The goal of the human factors data project is to improve aviation safety by the effective dissemination and processing of data that might be relevant to the goal. As I argued in the previous workshop (Wise & Wise, 1995), no data can be considered without reference to the a weltanschauung or a theory by which it is collected and analyzed. Burke, for example, has demonstrated many times that knowledge and how it is used is dependent on currently held theory and worldview.

You are what you know. Fifteenth-century Europeans 'knew' that the sky was made of closed concentric crystal spheres, rotating around a central earth and carrying the stars and planets. That 'knowledge' structured everything they did and thought, because it told them the truth. Then Galileo's telescope changed the truth.

As a result, a hundred years later everybody 'knew' that the universe was open and infinite, working like a giant clock. Architecture, music, literature, science, economics, art, politics - everything - changed, mirroring the new view created by the change in knowledge.

Today we live according to the latest version of how the universe functions. This view affects our behaviour and thought, just as previous versions affected those who lived with them. Like people of the past, we disregard phenomena which do not fit our view because they are 'wrong' or outdated. Like our ancestors, we know the real truth. (Burke, 1985, p 9)

Ah, the real truth is very important to all of us. For example, there were interesting events taking place in Russia at the time as the Workshop. Their first ever election for President had generated a significant debate in our news media about the consequences of a win by the Communist Party candidate. What would happen if the Communists regained power? The one thing that seemed to be agreed on by most of the Western media was that there would be a significant clamping down on the freedom of the Russian media. The Communist Party has long recognized control of information is extremely important to control of the people. Thus, the Russian government would need to get involved to make sure that the "wrong" information did not get out (i.e., to protect the real truth). Free flowing data can have serious consequences, particularly when it gets into the "wrong hands."

An issue that surfaced over and over again at both Workshops addresses this same issue. It has been suggested by many of the participants that the proposed database should be designed in such a way to keep those "other" people (the ones who always distort the "truth") from gaining access to all or at least part of the database. Everyone knows, if "they" have access to this database "they" will only use it to support "their" own point-of-view without regard to what "really" happened. Letting this data get into the "wrong" hands could have significant negative impacts of safety and aviation.

Everyone knows who "those" people are, so one could easily screen them out. After all, "those" people would only use that power to distort the information suit their point-of-view. But we, who are associated with the safety world, would only use data in a positive way. We would never with hold something for other than pure and scientific reasons. For example, air framers would never want to hold some engineering data back - even though an unsophisticated user might not be able to understand all the nuances involved. Surely, an engine manufacturer would never want to hold back data on a blade design because someone with out a good thermodynamics background might not understand why the trade-offs were made they way they were. A government agency would never want to hold something back, because someone outside of aviation would not comprehend why a waiver was given to a certain operator.

The control of safety data by the "righteous" is of course always good. It protects the innocent from the exaggerations and distortions of "those other people." Safety professionals are of course righteous. Their only interest is to make the world safer! Safety professional would never have a pet program they would like to protect. Safety professional would never go out of our way to emphasize marginal data on a "questionable" operation that stays just inside the official boundaries. No, never!!!

The point of this short paper is that everyone (maybe even this author) have biases. However, when they are our biases, we call them scientific theory or hypotheses. When they are someone else's we call them prejudice. It is clear that people color data to meet their expectations. That is because all humans all do it. Expectations always overwhelm data!!! Expectations are what we use to interpret raw data. Historians of science have shown this to be true even in the "hard sciences!" For example, Mitroff (1974) in his study of the impact of the Apollo Missions on the theory of the origins of the Moon - showed that the new data brought back from each mission was always interpreted in the light of the individual's personal theory. The theory might be modified a little, but it was never dropped in favor of another!

Thus, this paper argues that ALL of the data (within the limits of privacy laws) should be made available to everyone who is interested. Sure, we will be mad on occasion when we feel data has been distorted. But, occasionally a person outside of our area will apply their bias in a way that will provide the aviation community significant insight into a problem that was either was not recognized or that we did not know how to solve. Let's not behave like the establishment and hold Galileo in house arrest for publishing obviously biased and erroneous views about the world. One never knows what will be lost.

References

Burke, J. (1978). Connections. Boston: Little, Brown.

Burke, J. (1985). The Day the Universe Changed. Boston: Little, Brown.

Mitroff, I.I. (1974). The Subjective Side of Science: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Psychology of the Apollo Moon Scientists. Amsterdam: Elsivier

Wise, J.A. & M.A. Wise. (1995). In search of answers without questions: or, How many monkeys at typewriters will it takeÉ Proceedings of the Workshop on Flight Crew Accident and Incident Human Factors. McLean, VA: 21 - 23 June.