Abstract: Individuative Realism is the thesis that reality is individuated intrinsically – that is, that there exist some objects and/or kinds of objects that are circumscribed by boundaries that are totally independent of our gerrymandering.  If this thesis is true, then how do we determine which individuation schemes cut reality at its inherent joints?  Since our individuation schemes cannot be compared directly with the way reality is individuated intrinsically without begging the question about the latter, some philosophers argue that a match can only be determined indirectly, in virtue of an independent criterion.  This paper considers a few proposed independent criteria and finds them wanting.  The paper concludes by suggesting that such an independent criterion is unattainable in principle.        

Abstract: The notion of mind-independence plays a central role in the contemporary realism/anti-realism debate, but the notion is severely ambiguous and consequently the source of considerable misunderstanding.  In this paper, four kinds of mind-independence are distinguished: ontological, causal, structural, and individuative independence.  Appreciating these distinctions entails that one can reject the individuative independence of the natural world, and still maintain that the natural world is causally and structurally independent of us.  This paper argues that so-called anti-realists, especially Rorty, Putnam, and Goodman, are not opposed to the causal and structural independence of the natural world, as is frequently alleged, but rather its individuative independence.  An acceptance of these points will hopefully put an end to the prevalence of strawmen in the debate, and focus attention on meatier issues.

Abstract: Even if unconditional truth is unattainable in principle, the ideal of unconditional truth has an important role to play in practice – at least this is what Habermas argues.  Habermas' position can be construed as descriptive or prescriptive.  Either way, it faces considerable challenges.  As a description, it raises classic philosophical problems.  As a prescription, it raises many of the practical problems of religious fundamentalism – at least this is what Rorty argues.  The upshot of this paper is that trying to avoid the theoretical problems inherent to the concept of unconditional truth by non-epistemic means is not promising. 

Abstract: Individuative Realism is the thesis that reality is individuated intrinsically – that is, that reality is divided up into objects that are circumscribed by boundaries that are totally independent of our gerrymandering.  One strategy for substantiating the thesis would involve discovering some of reality’s inherent joints by direct observation.  This paper critically considers the observational strategy by examining a number of proposals for how reality might be individuated intrinsically, and demonstrating case-by-case that the individuation in question is likely imposed by us, rather than inherent in nature.  It is additionally suggested that even if objects with crisply unambiguous boundaries were discovered, it would still not be enough to vindicate Individuative Realism. 

Abstract: I discuss how the notions of God, the intrinsic nature of reality, and the Invisible Hand are explanatory inferences that also provide practice-independent justification for certain social practices.  Wittgenstein’s analysis of rules suggests that these underdetermined notions are better thought of as useful fictions for characterizing phenomena, rather than as causally efficacious entities.  I suggest that it is their underdetermination that suits them especially well to justification, since their content can flex to serve multifarious interests.