The Other Side: Metaphysics and Meaning

By

Russell M. Manion

(c) 1993 Russell M. Manion

I. ETHICAL NIHILISM     
 
 A. NATURALISM
 
 	He said he was a naturalist, that nature is all that is, that
terms have meaning by virtue of their description of some aspect of
nature.

B. MORAL CRITERIA
   
	With this I agreed, and so I sought to speak with him.  Early
in the conversation I mentioned some evil deed in the day's news. 
Some man, for his own pleasure, had caused a number of small
children to suffer and die.
	 At this point he stopped me and asked why I thought such
a deed to be evil.  Indeed, I was quite surprised at the question and
asked him if he didn't also think the same.
	 He responded, "Whether I think it evil or not in no way
indicates why you think it is evil.  Again, why do you think this
deed evil?"
	 As he had been kind and patient enough to ask me the same
question twice, I decided to answer him in a straight and forward
manner.  I said, "This deed is evil because it is wrong and immoral."
	 His expression was one of disappointment.  "I understand
perfectly well that when you say the deed is evil, you mean it is
wrong and immoral. But, this does not in the least explain why you
think the deed evil, wrong, or immoral.  Substituting one or more
words for another may clarify the point, but, it does not make it. 
Again, I ask you, why do you believe this deed to be evil?  How is
this belief  justified?"
	 I catch on quickly, and soon realized that what he wanted
to know was the criteria by which I determined the evilness of the
deed.  Therefore, I prepared to give him a number of justifications.

C. INTUITION

 	The first justification was easy.  It is immediately obvious to
me that the wanton destruction of small children is wrong.  So, I
quickly determined that the truth of my position was intuitive.  I
explained this to him and was quite confident that if he saw things
as clearly as I did, this would satisfy the question.  Unfortunately,
that did not turn out to be the case.
 	He asked me, "By 'intuitive' do you mean you received
insights by some mystical spiritual revelation?"
 	I chuckled at this and reminded him that I had already
expressed my adherence to a naturalistic world view.  "You will not
catch me propounding metaphysical nonsense."  I said.
	He raised an eyebrow and asked, "Then, do you mean to say
that this is a belief with which we are born, an innate idea by which
all men can know the truth?"
 I thought for a few moments.  With a tentative nod I said, "Yes, I
think that is what I mean."
	He then asked, "Why then, if we are all born with this belief,
is it that we don't all have it?  I, for one, don't see the truth of it at
all.  Furthermore, it does not follow that merely because we are
born with a belief, that it is true.  The truth of a belief is not
established by naming its origin."
	He waited a few moments for me to answer.  Realizing that
I would not soon come up with one, he suggested, "Perhaps, by
intuitive, you mean that you quickly and clearly perceive the truth
of something for many good reasons that you have not yet made
explicitly cognitive and articulated?"
	"Yes, that is it."  I quickly asserted.  "There are many
convincing reasons for affirming the truth of this belief, and all
good and clear thinkers should be able to see the truth of it, even
though these reasons have not all been made explicit."
	 "However," he pointed out, "a good and clear thinker
should be able to explicate at least one of these reasons when called
upon to do so.  How else can we know that any of these
"convincing reasons"  are convincing or even exist?"

D. EMOTIVE THEORY

 	For a brief moment I thought he had me.  Then, one of
those good reasons came to me.  I asked him, "Isn't it generally
agreed that nearly everyone, in all cultures, throughout time, have a
natural empathy for there fellow human beings?" "Generally," he
agreed.
 	I continued, "Perhaps this feeling of empathy is genetic, as
its evolution would be conducive to the survival of the community
in which it developed.  Or, perhaps this feeling originates from the
fact that we project our own desires and needs, on our fellow man,
and so, tend to treat others as we wish to be treated.  Either way,
wouldn't this certainly provide a basis on which to establish human
value and human ethics?"
	 Upon hearing my own argument I was greatly encouraged
and became more confident.  I smiled to myself and asked, "Does
that satisfy your question?"
	 He responded, "I agree that we tend to have empathetic
feelings toward our fellow man, but what justifies the belief that
those feelings and that man are valuable?  The mere fact that we
have feelings on a subject may tell us something about our own
emotional  disposition, but tells us nothing about the subject itself. 
A  description of one's emotive state on a subject is just that, a
description of ones emotive state on that subject.  Do not mistake
this for a description of the subject itself.  Do you think that by 
believing something to be true of a thing, that you impute that
property to the thing?"
	 I answered carefully, "No, I do not think that a thing
becomes true simply because I, or anyone else, believes it's true." 
As I am one predisposed to seek the truth, even when it seems to
have taken a different course than the one I am taking, I determined
to drop this line of reasoning.  However, to give him a glimpse of
my epistemic acumen, I added, "Besides, if the truth of a
proposition is not determined
by whether or not it describes an actual state of  affairs in nature,
but rather by whether or not it is believed, then  all beliefs would be
true, even those that contradict one another."  
	 "Very good."  He answered, "Do you have other criteria
with which to justify your belief that some deeds are evil, or on
which to base ethical positions in general?"

E. PRAGMATIC THEORY

	 I had already thought of another good reason and had been
waiting for the opportunity to deliver it.  Judging that he was
probably ready to handle more I began, "There are also pragmatic
reasons why some behaviors should be deemed right and some
deemed wrong," I said.  "The values a society adopts greatly
determine if it succeeds or fails.  Societies that condemn murder
and theft experience a higher degree of trust, cooperation and
productivity than their counterparts.  Wouldn't values like
these engender lives of greater peace and happiness for all its
Members?  In contrast, a society that does not generally prohibit
such behavior would find itself in a destructive cycle of conflict, 
vengeance and non-productivity.  Thus, couldn't we conclude that
those behaviors that are conducive to the development and stability
of a society are good and ethical?  Wouldn't those that are
destructive to  a society be bad and unethical?"
	 He rubbed his chin for a few moments of thought during
which I allowed myself a slight smile.  (This was going to be too
easy.)  Then he asked me, "So, you believe that if an action benefits
a society it is good?"
	 "Yes, I do," I replied.
	 "And similarly, If an action is detrimental to society it is
bad?"
	 "Yes, surely," I replied again.  He seemed to be getting it.
	 "Then," he asked me, "what do you do when the society is
bad?"
	 I thought for a moment then countered, "How would you
know the society was bad?"
	 "Exactly my point," he replied.  "Your consequentialist
ethics look to the consequence of an action to determine its value. 
This, however, presupposes the value of the consequence, doesn't
it? It may be the case that, if society has value, those actions that
benefit society  also have value.  But, how does your pragmatism
help us decide the value of a society?"  
	 I quickly thought through my argument again, but found
nothing that would address this question.  I hedged my answer, "I'm
not sure."
	 He proceeded, "At best, an action might be said to have the
value of its consequent.  Actions that produce a moral consequent
may have a positive moral value.  Actions that produce an immoral
consequent may have a negative moral value.  But then, actions that
produce a non-moral consequent would have no moral value at all. 
Consequentialism does not, in any way, help us decide the moral
value of the consequent, in this case society. Now, if we do not
know the value of the consequent, we cannot know the value of the
action that brought it about.  The question still remains, what is the
criteria by which you determine or base an ethical position?"

F. ONTOLOGICAL REFERENT

	 At this point I decided it was time to stop going easy on
this guy and start pressing him hard.  I figured there had to be some
emotional factor that drove him to evade these arguments.  I was
fully aware that my next question could push him away, but I asked
anyway, "I know I asked you a similar question already, but why
don't you want to believe it is evil to torment and harm small
children?"
	 I listened carefully to his answer.  I was looking for the
subtle clues that would betray his true motives.  Once identified I
would quickly extrapolate the genetic basis of his resistance, and
the debate would be over.
	 He answered, "Essentially, this is the same question I asked
you.  You see, the issue is not, 'Do I affirm some value A?'  That
answer is descriptive and certainly true.  The issue is not even the
merely prescriptive, 'Should I affirm some value A as opposed to
some other value B?' Rather the issue is, 'Is there a value A or B for
which I should have any feelings at all,' and, can belief in this value
be justified?"



G. MORAL PROPERTIES

	 His answer was clear.  The clues I was looking for were a
little too subtle, so I decided to be charitable and not use them
against him just yet.  Instead, I returned to his earlier question. 
"You asked me how consequentialism helps me decide the value of
a society?  I will concede that a pragmatic analysis of ethical
systems will only indicate which systems are most likely to produce
efficient and stable societies.  As these systems bring greater peace
and stability to a society,  the members of that society may have
greater feelings of pleasure and happiness. As nature has
programmed us to seek pleasure and happiness there is a functional
sense in which some ethical systems are better than others.  I would
call these ethical systems good.  Why wouldn't we call those
things that nature, endeavoring to help us survive, causes us to
value, values?"
	 I liked my response.  It felt good.  It sounded good.  So, I
pressed him a little harder still. "You said you were a naturalist, but
aren't  you being a little 'nihilistic' with your ethics here?"  I find a
little pejorative term here and there can go a long way in a debate.
	 Hardly a moment had passed when he began, "Yes, I am. 
In fact, I think all consistent naturalists would be nihilists.  In the
natural world we find no properties to which moral concepts
correspond. In fact we cannot even imagine what such a natural
phenomena would look like.  We can describe an event, such as 'A'
kills 'B,' as a set of physical movements.  We can even describe our
feelings on that event.  But, though these feelings may say
something about our own biochemical states, they say nothing
about the event itself."
	 He continued, "I will agree that if the behavior of 'A' killing
'B'  becomes normative, it will have a negative effect on social
order.  I will also agree that if the demise of society is immoral,
then 'A's' behavior is immoral.  But, just as we had to look at the
consequences of 'A's' behavior to determine its morality, so we will
have to look at the consequences of the demised society to
determine its morality, and so on.  No matter how many steps we
take, we will not find in nature any property that corresponds to a
moral concept.  Therefore, moral concepts are grounded either
outside nature or not at  all."
	 He paused a moment, then said, "If we ground ethics
outside nature we are doing metaphysics.  I do not know, a priori,
what properties a metaphysical reality would possess if it existed. 
Given a metaphysical wild card, ethics may be hypothetically
possible.  But, as a naturalist this is not an option.  The naturalist
must restrain himself to properties he can sense lest he cease to be a
naturalist.
	 Then, giving me an intense look he said, "What I must
challenge is your claim to be a naturalist. Each time you moralize or
make an  ethical affirmation you have gone beyond nature and have
engaged in metaphysics."

H. HUMAN EXPERIENCE

 His response startled me for two reasons.  First, because no one
had ever accused me of being a metaphysician before.  Secondly,
because I realized he was right.  Now that he said it, it was clear
that nature can not account for ethics. However, there were some
loose ends that needed tying up.  I decided to ask a few more
questions.  I determined that I would first ask him a question about
naturalism and then return to the issue of nihilism.  I inquired, "It
may be true that if we search through nature we will find no
indication of  ethics.  Yet, why can we not ground our ethics, as
many philosophers do, not in nature, but in the human experience?"
	 "I am surprised," he said. "Didn't you feel a rub when
asking your last question?  You agree, first, that ethics are not to be
found in nature, then, propose that we find them in humanity.  But,
where is humanity?  Isn't it also a part of nature? Or, is it outside
nature?  If it is a part of nature, then, as you agreed, we will not
find ethics there.  If it is outside nature, then, we are doing
metaphysics again and we are no longer naturalists."
	 "No," I responded, "I am not a metaphysician! I am a
naturalist!  Aren't naturalists allowed the same needs and desires as
metaphysicians?"
	 "Allowed by what?" he grinned.  "By government? Usually. 
By God?  Not if he doesn't exist.  By nature?  This is our question
isn't it?  Nature seems to allow anything that does not break its
laws, but the only laws of nature of which I am aware, all have to
do with physics not morality.  If the natural world has no moral
properties, then as a naturalist, you would be more consistent to say
so. Regardless of how strongly you, I, or anyone else feels about
our own existence, condition, happiness, etc., we cannot impute
properties to the universe."

I. BAND WAGON

	 He was good.  I had to give him that.  But, philosophically
he was out of the main stream and I knew it.  I decided to point this
out to him and see how tough his ego really was. I said, "I'm sure
you're aware that most naturalists are not nihilists, in fact, very few
are.  Therefore, doesn't it follow that either you have erred in the
way you look at ethics, or, nearly all naturalist are lapsing into
metaphysics every time they make a moral judgment?"
	 "That is exactly right." He countered.  "Indeed, it is difficult
to find any naturalist who is a nihilist.  I would agree that most view
ethics differently than I.  But, I suspect this is because they are,  as
you say, doing metaphysics, whereas I am not.  Surely, you're not
suggesting that the number of naturalists doing ethics in some way
justifies or provides a basis for those ethics do you?"
	 "Of course not," I responded immediately.  My
philosophical background made the fallacy of such thinking easily
transparent to  me.  


J. NON-RATIONAL

 	I decided to return to a modified form of social pragmatism. 
I said, "But, naturalists do espouse ethical codes that are rationally
based on our individual and social predispositions to survive.  As
we discussed earlier, certain behaviors, when adopted by
individuals, will be mutually beneficial to other individuals.  This
general co-operation of all members of a society will strengthen and
increase the survivability of the society.  As the society's chances of
survival increase, so do the chances of its members' survival
increase.  Thus, it would be rational to adopt as ethical those
behaviors that promote the general welfare of our society and
ourselves."
	 My basing morality on the rationality of choosing behavior
that promotes survival was brilliant. Certainly he could not argue it
was irrational.  
	 He began without hesitation,  "I agree that humans are
predisposed to survive.  I agree that, given this end, it is rational for
humans to adopt behavior that will serve it.  But, what makes the
adoption of this end rational?  As I stated before, the fact that we
are predisposed to survive in no way indicates that we ought to be
predisposed to survive.  We have already agreed that nothing in
nature can indicate this.  Thus, such a selection as an end, is not
rational.  
	 "We may select this end for genetic reasons.  We may
select it for cultural reasons.  But we certainly do not select it for
rational reasons.  I am not saying that the selection of this end is
irrational.  Rather, it is non-rational.  There are no natural criteria
for determining the value of humanity either individually or in
society.  There are no rational reasons for saying humanity is bad.
Again, I am not saying that humanity is bad.  Rather, I am saying it
is neither good nor bad.  Humanity just is, and our selection of it, as
an ends, just happened. 
	 "Now, if the end is neither good nor bad, and the end
determines the value of the means, then the means are neither good
nor bad.  They may be expedient in terms of the desired end, but
they are not good or bad.  This means that a given action, such as
murder, could be immoral  (in the sense that it is detrimental to the
survival of humanity), and yet, it would not be bad (in the sense that
it has no value). 
	 "Most people, such as yourself, have trouble with this. 
Most people believe that the killing of young children is not just an
inefficient way to run society, they believe it is wrong, and therefore
are not consistent naturalists. Perhaps, because our survival instinct
is so strong, our emotions toward this kind of  behavior compel us
to project value into these actions in an attempt to absolutise our
social prohibitions.  Therefore, although we can apply the word
'ethical' to a system of behavior, we can not say it is rational or has
value." 

K. COGNITIVE ASPECT

	 It seemed there was a sense in which he had a point and a
sense in which he didn't.  
	 "To some extent," I said "you must admit ethics are rational
and valuable.  Maybe the ends are hard to establish, but once given,
we can say whether or not a given behavior is rational and valuable
in achieving that end.  It is through reason we determine whether or
not a given behavior will bring about a desired end. Hence, it is
rational for the person trying to achieve a desired end to adopt
behavior his reason tells him will bring it about.  Similarly, such
behavior will be of  value to him.  So, in some sense at least, you
must admit that the terms rational and value can be properly applied
to a naturalist ethics."
	 "Yes," he said "it is true there is a cognitive aspect to
consequentialist ethics.  That is, one rationally evaluates available
means to determine which will best achieve the chosen end.  And, it
is true that a given means may have value in terms of a given end. 
Namely, those means that we rationally determine will bring about
the chosen end will have value in terms of that end.  But, it is
important to realize that the value and rationality of a means is
limited to its utility in bringing about the chosen end.  Again, there
are no criteria by which we can determine the value or rationality of
the end. Therefore, the ethical system as a whole is without value
and is non-rational.  Can you
offer me something, anything, which can establish the rationality
and or value of an ethical system?"

L. NO TRUTH VALUE

	 I had only a few cards left to play, but I never concede a
point until I've played the last one.  I came up with a new twist on
the argument that I thought would really test his agility.
	I asked, "Why can't we view ethics like mathematics?  Both
have starting assumptions and are affirmed, not because they
correspond to some Platonic reality, but because of their utility."
	 I'm known for these profound insights.  Coupling values
with mathematics would put him on the horns of a dilemma.  Now
he could neither deny values without also denying math, nor could
he affirm math without also affirming values.  I looked at him as if I
really expected him to have an answer.  He did.
	 He said, "It is true that mathematical systems have starting
assumptions.  If the starting assumptions correspond to the real
world, then the given mathematical system will also correspond to
the real world, giving the system utility.  But, if the starting 
assumptions do not correspond to the real world, the resulting
mathematical system will also not correspond.  The mathematical
system  may be a perfect tautology.  It may be internally rational,
but it will have no rational relationship to the real world.  If there is
no rational basis for choosing the starting assumption, then the
mathematical system as a whole is non-rational.
	 "In an ethical system, the end is the starting assumption.  If 
there is no rational basis for choosing the end, then the system is, 
at best, a tautology.  It may be rational in the sense that it is
internally consistent, but it will have no rational  relationship to the
real world.  Its rationality is formal, but such rationality is trivial.  It
may tell us what behavior coheres to the chosen end, but it tells us
nothing that corresponds to the natural world.  I agree that
mathematics do not correspond to some Platonic reality, rather it
has utility, only because it does correspond to the reality in which
we live.  If there is a Platonic reality to which ethics do correspond,
then naturalism is not true.  My point is, ethics correspond to
neither this reality nor a Platonic reality, and therefore correspond
to nothing.  They have no truth value."

M. ETHICS MYTH

	 It was time to play my last card.  I didn't have a lot of
confidence in it, but tossed it on the table just the same.  "Can't
each individual chose his own value and create his own meaning in
life?  Can't society adopt those values on which there is a
consensus?"
	 He raised his eyebrows in surprise and asked, "Are you
suggesting that each individual should create his own ethics myth
with which to give himself the illusion of meaning and value?  Are
you proposing we affirm as a core element of our lives something
that we know isn't true?  As for society adopting and codifying
those myths on which there is a consensus, wouldn't we have
created essentially the same thing as organized religion?  Not a
consistent position for a naturalist to advocate is it?"
	 I am astute enough to know I lost the argument.  But, I had
a feeling I had lost much more.  As before, I could still see that
murder, theft and deception were not in my best interest.  They
were inefficient, socially destructive, disruptive to my life and the
lives of others, but they were not wrong, not really wrong.
	 I looked forward to seeing where these new realizations
would take me.  I had always assumed that life somehow, in some
way, had meaning and value.  Now, I would have to look at the
world from the other side.

II. EPISTEMOLOGICAL NIHILISM
 
A. NIHILISM AND REASON

 	I looked at my mentor and said, "OK so life has no meaning
or value.  I suppose it is best to know that."
	 "We don't know that," he replied.
	 "What?" I stared at him.
	 "I Said we don't know that life has no meaning or value,"
he answered.
	 I furrowed my brow and focused intently on him, "What
are you talking about? We've been arguing this all afternoon.  How
can you say you don't know ethical nihilism is true?  You said you
were a nihilist!"
	 "I don't know ethical nihilism is true," he said. "I don't
know anything.  No one does."
	 "Ah! You're an epistemological nihilist too I suppose?"  I
asked 
	 "That's right.  I am.  I don't know nihilism is true.  I don't
even know reason is true."
	 I was flabbergasted, "But, you've been using reason all
afternoon."
	 "I believe I have," he said, "but, I never said I believed it
was true."
	 "How can you use reason if you don't believe it?" I asked.
	 "Because, it's the only way you and I can communicate."
He answered.  "Since you speak the language of reason, I decided
to speak it too.  Since you affirm both reason and naturalism, I
decided to demonstrate that the affirmation of reason and
naturalism includes the denial of values."
	 "But what do you mean when you say you don't believe in
reason?  What sense does that make?"  I asked.
	 He answered, "It makes no sense at all, but that is hardly a
criticism of a position that denies sense."
	 "Well," I asked, "how does a nihilist think about the
world?"
	 "He doesn't" He continued, "all thinking assumes reason
and knowledge.  Therefore, all thinking, even thinking about
nihilism must be done as a non-nihilist.
	 "Think of nihilism as a black hole.  Reason stops at the
event horizon.  Inside the event horizon is non-rationality.  There is
no knowledge there.  There can be no rational thinking about the
world.  Outside the event horizon we can think about nihilism, but
only as a negation of reason.  There can be no positive
contemplation, because all contemplation is rational and this is
exactly the thing we are denying of nihilism.  Yet, it would be
irrational to criticize a nihilist, a non-rationalist, for not being
rational. You see, the nihilist may not be able to defend himself, but
there is no need for him to do so, for no rational argument can be
made against him.  The event horizon cannot be crossed." 
	 Now  I was not only flabbergasted, I was concerned.  This
guy really was on the other side.  If I hadn't just finished the
argument on ethics with him, I would have dismissed him as a
kook.
	 "How did you come to this?"  I asked.
	 "The same way I got to ethical nihilism.  If you start with
naturalism outside of the event horizon, reason will bring you to the
horizon, self stultify, and deposit you on the other side.  Hence,
nihilism!"

B. THE SELF STULTIFICATION OF REASON

	 I had to hear this.  "How does reason self stultify?"
	 "Well, reason doesn't stultify all by itself.  Naturalism, when
extrapolated through reason, undermines the possibility of knowing,
of knowing anything, including reason.  In effect, it is naturalism
that undermines reason."
	 I said, "Naturalism undermines reason?  That is
preposterous! How?"
	 "How is nature connected?" he asked.  "Do planets and
particles move according to their own whim without regard to the
rest of nature?  Or, is their motion dependent on the laws of
mechanics and the antecedent state of the rest of nature."
	 "The laws of mechanics and antecedent states, of course," I
responded, off handedly, making it clear I was no duffer on the hard
sciences.
	 "Is there anything else that might effect their behavior?" He
prompted.
	 "No, of course not." I saw the trap. "The rest of nature
pretty  much includes the entire universe.  What else is there to
affect them?  If there was anything else we wouldn't be naturalists,
would we?"
	 "No we wouldn't," he agreed. "Couldn't we say then, that
since the state of everything in nature is dependent, and only
dependent, on the antecedent state of the rest of nature as
determined by the laws of mechanics, that everything in nature is
determined?  True, it is determined by the rest of nature, but
determined none the less."
	 Giving up morality is one thing.  That was difficult enough. 
Giving up reason is all together different.  I was not about to let
him win again.  Not on this one.  "OK, so the given state of some
thing is determined by the state of everything else.  I can see that,
but what has this to do with reason?"
	 He gave me that look in the eye again. "Is your reason,
your mind, your thoughts, your ideas, your beliefs, your brain a part
of nature?" 
	 I tried to speak, but could not open my mouth.  He was
doing it again.  It was obvious where he was going.  I did not want
to go there.  But, I did not know how to stop it.  His logic was
seamless.  Yet, I knew he must be wrong.  After all, here I was
reasoning with him, wasn't I?  I answered, "Of course it is.  As you
have pointed out so many times already today, if they were not, I
would not be a naturalist."
	 "Then they must all be determined, aren't they?" He
affirmed. 
	 And there it was.  It was to easy.  The point was succinct. 
There are few terms.  There was very little room for error.  But, I
wasn't about to help him.  If he wanted the point, he would have to
make it.    "So, they are determined." I said.  "What has that to do
with reason?" 
	 "I would think that is quite clear." He began. "If all your
beliefs are determined, then any particular belief is determined, isn't
it?"
	 "Now you're stating the obvious." I replied.  "You're taking
awfully small steps aren't you?"
	 "Would you prefer I skip a step?"  he countered smiling,
"Since any particular belief is determined, you have no choice but to
believe it.  It is held, not on the basis of good reason, but because it
is the consequent of antecedent causes.  You do not choose your
beliefs.  You hold the beliefs you do, because of the antecedent
state of the universe, whether that belief is true or not."

C. REASON AND CAUSE

	 Objections were finally coming to me.  I asked, "What if
the antecedent causes are the reasons.  Wouldn't it be the case then
that we are caused to believe something because it is true?"
	 He didn't even flinch.  He simply responded, "That makes
no difference.  If all beliefs are determined, so is your belief in
naturalism.  There are a couple of problems here.  First, it does no
good to cite your reasons for holding a position.  If the position you
hold is determined, you would hold it regardless of the reasons
given.  Furthermore, the reasons you give are every bit as
determined as the belief they are intended to justify.  Thus, you
would offer those reasons even if they are not valid.  Remember, as
a determinist, it is not just your conclusions that are determined, but
every notion,  justification, and thought you have.
	 "The second problem has to do with the fact that there are
those who disagree with you.  As a naturalist you believe that the
beliefs of the supernaturalist are also determined.  In fact, they are
determined by the same antecedent state of the universe as your
naturalistic belief.  How, therefore, could we possibly discriminate
between the two beliefs?  If all caused beliefs are true, and all
beliefs are caused, then all beliefs are true, even the belief that it is
not the case that all beliefs are true."

D. CHANCE

	 "The universe is not that simple," I countered.  "Nothing is
absolutely determined.  There is always a small amount of chance, a
modicum of randomness.  Therefore, it is not the case that all
beliefs are determined.  There is an element of randomness to every
belief.  Since beliefs are not fully determined, perhaps it is the case
that we are not compelled to our beliefs by antecedent causes."
	 He asked, "When you speak of randomness in nature do
you mean to indicate there is an aspect of our experience that is
transcendental rather than natural?  Or, do you mean to indicate
that there is in nature a limit to the degree of accuracy by which any
aspect of nature can be measured?  The two are very different you
know.  As a naturalist you can only take the second interpretation."
	 "Yes, I take the second interpretation.  That is what I
meant." I said.
	 "How then, does that account for reason?" He said.
	 "I don't know."  I admitted.  "I thought it might provide
some possibility."
	 "I think that maybe you took the second interpretation, but,
hoped it might have the effect of the first." He countered.
	 I shrugged, "Maybe."
 "Let's look then at this second understanding of randomness,"  he
proposed.  "We believe that within nature any given energy,
position or momentum cannot be exactly ascertained.  That all
measurements have an exceedingly small amount of indeterminacy
inherent to them.  Therefore, you are correct in saying that a belief
is not precisely determined by its antecedent states.  It exhibits an
infinitesimal variance.  But, does this provide the possibility of
reason?  No,  randomness is not the same thing as reason.  Rather,
it introduces chaos to our beliefs, not reason.  In fact, this is exactly
what indeterminacy does to all complex physical systems.  As
randomness is introduced at each causal connection in the system it
is compounded and magnified over time, thereby bringing chaos to
the system and rendering long term projections impossible.  So,
though a belief is not entirely determined by antecedent states, it is
primarily determined by them, while a small portion of the belief is
determined by chance.  Whether by antecedent states or by chance,
beliefs are determined still."

E. EVOLUTION AND REASON

	 I may have already told you that I too am not unread in the
sciences.  I have a rough familiarity with learning theory, neural
networks, feed back systems, contextualization problems and the
like.  Consequently, I was able to concoct a naturalistic paradigm
for the evolution of reason and thereby reasonable belief.  I
proceeded to explain it to him.  "Would you agree that a creature's
chances for survival are enhanced by its ability to accurately identify
its  environment and make appropriate responses to it?" 
	 "Of course," he said, "that's essential to evolutionary
theory."
	 "Then," I asked, "wouldn't it be the case that those
creatures that formed more precise mental models of the world and
were capable of constructing the most accurate analysis of those
models might have a survival advantage over those that don't?"
	 "Yes he said, continue."
	 "Wouldn't those creatures who survive then pass on their
traits and dispositions more frequently than those whose senses and
mental capacities are less capable of constructing accurate models
and analysis?  Also, wouldn't those genetic mutations which
enhance these capabilities survive and become a part of the gene
pool?" I asked.
	 "Undoubtedly," he answered.
	 "Then, wouldn't there be a tendency for a species to
develop a concentration of those attributes that enable it to
accurately identify and evaluate its environment?"  I asked him.  He
could only give one answer, and when he did, I would have him.
	 "Yes, that is clear." He said.
	 "Then," I said, "if the mental models of a thing correspond
to knowledge and the assessment of those models correspond to
reason, we would have a paradigm for the evolution of knowledge
and reason.  We already have mechanical representations of this in
artificial intelligence systems.  We have robots that identify objects
in a room from video input and make a sufficient analysis of these
models to navigate around the room.  If we set up an experiment
where robots that ran into objects disappeared while those that
successfully avoided objects reproduced with  minor changes in
their programming, we would eventually evolve a collection of
robots with an astute knowledge of their environment and ability to
assess and navigate it.   In like manner, man has evolved the ability
to form extremely detailed  and accurate models of his sensory
input of the world and to make sophisticated analysis of that data. 
Hence, man has evolved knowledge and reason.  True, this system
is still deterministic, and man is still a part of the natural system he
has come to know.  But, he knows it none the less.  It is a case of
nature knowing itself.  A sort of feed back loop, or self-diagnostic
routine."
	 I was on a roll.  This sounded as compelling to me as
anything he had said so far.  I was eager to hear his response. 
	 He gave it.  "I agree, this is exactly what we experience as
knowledge and reason.  But, this is superficial and does not address
the epistemological problem at all.  Would it be fair to say I believe
nihilism follows from determinism whereas you do not?"
	 "Yes I think that would be an accurate statement," I
replied.
	 "I don't think it's accurate at all."  He surprised me.  "The
language is not naturalistic.   It originates from a time when the
predominant metaphysical position was dualism.  People thought
reality consisted of matter much as we do, but they also believed
reality consisted of mind.  They believed man was essentially
transcendental and could act independent of, and on, the material
world.  Man himself was not determined.  But as a naturalist you
have  already agreed that mind, ideas, thoughts, and beliefs are all
phenomena of nature haven't you?"
	 I thought a moment, "Sure," I said.
	 He continued, "It would follow then, that we do not do
anything.  We do not act on nature.  We are actions of nature.  Our
thoughts, beliefs and reasons do not come from us, they come to
us.  My belief that determinism leads to nihilism is not my idea, it is
an idea that nature has in me.  The ‘idea’ is an event in nature that
occures in association with the event in nature called ‘me.’  Do you
agree with this?"

F. KNOWLEDGE AND NATURE

` "I suppose I would have to.  I do not believe we transcend
nature."  I answered.  "But this is in keeping with my robot
paradigm.  Their sensory apparatus and their programs were all put
into them.  Yet, the ones that avoid the obstacles survive.
Obviously, they knew something the others didn't."
	 He countered, "The robots know nothing.  Simply, the ones
set up to avoid obstacles, avoid obstacles, the ones that don't, don't. 
Can we say that water flows to the ocean because it knows the
way?  Does water that finds its' way to the ocean know something
that other water doesn't?  You see, water simply does what nature
would have it do. So the robots do what their environment, sensory
apparatus, and programs would have them do.  Their actions are
caused.  They cause nothing.   In like manner we believe what
nature would have us believe.  We do nothing.  We are the
repository of certain thoughts.  I do not create my beliefs.  I am
simply a repository of belief.  All of it, my  beliefs, my thoughts, my
reasons, even the language by which I try to explain them, are
simply acts of nature."

G. PRIVILEGED POSITION

	 "OK,"  I said.  "I already agreed everything is determined,
and  I'll agree that our language has traces of transcendentalism in
it.  But still, if I am nothing more than a nexus of nature where the
phenomena of thought, belief, and reason are expressed, then that is
what I am.  I can live with that, and that is not nihilism."
	 "Are not both of us aspects or events of the same natural
world?"   he asked.
	 "Certainly," I answered, "No one would question that."
	 "Does the nature of the universe differ in regard to you
than it does for me?"  he asked.
	 "No, of course not," I replied.
	 "Is there a qualitative or quantitative difference in the
natural world that causes your beliefs and the natural world that
causes my beliefs?"  he asked.
	 "No, you know I believe there is only one natural world. 
Please stop trying to lead me,"  I responded.
	 "Then," he asked, "how is it that you and I disagree?"  I
believe that determinism leads logically to nihilism and you do not. 
Yet,  both our beliefs are grounded in the same cause, the
antecedent state of the universe.  Granted, we differ in our spacial
and temporal relations to the universe, but how do I know which
relationship is privileged to know the truth?  I have only those
beliefs, reasons, and thoughts that nature has given me.  I can not
get behind nature, look at it, compare it to my beliefs, evaluate my
reasons, and find out if they are valid.  I can think you are wrong
only by assuming that my  relationship is privileged, that it has
caused in me truth and caused in you error.  But, since you believe
as you do, and believe you are right, you too, must make the same
assumption of privilege.  And everyone who thinks, must make this
assumption of privilege for every opinion they hold.  In the end we
must admit that nature holds a myriad of contrary positions on
every subject.  And on every subject all contrary opinions but one
must be wrong.  If one is true, it is by accident, but we can never
know which it is, for we can only hold the opinion we are given. 
We can know the truth of nothing, hence nihilism."

H. BELIEF AND KNOWLEDGE

	 I felt as though the last door were closing.  I didn't have
much confidence left but thought I better ask any questions I still
had.  "How can you be a nihilist then?  You obviously believe in
naturalism and reason."
	 "I said I believe in naturalism and nihilism.  I said I use
reason.  I did not say I knew them to be true.  More accurately, I 
would say that in me nature holds a belief in naturalism and
nihilism.  It may even hold in me the belief that this is true, but I can
never know it.  As a nihilist, I believe that everyone is a nihilist, for
everyone holds those beliefs nature has given him, even their beliefs
in God and in truth.  They cannot believe otherwise." 

I. SURVIVAL AND TRUTH

	 "But how about the robots that survive?  Doesn't that
indicate the truth of their models and programming?"  I asked.
	 "Why?" he asked.  "Any view of the world that does not
destroy the viewer could be perpetuated regardless of its truth
value.  Religious systems that bring order to a society greatly
strengthen it and increase its survivability, but that does not make
these religions true does it?  If survivability is the test for truth, then
we would have to admit the truth of every belief held by a
survivor."

J. NIHILISM AND MEANING

 	 The door closed.  I was on the other side.  I no longer
believed in truth.  I was a nihilist.  I knew nothing.  I now realized
that nihilism is not a world view one arrives at by reason.  You are
sort of dropped off there by a rational world view.  Then you leave
reason behind.  I was excited to hold a position for which so many
good arguments could be marshaled.  However, I was disturbed by
the fact that once the arguments brought me there I could make no
arguments at all.  I was also disturbed by the lack of values.  I no
longer had need to be concerned about being right or wrong.  The
problem was that, as a nihilist, I had nothing to be concerned about
at all.
	 As time went on, I found nihilism un-satisfying.  It offered
no meaning.  No meaning at all.  No meaning to life.  No meaning
to my  actions.  No meaning to words or thoughts.  No reason. 
And worst of all no philosophy.  I began philosophy as a quest.  A
quest for meaning.  A quest for truth.  But my journey had led me
to a dead end.  No, not a dead end, a black hole.  What I found is
that there is nothing to find.
	 My quest was over.  Not because it was completed.  Not
even  because I was distracted and side tracked.  I didn't even get
lost.  I died.  I went looking for truth, but, ethically and
intellectually I found nothing.  I tried to get out but the hole was
deep.  Over and over again I would make a hypothetical leap back
to reason and nature,  but each time it brought me back to the same
place, Nihilism.
	 I sought to falsify nihilism itself, but as my mentor had
made so clear, no argument can be made against positions on the
other side of reason.  Nihilism can not be falsified.  Yet, an emptier
truth can not be imagined.  I had always assumed, perhaps naively,
that when I found the truth it would be meaningful.  If there was a
world view that could be both true and meaningful it would
certainly be worth investigating.

K. METAPHYSICAL WILD CARDS

	 Then a possibility occurred to me.  Not an attractive
possibility, but a possibility none the less.  My mentor had
mentioned a metaphysical wild card.  I found the metaphysical
aspect repulsive, but I decided to take it out for an intellectual test
drive anyway.  It seems that most of the difficulties came from my
fidelity to naturalism.  Once I was open to metaphysical possibilities
beyond nature, a number of options opened up.  What if there are
non-physical properties in the universe.   What if there are
properties that do correspond to moral qualities.  Then, there would
be a reality to which moral language would correspond.  What if
the dualists are right and there is a non-physical aspect to mind. 
Then the thoughts and beliefs of man would not necessarily be
determined. He could stand independent of nature as an objective
evaluator and form opinions of it.  I have no idea how to decide if
such metaphysical realities exist.  Nor do I know how belief and
reason would work in such a framework.  But, at least
hypothetically, morality, reason and knowledge would be possible. 
This would be worth exploring.

Back   Home