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Here is Collins' depiction of the intellectual context for John Dewey's thought, which demonstates Collins' sociological
methodology for tracking intellectual change.
Relational ties, whether master-pupil ties, adversarial ties, or acquaintanceship ties, as well as the groups associated with them, constitute the intellectual context for the development of individual thought. See Collins, The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change (1998). C.S. Pierce, William James, G. S. Hall, G. H. Mead (at Chicago), G. S. Morris are all well know influences on Dewey. But less well known are the St. Louis Hegelians that gave support and encouragement to the young Dewey: W. T. Harris, H. C. Bokmeyer, and through them, ties to the New England Transcendentalists. Others include Denton Snider, Thomas Davidson, and G. H. Howison. It would not be going too far to characterize the St. Louis Hegelians as an innovation hearth, whose particular focus of interest and activity was public education and progressive reform -- Dewey in embryo. For more see: http://www.iep.utm.edu/h/hstlouis.htm
On the roots of Dewey’s Education
as Growth idea: Harris: ================================ Bertrand Russell devotes several pages to the
thought of John Dewey in his A History of Western Philosophy (1945). But after
lauding him in the opening paragraph (saying that Dewey is “the leading living philosopher of In his review, Russell recalls that “Hegelian
philosophy influenced Dewey in his youth” (820); and he points out that, while critiquing the reliance upon organic
or “unified wholes” in Dewey’s philosophy of instrumentalism, “Dewey’s love of what is organic
is due partly to biology, partly to a lingering influence of Hegel … [or on] an unconscious Hegelian metaphysic”
(823). Russell himself does “not know how far [Dewey] is aware of this fact.” Santayana agrees, saying that “In Dewey
… there is a pervasive quasi-Hegelian tendency to dissolve the individual into his social functions, as well as everything
substantial and actual into something relative and transitional.” However, to the extent that Santayana dismisses
Dewey’s incipient constructivism, the result of Dewey’s influence by G. H. Mead, he perhaps errs, and Dewey comes
out the better. And while Russell is himself groping toward a kind of constructivism in his discussion of “truth”
and “significance,” he does not see Hegel’s involvement, as Santayana does.
Russell concludes by allowing that Dewey is “attractive
to those how are more impressed by our new control over natural forces than by the limitations to which that control is subject,”
finding that Dewey’s philosophy “is in harmony with the age of industrialism and collective enterprise.”
But it is Dewey’s underlying hubris that Russell singles out as “the greatest danger in our time” because
“it is increasing the danger of a vast social disaster,” however unintentionally. Russell’s fears, at least in part, have
been realized. There are many who would, without hesitation, describe public education, in combination with other social,
economic and political forces, a “vast social disaster.” There are, of course, many more that disagree. |
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