Knockdown Update
© Greg Meyer

May 2001

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Landmark Taser study published by Canadian Tactics Expert Following 6-month Field Test

Following a highly successful, six-month field test of the Taser by the Victoria Police Department in Canada, Sergeant Darren Laur of the VPD has published an outstanding article entitled, "Independent Evaluation Report of TASERÒ and AIR TASERÒ Conducted Energy Weapons." Appended to his article is the report of the VPD field test. Sergeant Laur examines in great detail the two primary law enforcement TASER products currently on the market, with hints of enhancements that are in development.

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November 1998

Startling News on Positional Asphyxia; Effects of the "Hog-Tie" Called into Question; Dr. Reay Changes Opinion

Ed. Note: The significance of the Price case is such that I am reprinting a lengthy excerpt here. Also, it is worthy of note that in personal correspondence from Dr. Reay after the Price case, he told me that although the Price case research altered his view on the "hog-tie" itself, he continues to be concerned about other restraint-asphyxia issues.

PRICE V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO (a custody death case)

1998 WL 16007 (S.D.Cal.)

HIGHLIGHTS

Plaintiffs primarily rely on the testimony of Donald T. Reay, M.D ., who first hypothesized the concept of positional asphyxia. The UCSD study, which Dr. Reay concedes rests on exemplary methodology, eviscerates Dr. Reay's conclusions. The UCSD study refutes Dr. Reay's underlying premise--that blood oxygen levels decrease after exercise. Thus, the UCSD study refutes Dr. Reay's ultimate conclusion--that the hogtie restraint prevents the lungs from replenishing the blood's oxygen supply . . .

After Dr. Reay's retraction, little evidence is left that suggests that the hogtie restraint can cause asphyxia. All of the scientists who have sanctioned the concept of positional asphyxia have relied to some degree on Dr. Reay's work. The UCSD study has proven Dr. Reay's work to be faulty, which impugns the scientific articles that followed it. Like a house of cards, the evidence for positional asphyxia has fallen completely. . . . In light of the UCSD study, the hogtie restraint in and of itself does not constitute excessive force--when a violent individual has resisted less severe restraint techniques, applying a physiologically neutral restraint that will immobilize him is not excessive force.

The deputies admit, however, that they applied minor pressure to Price's back. As they handcuffed and hogtied him, they necessarily had to control him from thrashing around, so a deputy placed a knee in Price's back and a hand on his shoulder. The Court finds that this action was reasonable. See Estate of Phillips v. City of Milwaukee, 123 F.3d 586, 593 (7th Cir.1997) (holding on similar facts that "the officers' response was reasonable [inasmuch as the officers] placed just enough weight on [the arrestee] to keep him from rolling over and kicking"). A deputy testified that he may have maintained this pressure for a few seconds after he completed the hogtie as he got up from the ground. The Court holds that this innocent, brief action was reasonable. . . . In addition, Deputy Tally testified that he knelt next to Price, placing most of his weight on his heels. However, he placed a knee in Price's back. Deputy Tally did this to calm Price (and thus keep him from smashing his face into the ground) and to convey a sense of control in a tense, confused situation. Notably, Deputy Tally did not apply significant pressure to Price. The Court finds that Deputy Tally's actions were reasonable. . . .

The Court emphasizes the limited nature of its holding. The Court merely holds that on the particular facts of this case, the hogtie restraint did not constitute excessive force. Given the limitations of the UCSD study noted above, the Court intimates no view on whether the hogtie restraint might constitute unreasonable force if used on other individuals in other circumstances.

The obvious question remains, however: What did cause Price's death? The Court finds that, as several expert witnesses testified, he most likely died from a cardiac arrest that occurred during his encounter with the deputies. [FN18] Numerous factors indicate that methamphetamine-induced toxic delirium caused this cardiac arrest. . . . Dr. Neuman perfectly captured the cause of death when he made the following statement:

We have clear data that there is no respiratory component to the hogtie position. We also have clear data that Price was a chronic methamphetamine abuser. He had essentially all of the signs and symptoms of methamphetamine use, and he died a death that was completely consistent with toxic delirium secondary to methamphetamine use. To suppose anything else placed a significant role in his death is speculation.

Plaintiffs claim that the Sheriff's Department's decision not to train its deputies in applying the hogtie restraint constituted a governmental policy or custom that inflicted constitutional injury on Price. Plaintiffs also have suggested that the Sheriff's Department had a custom or policy not to train its deputies to administer CPR. These arguments fail. The hogtie restraint did not inflict a constitutional injury on Price, so Monell liability cannot attach. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 106 S.Ct. 1571, 89 L.Ed.2d 806 (1986) ; Quintanilla v. City of Downey, 84 F.3d 353, 355-56 (9th Cir.1996) , cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 972, 136 L.Ed.2d 856 (1997) . Moreover, the Sheriff's Department did not show "deliberate indifference" by not teaching its deputies about nonexistent dangers.

The events of this case are undeniably tragic. They are tragic for Price's widow. They are tragic for his young children. They are tragic for his parents. Above all, they are tragic for Price himself. The events of this case are also tragic for the deputies. Undoubtedly, the deputies did not expect or desire Price to come to any grave harm. The Court is well aware of the distress that deaths in the field daily cause peace officers. Plaintiffs, who had the burden of proof, ably presented a strong case with strong facts. However, as in most cases, other evidence contradicted Plaintiffs' evidence. In the end, the weight of the evidence preponderated against Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs simply did not meet their burden of proof. In many ways, this case is symptomatic of a larger problem that has swept the San Diego area in recent years. The scourge of methamphetamine daily ravages its victims. Quite apart from the medical cause of death, which the Court discussed at length above, methamphetamine abuse precipitated this entire case. If Price had not abused methamphetamine, he would not have acted in a bizarre fashion, the deputies never would have arrived, and none of the incidents of this case would have transpired. Methamphetamine has devoured another of its victims, and forever transformed the lives of his family members. The Court's rulings today in no way seek to downplay the tragic events of this case. In the end, the Court simply could not conclude that Defendants were the ones to blame for the unfortunate events that transpired. Accordingly, the Court must grant judgment for Defendants.

Other "Positional Asphyxia" Links

Ed. Note: As can be seen from the Price case (above), restraint asphyxia is a developing area that continues to be the subject of great debate among medical and law enforcement personnel. The following links illustrate what a serious debate this is. The topic has significant implications for officer and suspect safety, attitudes in the community, and the liability that springs from custody deaths.

Abstract of the UCSD Research Used in the Price Case

Custody Deaths in the United Kingdom

Jonny Gammage Case (Pittsburgh, PA)

Pepper Spray in Prisons

Pepper Spray Article

BodyCuff: The Hoffman Incident (San Diego)

The Library

Official Negligence: How Rodney King and the Riots Changed Los Angeles and the LAPD, by Lou Cannon (biographer of Ronald Reagan), Times Books, 1997, $35. This book will survive as the definitive history of the cataclysmic events in Los Angeles in 1991 and 1992. The Rodney King incident forever changed law enforcement, and the L.A. riots changed political and economic history. Available in book stores.

Stunguns, Lies and Videotape: A Guide to TASER Technology, by John Murray and Barry Resnick, Whitewater Press, 1997, $19.95. Murray and Resnick have provided a great service to law enforcement by documenting the history of Taser technology and its life-saving applications. Contact Whitewater Press, 32742 Mediterranean Drive, Dana Point, CA 92629.

Ed. Note: The first internet edition of "Knockdown Update" appears above. Below this line are excerpts from the quarterly newsletter version of "Knockdown Update" I published from 1992 to 1994.

Knockdown Update
© Greg Meyer

October, 1994

Rodney King Case Retrospective
On September 7, I joined Mike Stone (who was Officer Laurence Powell's attorney) for a lively retrospective on the Rodney King case, in Huntington Beach, CA, for the Orange County Traffic Officers Association. Thanks to Steve Polley of La Habra PD.

Nonlethal Course a Success in Florida
On October 17, it was a privilege to present my one-day course, "Beyond Rodney King: Nonlethal Weapons vs. Conventional Police Tactics" at the Central Florida Criminal Justice Institute at Orlando. My thanks to Jon Welch and Ron Kazoroski for making this possible.

Quotable
"Put the Phaser on 'stun,' Scotty!" - Captain Kirk ("Star Trek") and the ultimate nonlethal weapon

NIJ Research Grants Available to Further Nonlethal Weapons
The National Institute of Justice NIJ Program Plan contains a wealth of information about in-progress research and opportunities to obtain grant funding to conduct new research. The nonlethal weapons field is receiving significant funding, and there is every indication that more research in this field would be welcome.

The Program Plan lists recent NIJ grant funding awards. For example, the 1993 publication lists the following grants: "Public Acceptance of Less-Than-Lethal Technology ($150,000); Legal and Policy Analysis of Use of Less-Than-Lethal Weapons in Civilian Law Enforcement ($151,702); Less-Than-Lethal Weapons Program--Technical Support ($187,691); Less-Than-Lethal Weapons Technology and Policy Assessment ($190,566); Nonlethal Weapon System Research and Development Project ($199,629); and Physiological Responses Applicable to Less-Than-Lethal Weapons ($150,000).

Quoting from the Program Plan, "The National Institute of Justice plays an important role in the development and promotion of research, evaluation, and technology in the field of criminal justice at the Federal, State, and local levels. Traditionally, NIJ performs these functions by soliciting proposals to address specific research questions (in support off NIJ's Program Plan goals). . . . Each project is expected to generate products of maximum benefit to criminal justice professionals, researchers, and policymakers." One of the goals is "to improve the effectiveness of Criminal Justice and Service Systems' Responses." Police use of force is a specific issue of interest under that goal.

There are plenty of unexplored research ideas having to do with current and future nonlethal weapons, rates of effectiveness of different devices, and tactical and training issues. Call the National Criminal Justice Reference Service publications unit at 800-851-3420, and ask for the publication.

Knockdown Update
© Greg Meyer

June, 1994

King Civil Trial Ends
Rodney King went home a "winner" in his federal civil trial, with the jury awarding $3.8 million in general damages, but no punitive damages from the officers or former Chief of Police Daryl Gates. See article, "After Rodney King: What Have We Learned?" The federal appellate court has heard the appeals of Sergeant Stacey Koon and Officer Laurence Powell (both in prison since last fall), and a decision is expected this summer.

The Library

"Pepper Spray and In-Custody Deaths," John Granfield, Jami Onnen and Charles S. Petty, M.D., International Association of Chiefs of Police, Science and Technology Executive Brief, March 1994. This is "must" reading! More than merely debunking rumors of OC deaths, this brief provides comprehensive information on in-custody deaths in general. Write IACP, 515 N. Washington St., Alexandria, VA 22314 or fax your request to 703-836-4543.

"Flashlights and Police Liability," John G. Peters, Jr., and Michael A. Brave, Esq., in The Police Chief (IACP), May 1994. The Malice Green fatality in Detroit has again illuminated the dangers of flashlights as weapons. The article details important considerations about flashlights.

"Robocops," David C. Morrison, in the National Journal, 4/16/94. The Cold War is over. Internal security is the greatest threat. Military technology is being mobilized to "leapfrog law enforcement well into the 21st century." Features comments by David Boyd, director of Science and Technology at National Institute of Justice.

Quotable
"In conclusion, in none of the 22 cases was OC considered to be a cause of, or a contributor to, the deaths." - John Granfield, et al IACP Executive Brief on Pepper Spray and In-Custody Deaths 3/94

Travel Notes
I testified as an expert witness in the punitive damages phase of the Rodney King federal civil trial in Los Angeles, then headed East for three weeks. It was a pleasure to meet with some of you along the way! My wife and I had the honor of attending the National Law Enforcement Officers' Memorial service in Washington D.C. Visit the memorial at Judiciary Square when you are in the D.C. Along with the Vietnam "Wall", the law enforcement memorial is "must-see." There are more than 13,000 names inscribed on the National Peace Officers' Memorial; let us resolve to put the engravers out of business in years to come.

NIJ Hosts Hi-Techies
The National Institute of Justice Science and Technology Division, under the leadership of David Boyd, this month is hosting a conference off military, defense industry, law enforcement and legislators on the subject off technology transfer to the law enforcement arena. The Science and Technology vision at NIJ is to serve as the R&D focus for U.S. law enforcement, help law enforcement move from the late 19th to the 21st Century, save police and civilian lives, provide coordination of law enforcement R&D requirements with DOD and intelligence community R&D, and help focus 1/2 of 1% of federal R&D on law enforcement needs. We should all support this effort! It is probably inevitable at this stage of the game that most of the effort goes toward the "fancy" gear for the next Waco, the next riot, or the next O.J. Simpson-type pursuit. We should encourage research directed toward development of an ultimate nonlethal weapon (like the Phaser of Star Trek fame: hand-held, noninjurious, immediately effective) for street cops and jailers.

Knockdown Update
© Greg Meyer

February, 1994

The Library

"Use of Deadly Force Against Suspects Armed with Aerosol Weapons: Some Preliminary Guidelines," Gary S. Rapaport, Assistant Corporation Counsel, Springfield Police Department, Illinois. This article appeared in The Police Chief, February 1994. Rapaport is a member of IACP's Legal Officers Section. The legal issues in situations where officers are confronted with suspects threatening to use OC are considered. It is important for law enforcement to consider its response when OC is used against officers, before such incidents occur.

"Less-than-Lethal Weapons: New Solutions for Law Enforcement," Lois Pilant, IACP. This article appeared in IACP's Science and Technology Executive Brief, December 1993. The article provides an overview of the National Institute of Justice's effort to blend military and civilian technology to create better less-than-lethal and nonlethal weapons for law enforcement.

Quotable
"Police still have the same choices Wyatt Earp had. They can talk a subject into cooperating, they can beat him into submission or they can shoot him. What police need are better alternatives." -David Boyd, Director, NIJ's Science & Technology Division 12/93

Beyond "Reasonable & Necessary": Better Policy and Training
Many use-of-force policies are written in response to state laws or court decisions which require that an officer's actions in a use-of-force situations be "reasonable" or "reasonable and necessary" (two different concepts; the U.S. Supreme Court established "reasonable" as the standard in Graham v. Connor). On the surface, this mandate itself appears to be "reasonable and necessary." It is also sufficiently vague to simultaneously provide wide latitude to the officer faced with immediate, complex situations and to condemn the officer's actions on review. In days past, this wide latitude was acceptable. These days, officers are going to jail and/or paying punitive damages because of it. Our use-of-force policies need to be more specific, and they need to be infused with a moral imperative which expresses our commitment to minimizing injuries to officers and suspects alike. Our training needs to thoroughly translate the good intentions of our policies into useful hands-on capabilities. And our practices in street confrontations need to be consistent with our policy and our training.

Modern nonlethal weapons provide us the opportunity to reduce injuries and to achieve consistency among our purpose, our policy, and our practice. Officers may use only that force which is "reasonable and necessary." Given that force is sometimes "necessary," what level of force is "reasonable" in a given situation? "Reasonable force" is the type that 1) gets the job done, and 2) results in the fewest and least severe injuries to officers and suspects. The policy implication of this assertion is that nonlethal weapons (which have proven to cause fewer and less severe injuries than impact tactics, martial arts tactics, and other conventional knockdown tactics) should be used in a knockdown situation whenever the dynamics of the confrontation allow the officer to have a choice of tactics.

Of course, not all martial arts tactics have proven to be injurious. But many of the best-known and most often used tactics (wrist- and twist-locks, and arm-bars, to name a few) frequently result in broken bones, strains, or sprains. Also, not all confrontations put the two critical factors of "time and distance" on the side of the officer. When an officer comes under sudden attack, or when environmental conditions preclude the use of chemical or OC sprays or electrical weapons, martial arts tactics and conventional tactics (including impact) are appropriate. But experience shows that many confrontations start out with time and distance on the side of the officer. Officers who are properly trained and equipped with nonlethal weapons (and related policies) will achieve the needed knockdown with fewer and less severe injuries.

Knockdown Update
© Greg Meyer

November, 1993

Quotable
"A decision to suspend use of pepper spray is a decision to return to higher levels of baton use and officer injuries during arrest." - Reece Trimmer, July, 1993, Senior Agency Legal Specialist, North Carolina Justice Authority

NC Autopsy Causes OC Safety Concerns
During the early morning hours of July 11, 1993, Angelo Robinson (a six-foot, one-inch, 308 pound, 24-year-old Black male) died after a violent confrontation with Concord, North Carolina, police officers. Robinson had been sprayed with OC (oleoresin capsicum, or "pepper spray") during the incident. The medical examiner, Dr. Lisa M. Flannagan, reported the cause of death as "Asphyxia due to bronchospasm precipitated by pepper spray." In the Summary and Interpretation section of her report, Dr. Flannagan wrote, "The decedent complained of respiratory difficulty and subsequently collapsed soon after being sprayed with this substance. . . . There is no physical injury to explain his death. Based on the temporal relationship between his being sprayed with the pepper spray and his apparent respiratory compromise and rapid demise, I believe that this agent served as the precipitating factor in the chain of events. Mr. Robinson had a significant underlying pulmonary condition that conceivably predisposed him to hyper-reactive airways. In addition, his enlarged heart may have made him more susceptible to a cardiac arrhythmia under conditions off hypoxemia and stress." Robinson's alcohol content was measured at .14 BAC.

In the aftermath of Dr. Flannagan's findings, many questions are being raised. Are the doctor's conclusions correct? What other factors (such as acute exhaustive mania or positional asphyxia, which frequently come into play when particularly large suspects are involved in fatal confrontations with police) might have caused the death? Of the many thousands of people who have been sprayed with pepper spray, why haven't we seen more deaths if in fact the Concord death was caused by pepper spray? Even if it is ultimately proven to almost everyone's satisfaction that this particular death was brought on by pepper spray, does that mean that law enforcement should abandoned a tool which has proven in thousands of cases to result in fewer and less severe injuries than conventional police tools and tactics?

Howard Perry, president of Advanced Defense Technologies, Inc., (which produces First Strike, the OC product used on Robinson), was quoted in Law Enforcement News (October 15, 1993): "With respect to the inaccuracy and sloppiness of this autopsy, if [Flannagan] were treating alive patient, she would have been sued for malpractice . . . [n]owhere in her autopsy does she even establish there was any pepper internally or externally in the decedent, only that she was told he was sprayed with pepper. . . . So she concludes it must have had something to do with his death because she couldn't find anything else. . . . Our contention is, and will continue to be, that the guy died because of a lack of proper medical attention." Law Enforcement News also reported that Advanced Defense Technologies own investigation of the incident concluded that Robinson was sprayed with one canister of First Strike, which was "properly applied and did not contribute to the suspect's death. The suspect was intoxicated, passed out in the cruiser, vomited and choked to death on his own vomit."

It remains to be seen whether the medical examiner's conclusion will stand up to the intense review process which is underway. Law enforcement professionals should continue to use tools and tactics which minimize the chances of death and serious injury. More research must be conducted to determine what are the safest and most effective tools and tactics. Law enforcement officers will continue to have to knock down resisting suspects. Occasional adverse incidents come with the territory.

Knockdown Update
© Greg Meyer

August, 1993

The Library

Videotaped Experiments Question OC, Mace Effects. A videotape depicting experiments which call into question the effects of various OC (oleoresin capsicum) products on "determined attackers" has been making the rounds in the tactics-training arena. Phil Messina, of Modern Warrior (516-226-8383), facilitated the series of videotaped experiments to assert that armed and unarmed "determined attackers" (those who had a goal and a commitment to accomplish that goal) are capable of resisting the effects of the various spray types and completing their attacks.

On the other side of the issue is Roland Oullette, of R.E.B. Security Training (203-677-5936). Oullette's experience is that when OC is sprayed into the eyes and its mist is inhaled, nearly all subjects will be unable to complete their attack.

The OC argument rages on, and prudent researchers, trainers and administrators will become aware of the various points of view and tactical circumstances in which "success" or "failure" is proclaimed.

Quotable
"My big problem is the perception that's being given out that [chemical spray and oleoresin capsicum products] will take the place of self-defense, of good defensive tactics. I really don't think it will." - Phil Messina June, 1992 Modern Warrior's video

Use-of-Force Scale and Nonlethal Tactics
This issue features "Injury-Based Use-of-Force Chart" designed to graphically depict injury and liability reduction concepts.

Two Detroit police officers have just been convicted of second-degree murder after using flashlights to subdue a resisting narcotics suspect. Two LAPD officers appear to be headed for prison following their federal civil rights violation trial in the Rodney King case. Another LAPD officer has just been arraigned for second-degree murder arising out of an officer-involved shooting which might have never happened had there been an early and aggressive use of OC spray, a Taser, or an Ultron.

Consider these scenarios: (1) An officer approaches a drunk driver, who shoves the officer, who draws a baton, which is taken away by the drunk, who draws a buck knife and threatens the officer, who shoots the drunk. (2) An officer chases a car theft suspect, who turns on the officer and refuses verbal commands, charges the officer and attempts to take the officer's gun. The officer wrestles with the suspect, and eventually shoots him. (3) An officer confronts a narcotics suspect who has been throwing cans and rocks at people, attempts to handcuff the suspect, they wrestle, fall, wrestle some more, and the suspect takes away the officer's baton and begins to use it as the officer shoots.

I generally focus discussion of nonlethal weapons tactics on situations which do not rise to the level of the use of deadly force, but there is also a place for nonlethal weapons early in many shooting incidents. The vast majority of police shootings are "in policy" and "legal" at the time the shooting occurs. But we must also look at the tactics which put us into the shooting situation. Probably 25-30 percent of the time we would find the shooting to have been "preventable" if the officer had been equipped and trained with a nonlethal weapon, and had been supported by policies and procedures which encouraged the early and aggressive use of such knockdown devices.

We need to keep our people alive and out of jail.

Knockdown Update
© Greg Meyer

May, 1993

The Library

"Selecting Nonlethal Weapons," Lois Pilant, The Police Chief, May '93. Excellent overview of the issues and available devices.

"Oleoresin Capsicum," Bill Clede, Law and Order, March '93.

"Nonlethal Weapons," Greg Meyer, Defensive Tactics Newsletter, seven-part series commenced January '93 (published by ISC, Box 8798, Lakeland , FL 33806, contact Ron Kazoroski, Editor).

Quotable
"At a minimum, all officers who are authorized to use less-than-lethal weapons should be thoroughly trained in their use. While this may not free officers, police administrators, and police departments from complaints of inappropriate or excessive use of force, and may not eliminate deaths or injuries, it will serve to demonstrate good faith by providing proper equipment and training." - IACP/BJA February,1989 National Law Enforcement Policy Center

King-Case Officers Convicted in Federal Trial: What's the Message?
Listen to these post-verdict quotations from letters written by street police officers: "I'll bet my second-degree black belt in Tae Kwon Do would have been of little help in dealing with (Rodney King)." "The guys are kind of hesitant right now. They think in the back of their minds, 'What should I do? . . . We do what they taught and end up penalized.' It's really hard for the officers."

The Simi Valley jury (which acquitted the officers, except for hanging one count on one officer, in 1992) dealt with the facts of the case. The federal jury used its powers to look beyond the facts and arrive at an ultimate truth: Law enforcement simply must do better than what was seen on the King videotape.

Many agencies are groping for better alternatives than nightsticks and karate kicks. Some are even defying the traditional tug of bureaucratic paralysis, adopting appropriate policies to go along with innovative tactics and equipment. This is good news. Better alternatives and policies will mean fewer and less severe injuries for both suspects and officers. Fewer taxpayer dollars will be paid out in liability actions. Law enforcement should enjoy an improved image. The bad news is that the world is imperfect, and no weapon or tactic works on every resisting suspect, every time. Occasionally, there will be a nasty incident that strains relations between the public and the police.

Nonlethal weapons must be employed early and aggressively in potentially violent confrontations. Since there is little public understanding of police restraint tactics, it is imperative that police leaders seek to educate the public through the media. Some alternatives to the baton cause suspects to cough, wheeze, shake, fall and otherwise look disgusting to witnesses, videotape viewers, and jurors. The reality of dealing with resisting suspects will not always look tidy on the 6 o'clock news.

The police must act in good faith to minimize the number of adverse incidents. But the police are only part of the equation. The public must become less tolerant of lawbreakers who resist arrest. Police, sheriff and corrections leadership must equip and train their personnel to use effective, less-injurious knockdown tools and tactics. Leaders must stand up for their personnel when the devices are used in good faith.

February, 1993

The Library

Deadly Force: What We Know, by William A. Geller and Michael S. Scott, is bound to be "the bible" on use of force for at least the next several years. The volume is meticulously documented, although the title does not reveal that there is a significant section on nonlethal weapons in the fifth chapter. In fact, Deadly Force may be the most significant compendium of reference material on lethal and nonlethal weapons today. This book will be very useful to decision makers and training personnel who seek a broad understanding of current use-of-force issues. The 50-page bibliography cites hundreds of references spanning the past quarter century. The book is a very practical guide. Send $33.50 to the Police Executive Research Forum, 2300 M Street N.W. Suite 910, Washington, DC 20037, phone 202-466-7820 or fax 202-466-7826.

Presumed Guilty is from LAPD Sergeant Stacey Koon, who was the supervisor at the scene of the Rodney King incident, and co-author Robert Deitz. The mass media has been unable (or unwilling) to properly tell the officers' side of the Rodney King beating. This book helps to fill that void in a frank, comprehensive, revealing way. It is a blunt, harsh, crude and thought-provoking account of the incident itself and the trial. The media, thus a large part of the public, continue to be baffled at how the Simi Valley jury reached its not-guilty verdicts for the four accused officers. This book reaches way beyond the infamous videotape and explores the dynamics of the tragedy, especially focusing on the failure of "the system" to provide more effective, less injurious knockdown tools. With the officers now in a federal civil rights trial arising out of the same incident, Koon's book is also quite timely. Send $20 to Mary Koon, Box 444, Castaic, CA 91310

Other Current Readings

"Nonlethal Weapons vs. Conventional Police Tactics: Assessing Injuries and Liabilities," Greg Meyer, The Police Chief, Aug '92. Excerpts from my master's thesis, "Nonlethal Weapons Vs. Conventional Police Tactics: The Los Angeles Police Department Experience," reprints available.

"Oleoresin Capsicum Policy Considerations," Chief J.P. Morgan, The Police Chief, Aug '92 .

"A Non-lethal Force Weapon: The Taser," Keith W. Strandberg, Law Enforcement Technology, Oct '92.

"Nonlethal Weapons: Where Do They Fit?," Greg Meyer, Journal of California Law Enforcement, 1992, in three parts.

"A Bouquet of Aerosol Sprays," Bill Clede, Law and Order, Sep '92.

"A Can of Self Defense," Vic Sussman; and "Cops Want Help, Too," Gordon Witkin, both for US News & World Report, Sep. 28 '92.

"A Current Affair," John Murray, Police, Oct '92, on the Taser device.

Quotable
"The National Law Enforcement Policy Center recommends that police departments ban the use of . . . slapjacks, blackjacks, and brass knuckles and nunchucks, fighting stars, and other martial arts weapons. In addition, police agencies should prohibit the use of the flashlight as a weapon unless an officer has no recourse." - IACP/BJA February,1989 National LE Policy Center

November, 1992

Reducing Deaths and Injuries: Thoughts for Today's Leadership
With an increasing amount of public pressure focused on uses of force by police, sheriffs and corrections officers, leaders need to undertake a serious search for less injurious alternatives to our traditional tools, tactics, and training.

The reasons? Costs of liability are increasing. Juries seem to be less sympathetic to law enforcement's assertions of why particular tools or tactics had to be used to subdue the suspect. Disability pensions of our personnel are becoming more expensive. Many agencies have lowered their height and weight requirements at the entry level, but the mission of apprehending and controlling violent suspects is ever present.

It is time to equip our front-line personnel with the ability to knock down combative or resistive suspects with significantly less injuries and risks of death to officers and suspects.

One in seven officers who are murdered is killed with his/her own gun. These tragedies and other cases which result in serious injuries and lawsuits are frequently preventable with today's technology.

Is your agency on board?

Decisive! : Wisconsin Chiefs and Sheriffs Act Quickly
At the Wisconsin DOJ Roundtable for police chiefs and sheriffs in early November (where California police litigation attorney George Franscell, tactics expert Ron McCarthy, and I made presentations), consensus was reached on two key points: Adopt OC (oleoresin capsicum, or pepper spray), and lower it to just above verbalization on the statewide use-of-force ladder. Wisconsin's enlightened decisions parallel those of Orlando (FL) and the FBI.

Quotable
"It seems surprising that the roster of nonlethal weapons is so slim . . . (possible explanations include) the absence of aggressive leadership in the law enforcement community . . . (and) an unfortunate failure to direct adequate energy and resources to the subject." - Criminologists Gilbert Geis & Arnold Binder, 1990

August, 1992

Why Nonlethal Weapons???

Reduced injuries to officers and suspects.
Reduced liability.
Reduced personnel complaints.
Reduced disability pension costs.
An improved public image for the agency.

"Soft Control": Orlando P.D. Scores Policy Coup, Lowers "OC" on Scale
Four months ago, the Orlando, Florida, Police Department lowered the use of oleoresin capsicum, or "pepper spray" to the "soft control" (just above verbalization) on their use-of-force continuum. This major policy shift has already saved numerous injuries to officers and suspects, according to Orlando's training staff.

By encouraging officers to use the spray early in confrontations with suspects who cannot be "talked into jail," Orlando has made a significant commitment to reduce injuries. One of the keys to nonlethal weapons philosophy is that effective, less injurious knockdown devices should be used early in the confrontation, before that point in time where more injurious tools and tactics come into play. Other agencies would do well to emulate Orlando's enlightened policy on nonlethal weapons usage.

Quotable
"The problem lies in the fact that police officers do not have at their disposal the necessary variety of force options to meet these situations . . . the mentally disturbed and those under the influence of drugs are notable examples . . . the need has been apparent for decades." - Chief Joe D. Casey, President, International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1988

Law Enforcement in U.S. Finding Better Nonlethal Weapons

In the wake of the Rodney King incident in Los Angeles last year, more and more law enforcement agencies are paying attention to the need to develop less injurious tools and tactics for taking resisting suspects into custody. The "OC" pepper sprays are gaining acceptance in policy departments across America, including Alexandria, Fairfax County, Arlington County, Orlando, Cincinnati, Texas State police, Delaware State Police, Alaska State Troopers, and many others. The FBI has made OC standard issue to its agents.

In California, two OC products were recently certified for field testing, and LAPD is planning a field test.

The FBI and the British Columbia police have reported good results with the field tests of OC: no injuries, less contamination of officers than is typically experienced by officers using CS and CN formulas.

Agencies are encouraged to learn about and experiment with devices and tactics which will lead to less injuries to officers and suspects. It is time to re-examine our traditional tools.

Zzzzzapppp! : Don't Overlook Electric Weapons Like TASER, Ultron II, and Nova

LAPD has used the TASER with good success (over 3,000 uses) for more than twelve years, since 1980. Also, many departments find that the Ultron II and Nova are useful.

TASER is sold by Tasertron (Newport Beach, CA); Ultron II by StunTech (Cleveland); and Nova by Nova (Austin, TX).