I have received a number of queries about my research into the international
used good trade. In response, I am making my dissertation available here, which contains much of the data, along
with other data and links to related research.
Along with formally modeling the political economy and impact of used automobile
restrictions, the dissertation explicitly uses the trade regime governing the used and new automobile trade as
a natural experiment to look at the political economy of trade policy. Differences in the treatment of new and used
automobiles in national and international trade regimes are exceptionally difficult to explain along standard political
economy lines, for example the Stolper-Samuelson or specific factors models. Instead, the differences appear to
be the result of intra-industry/ inter-firm policy competition.
The conclusion is that in this competition
the used automobile sector faces inherent disadvantages related to its diffuse industry structure and constituencies.
While the process of intra-industry/ inter-firm policy competition is particularly apparent in the case of the automobile
sector, this case provides insight into the general political economy of trade regimes.
