US DOE proposes major new changes to Higher Education Accreditation
http://insidehighered.com/news/2007/03/23/accredit
All but unnoticed in the halls of American higher
education this week were the extensive changes to 34 CFR 602 that were proposed by the US Secretary of Education.
These are the regulations that govern the recognition
of accrediting agencies, which are then placed on the Secretary’s list of those regional, national and specialized accrediting
agencies that have been approved for Federal purposes, i.e., Title IV gatekeeping for access to Title IV financial aid and
student loan guarantees.
NACIQI make-over ?
This draft involves
a number of ambitious proposals, including beefing-up of NACIQI’s role in the review of accrediting agencies which, until
now, has been to give a rubber-stamp of approval to accreditors.
But all this is about to change. Maybe.
The insertion of an additional layer of accountability into
the regulatory structure (i.e., the addition of the senior Department official beneath the Secretary) also gives the federal
agency a great deal more flexibility, and is perhaps an attempt to overcome the symptoms of regulatory agency capture by the
accrediting guilds that have undermined the overall credibility of the Secretary’s recognition process.
There are, however, at least two major obstacles remaining
before moving away from the process model of regulation of the accrediting guilds.
First, these proposed CFR changes must be understood as attempts
by the Federal government to transform a mutual benefit association organizational model (the accrediting guilds) into a quasi-governmental
instrumentality, that is, into a regulatory arm of the Department of Education.
Viewed in terms of organizational structure, there are many
reasons for the accrediting guilds to strenuously resist these kinds of changes.
Historically, the voluntary system of peer review and institutional
self-improvement that emerged over 100 years ago has almost nothing in common with the much more recent Federal interests
in American higher education, which have now been imposed upon the older organizational base. Regional
accrediting guilds were originally formed for the benefit of their members, and in this regard they have performed admirably
well, most notably by resisting interference and change.
It may happen that the accreditors will protest these proposed
changes, and unleash their dogs on the Secretary and Congress, as happened during the defeat of the SPREs in the 1990s. Or
it may be that the accreditors will publically acquiesce for political reasons, and seek minimal compliance but continue to
resist internally.
This brings us to the remaining problem that awaits resolution:
the so-called Atomic Bomb problem with the current regulatory structure.
The Atomic Bomb problem refers to the regulatory dilemma that
has been previously avoided by the US DOE’s “minimalist” or process approach to HE accreditation, but one which tends to undermine
the credibility of the recognition process.
“The Education Department’s accrediting agency evaluation
branch has in the past often approached its function regarding accrediting agencies not as a regulator, but as a collegial
peer reviewer. While this approach has been helpful in avoiding undue federal influence over higher education, it has also
meant that the recognition process has not been effectively used to promote better ‘gatekeeping.’ ... Part of the staff’s
reluctance to consider deregulation of an agency resulted from the devastating effect on schools’ eligibility if their accrediting
agency were delisted. Students and quality institutions could be seriously harmed by such action. Thus, the consequences of
derecognition were so severe that the threat of derecognition was not credible.”
(Source: Jeffrey C. Martin, “Recent
Developments Concerning Accrediting Agencies in Postsecondary Education,” Law and Contemporary
Problems 57:4, Autumn 1994, pages 121-150.)
This is what Martin calls the “atomic bomb problem,” and although
the 1992 HEA provides for a Title IV waiver of up to 18 months for accredited institutions upon the loss of their accreditor,
the problem illustrates the kinds of system-wide disincentives that the US DOE/AAEU is forced to operate under. The proposed
changes do not address this problem in any way.
The NCA, for example, accredits about 1,000 postsecondary
institutions and SACS accredits about 800. The negative repercussions of closing down either of these associations would be
difficult to describe, let alone face in actuality. Thus, acting resolutely against non-compliance is simply ruled out. This
is the sad legacy of the deterrent of the “Atomic Bomb” problem, which continues to hobble the regulatory scheme, despite
the Secretary’s proposed changes.
One recalls the sage advice of the Puffer Report, which urged
breaking-up these massive agencies into smaller ones. Perhaps the time has come to reconsider this proposal once again.
Can the US DOE regain lost ground?
Sadly, most commentators have missed the forest for the trees by focusing on the “student learning”
standard required by these proposed changes. Rather than see compliance with this new requirement as a simple thing (‘it is
only as difficult as you make it’), the more sinister meanings attributed to it have obscured the historical context and its
epochal significance.
This history, in so far as it relates initially to proprietary
schools receiving Title IV funds, goes back to the massive student loan defaults of the late 1980s and 1990.
Accrediting standards first appear as part of the 1992 amendments
to the Higher Education Act, and were meant to end high rates of student loan defaults. Specifically, the legislative intent was for the US Department of Education to require that accreditors have “minimum standards” for student
learning, faculty qualifications, and other standards as well.
But in the uproar over the SPREs, which were also part of
the same legislation, both the Department and Congress were forced into retreat. In the confusion, the Department backed-down
from implementing the Part H, Program Integrity standards, leaving in place instead minimalist “process” standards, or what
I call “standardless-standards.”
What’s happening now is that the Department is playing catch-up,
and attempting to regain some of the ground that it lost during the SPREs debacle, albeit in slightly different form.
This complex prior legislative history is why recent events
appear to be somewhat confusing but should not obscure the original legislative intent behind Part H of the 1992 HEA, after
which, as they say, the train left the tracks. Congress itself bears much blame for this through its laxity and poor oversight,
as history will show.
My hope is that, eventually, the accrediting guilds will be
transformed more and more to resemble what Claude Puffer called “public utility commissions” in higher education, and come
to understand the consumer point of view, rather than to simply advocate for their member institutions.
What we are witnessing is the attempt to gradually reform
a one-hundred year old institutional guild, no small feat by any means, and by no means an assured success either. Therefore,
there is no certainty that these far-reaching proposals will be actualized; nor is there any assurance that they will be implemented
any better than Part H of HEA was. Much depends, for example, on who is appointed to be the new senior Department official,
and what his/her marching orders are.