all safe here, when I observed a brigade of the enemy, under command of General Sears, moving from the north, its left extending across the railroad.

I rushed to the two companies of the Ninety-Third Illinois, which were on the brink of the cut running north from the redoubt and parallel with the railroad, they having been re-enforced by the retreating pickets, and urged them to hold on the spur, but it was of no avail. The enemy's line of battle swept us back like so much chaff and struck the Thirty-ninth Iowa in flank, threatening to engulf our little band without further ado.

Fortunately for us Colonel Tourtellotte's fire caught Sears in the flank, and broke him so bad as to enable me to get a staff officer over the cut, with orders to bring the Fiftieth Illinois over to re-enforce Rowett, who had lost very heavily.

However, before the regiment sent for could arrive, Sears and Young both rallied and made their assaults in front and on the flank with so much vigor and in such force as to break Rowett's line, and had not the Thirty-ninth Iowa fought with the desperation it did, I never would have been able to have brought a man back into the redoubt.

As it was, their hand-to-hand struggle and stubborn stand broke the enemy to that extent he must stop to reform before undertaking the assault on the fort. Under cover of the blow they gave the enemy, the Seventh and Ninety-Third Illinois, and what remained of the Thirty-ninth Iowa, fell back into the fort. The fighting up to this time (about 11 a. m. ) was of a most extraordinary character;  attacked from the north, from the west, and from the south, these three regiments (Thirty-ninth Iowa, Seventh Illinois, and Ninety-Third Illinois Infantry) held Young's and a portion of Sears' and Cockrell's brigade at bay for nearly two hours and a half.” (Official Record)

One of the reasons that the Union forces in the Rowett’s Redoubt area hung on as long as they did was because the men of the 7th Illinois Infantry had Henry repeating rifles, with 16-shot magazines.  The weapons had been purchased (and shipped) at the expense of 7^th Illinois Infantry Captain John Alexander Smith, and arrived just days before the battle.  The Henry, a predecessor of the Winchester, would have been a significant advantage against the Confederate forces fighting with one-shot weapons.

In French’s report on the opening part of the battle, he seemed to be under the impression that Sears had been more successful in his attack on the Eastern Redoubt than was actually the case:

“…the order was given for the assault by directing the advance of Cockrell's brigade. Emerging from the woods and passing over a long distance of abatis formed of felled timber, and under a severe fire of musketry and artillery, nobly did it press forward, followed by the gallant Texans. The enemy's outer line and one redoubt soon fell. Resting to gather strength and survey the work before them, again they rushed forward in column, and in murderous hand-to-hand conflict that left the ditches filled with the dead, did they become master of the second redoubt. The third and main redoubt, now filled by those driven from the captured works on the West side of the railroad, was further crowded by those that were driven out of the fort on the east side of the road by the attack made by General Sears.” (Official Record)

Fighting at the Star Fort (11:00a-3:00p)

Sally Port of the Star Fort

After the retreat from Rowett’s Redoubt into the Star Fort, the Union forces faced concentrated rifle fire from three sides.  Several assaults were made on the Star Fort between 11:00a-12:00, but none were successful.  At one point, Corse was wounded and fell unconscious.  He later “came to”, and continued to direct the battle.   

Corse described the fighting in the Star Fort in detail:

“So completely disorganized were the enemy that no regular assault could be made on the fort till I had the trenches all filled and the parapets lined with men. The Twelfth Illinois and Fiftieth Illinois arriving from the east hill enabled us to occupy every foot of trench, and keep up a line of fire that, as long as our ammunition lasted, would render our little fort impregnable.

The broken pieces of the enemy enabled them to fill every hollow and take every advantage of the rough ground surrounding the fort, filling every hole and trench, seeking shelter behind every stump and log that lay within musket-range of the fort. We received fire from the north, south, and West face of the redoubt, completely enfilading our ditches, and rendering it almost impracticable for a man to expose his person above the parapet.

An effort was made to carry our works by assault, but the battery (Twelfth Wisconsin) was so ably managed and so gallantly fought as to render it impossible for a column to live within 100 yards of the works. Officers labored constantly to stimulate the men to exertion, and most all that were killed or wounded in the fort met this fate while trying to get the men to expose themselves above the parapet and nobly setting them the example.

The enemy kept up a constant and intense fire, gradually closing around us and rapidly filling our little fort with the dead and dying. About 1 p. m. I was wounded by a rifle-ball, which rendered me insensible for some thirty or forty minutes, but managed to rally on hearing some person or persons cry, "Cease firing," which conveyed to me the impression they were trying to surrender the fort. [Note: the order to cease fire was to allow the Union guns to cool.]

Again I urged my staff, the few officers left unhurt, and the men around me to renewed exertion, assuring them that Sherman would soon be there with reinforcements; the gallant fellows struggled to keep their heads above the ditch and parapet in the face of the murderous fire of the enemy now concentrated upon us.

The artillery was silent for want of ammunition, and a brave fellow, whose named I regret to have forgotten [probably Private Edwin R. Fullington], volunteered to cross the cut, which was under fire of the enemy, and go to the fort on the east hill and procure ammunition. Having executed his mission successfully he returned in a short time with an armload of canister and case shot.

About 2. 30 p. m. the enemy were observed massing a force behind a small house and the ridge on which the house was located, distant northwest from the fort about 150 yards. The dead and wounded were moved aside, so as to enable us to move a piece of artillery to an embrasure commanding the house and ridge. A few shots from the gun threw the enemy's column into great confusion, which being observed by our men, caused them to rush to the parapet and open such a heavy and continuous musketry fire that it was impossible for the enemy to rally.

From this time until near 4 p. m. we had the advantage of the enemy, and maintained it with such success that they were driven from every position, and finally field in great confusion, leaving their dead and wounded, and our little garrison in possession of the field.” (Official Record)

Eastern redoubt

The Star Fort wasn’t the only scene of heavy fighting.  Multiple assaults were made by Brigadier General Sears on the Eastern Redoubt, and all were repulsed.  80 Confederates trapped in a gully to the north of the Redoubt were captured after the battle.

Remains of the Eastern Redoubt

During the battle, the Eastern Redoubt provided reinforcements and ammunition to the besieged Star Fort via a rickety wooden bridge, formed by felled trees, across the railroad cut.

Corse gave great credit to Tourtelotte for protecting Corse’s eastern flank:

“The hill east of the cut was gallantly and successfully defended by Colonel Tourtellotte, with that portion of the Third Division, Fifteenth Army Corps, that fell back from the town early in the morning. Not only did they repulse the assaults made upon them, but rendered me valuable aid in protecting my north front from the repeated attacks by Sears' brigade.” (Official Record)

French’s withdrawal

Sometime between 3:00p/3:30p, General French made the decision to withdrawal.  As part of the ordered withdrawal, French’s troops captured the Sandtown Rd. blockhouse. 

“The troops reformed on the original ground west of the works and marched back to the south side near the artillery… [at 3. 30 p. m] After the troops engaged in the assault had left, I rode on down to Colonel Andrew's position, in front of the works, and directed him to remain until 5 p. m., and then withdraw and move on in our rear. Before I had determined to withdraw the infantry from the captured works (but after the guide said I would have to return by the way I came) I sent orders to major Myrick to send two of his batteries and his caissons to a point beyond the block-house on the Sandtown road, to act in concert with the troops left there.

Having been informed by Colonel Adaire that the block-house at he Allatoona bridge had not been captured I directed Captain Kolb, with his battery, that had remained with Colonel Andrews, to move on and report to General Cockrell for the purpose of taking the block-house.

Shortly after 4 p. m., and when not a person could be seen in or around the forts, I left the command of Colonel Andrews and overtook the Division near the block-house. Colonel Adaire had burnt the railroad bridge over the Allatoona Creek (over 200 feet long) and the duplicate of the bridge, already framed to replaced the older structure. Under an increased artillery fire the garrison of the block-house surrendered.” (Official Record)

In retrospect, one of the great failures of the Confederate attack was leaving the Federal supplies intact.  French later gave an explanation as to his failure to destroy Union supplies at Allatoona:

“Before withdrawing ordered the stores be burned at the depot. Parties were sent, but all efforts they could make failed to procure fire. The matches furnished would not ignite, and no fire could be procured. The enemy's fire concentrated too protect their stores was heavy and incessant all the time.” (Official Record)

Why did French withdraw?

So, why did French withdraw?  Corse would later view that it was because the Confederates were defeated and in disarray.  French cited several reasons in his report that included:

• He was concerned that his men had been (essentially) three days without rest

• He had received multiple reports that a large enemy force was drawing near from Big Shanty

• He was low on ammunition, and it would have taken 2 hours to replenish

“I knew the enemy was in Big Shanty at 9 a. m. [as it turned out, this report was inaccurate].  By noon he could reach Acworth and be within two miles of the road on which I was to reach new Hope Church. I knew General Stewart had been ordered to near Lost Mountain. My men had marched all day on the 3d; worked all the night of the 3rd destroying the railroad; they had worked and marched all day on the 4th; marched to Allatoona on the night of the 4th; had fought up to the afternoon of the 5th; and could they pass the THIRD day and night without rest or sleep, if we remained to assault the remaining work?

I did not doubt that the enemy would endeavor to get in my rear to intercept my return. He was in the morning but three hours distant, and had been signaled to repeatedly during the battle. Under these circumstances I determined to withdraw, however depressing the idea of not capturing the place after so many had fallen, and when in all probability we could force a surrender before night; yet, however desirous I was for remaining before the last work and forcing a capitulation, or of carrying the work by assault, I deemed it of more importance not to permit the enemy to cut my Division off from the army…” (Official Record)

Results and Aftermath

Casualties on both sides at Battle of Allatoona Pass were high, with the Union forces suffering 36% casualties, and the Confederates suffering 27% (can you imagine a modern battle involving U.S. forces with 30% casualties!)  As such, it was one of the most fiercely fought engagements of the whole War.

Note: Estimates of Confederate casualties range from 799-897.

From a strategic standpoint, the battle was a Union victory – the Pass was held, the supplies were saved, and ultimately, Hood’s forces retreated.

In Corse’s initial report, he claimed that “with a brigade of fresh troops I would have captured French's entire DIVISION”: 

“The enemy followed up and continued to fight with great desperation until 3. 30 p. m., when they withdrew in disorder, repulsed at every point. With a brigade of fresh troops I would have captured French's entire DIVISION. We saved all the stores, buried 150 rebel dead, including 2 colonels and several other field officers. Have 400 prisoners, including the wounded; among the wounded are 1 rebel colonel and several other field officers. We have in our possession 3 stand of rebel colors, and have already gathered 500 stand of small-arms, and the country, is still strewn with them. A rebel surgeon reports General Young killed [Young was wounded, not killed] and General Cockrell wounded. My loss is about 600 killed, wounded, and missing. I brought about 900 muskets with me. Colonel Tourtellotte had about 600, making in all about 1,500. We looked anxiously all day for the arrival of my troops from Rome or reinforcements from you. The damage done to the track by the recent heavy rains prevented the train I sent from returning with my troops until the morning of the 6th.” (Official Report)

It is doubtful that General French would have agreed with General Corse’s assessment of his withdrawal in “disorder”.  If French’s forces had been in such disarray and disorder, it is doubtful that French could have captured the Sandtown Rd. blockhouse during his retreat. 

French called the Allatoona Pass battle one of the “most sanguinary [bloody] conflicts of the war”.

“History will record the battle of Allatoona one of the most sanguinary conflicts of the war, and when it is remembered that the enemy fought from within their strong redoubts, the desperate deeds of daring performed by our troops in overcoming so many of the foe, a need of praise is due to their heroic valor.

The artillery opened about 7 o'clock in the morning, and, except when the flag of truce was sent in, continued till 2 p. m. The assault, commencing about 10, continued unremittingly till 1. 30 p. m., and the rattle of musketry did not cease entirely till near 3 p. m., when it died away and a silence like the pall of death rested over the scene, contrasting so strangely with the previous din off battle.

I cannot do justice to the gallantry of the troops. No one faltered in his duty, and all withdrew from the place with the regret that General Sherman's movements - closing up behind us - forbid our remaining longer to force a surrender of the last work.” (Official Record)

By October 6, French had rejoined Hood’s army near Dallas.  On November 9, as Sherman prepared to commence his March to the Sea, he issued orders to destroy the very railroad that he had fought so fiercly to protect the month before:  

“In accordance with instructions from Major-General Sherman, commanding Military Division of the Mississippi, corps commanders will have their commands in readiness to march at a moment's notice to commenced the complete destruction of the railroad…From Big Shanty to a point eleven miles south will be destroyed by the Seventeenth Army Corps, and thence to the Chattahoochee bridge by the Fifteenth Corps. The destruction will be most complete, the ties burned, rails twisted, &c., as [has] been done heretofore.” (Official Record)

On November 15, 2004, Sherman commenced his “March to the Sea”.

Miscellany

Corse’s injuries

Shortly after the battle (October 6, 1864), in a signal exchange with Captain L.M. Dayton on Kennesaw Mountain, Corse described his injuries as such:

“I am short a cheek bone and one ear, but am able to whip all hell yet. My losses are very heavy.” (Official Record)

When Sherman saw Corse several days later, he commented, “Corse, they came damned near missing you, didn’t they?”, indicating that Corse might have exaggerated his injuries somewhat!

Sherman on Kennesaw Mountain

One of the interesting features of the battle is that General Sherman attempted to follow the action from Kennesaw Mountain, 12.5 miles away.  Signals were transmitted throughout the battle from the “Crow’s Nest”, a 60-foot tall tree to the east of the Eastern Redoubt.  Sherman later reported on his observation of the battle:

“In person I reached Kenesaw Mountain about 10 a. m. of the 5th, and could see the smoke of battle and hear the faint sounds of artillery. The distance eighteen miles, was too great for me to make in time to share in the battle, but I directed the Twenty-Third Corps, Brigadier-General  Cox commanding to move rapidly from the base of Kenesaw, due west, aiming to reach the road from Allatoona to Dallas, threatening the rear of the forces attacking Allatoona. I succeeded in getting a signal message to General Corse during his fight, notifying him of my presence. The defense of Allatoona by General  Corse was admirably conducted and the enemy repulsed with heavy slaughter.” (Official Record)

Throughout the day, Sherman sent several signals to Allatoona that said, in effect, “Hold fast; we are coming” (even though no relief force was in motion on the day of the battle).  After the battle, the Northern press reporting these signals as a more stirring “Hold the fort; I am coming” message, which was latter turned into a popular hymn by evangelist Phillip Paul Bliss.

 Ho! My comrades! See the signal, Waving in the sky!

Reinforcements now appearing, Victory is nigh

“Hold the Fort, for I am coming,” Jesus signals still

Wave the answer back to heaven, “By His grace we will”

The battlefield today

The forts (Star Fort and Eastern Redoubt) and railroad cut are open to the public.  The columned house in the extreme left of the George Barnard photo still stands today. 

With the construction of Allatoona Lake in the 1940s, a causeway was built to the southeast of the railroad cut, which has somewhat altered the topology of the battlefield.  But all in all, Allatoona battlefield is fairly intact.

W&A railroad cut entrance, looking north

W&A railroad cut, looking north

Remains of the Star Fort

Clayton-Mooney House, used as a hospital at the Battle of Allatoona Pass

“An Unknown Hero” grave

About 200 yards south (just across the CSX railroad tracks) of the entrance to the railroad cut is the grave of a Confederate “Unknown Hero”.   The remains have long been assumed to be that of a soldier that fell at the Battle of Allatoona Pass, although that is only conjecture – the remains were shipped to Allatoona a few days after the battle in an unmarked wooden box. 

 The original site of the grave was in the now abandoned railroad cut.  There is a marker at the original gravesite. The grave was moved to its present location in 1944, when the route of the railroad was changed.  Railroad workers have tended the gravesite since 1880.

Allatoona Pass then and now

 George Barnard photo

Bibliography

• A History of the Civil War, Benson Lossing, 1912
• Allatoona Pass, by William R. Scaife, Etowah Valley Historical Society, 1995
• Fields of Glory, by Jim Miles (1989, Rutledge Hill Press)
• Harper's New Monthly Magazine
• Sherman’s March: Atlanta to the Sea, by David Nevin (1986, Time-Life Books)
• The Henry Rifle In the Civil War, Andrew L. Bresnan, M.S., http://www.rarewinchesters.com/articles/art_hen_02.htm
• The Photographic History of the Civil War: Forts and Artillery, Edited by Theo. Rodenbough, 1911
• The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Government Printing Office, 1892

Color photos by Robert Jones

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