Chief Circuit Judge Boyce F. Martin exhibits such a pathological bias in favor of a fellow judge that he will go to any lengths to protect another judge, including, but not limited to, violation of his oath of office, denial of the most basic medical needs of prisoners, and obstruction of justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503.  Chief Circuit Judge Martin’s behavior is a classic example of a judge treating those who are not part of the judicial machinery as “lesser breeds without the law.”  See Butz v. Economou, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2921-2922 footnote (1978) (dissent).

This judge, who has no authority to refuse to file 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1) complaints against a federal district court judge, took it upon himself to return dozens of Judicial Misconduct Complaints, against federal district court judge Richard Alan Enslen, unfiled.  Concealing documents is a felony, obstruction of justice.  See United States v. Laurins, 857 F.2d 529, 537 (9th Cir. 1988).

Chief Circuit Judge Martin has denied those filing § 372(c)(1) complaints their First Amendment right “to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”  He is so biased in favor of a fellow member of the aristocracy (another fellow judge) that he deliberately confuses decisions and judicial rulings with felonies.

In case no. 1:98-CR-54, Western District of Michigan, Southern Division, Judge Richard Alan Enslen has exhibited the following behavior.

The indictment in case no. 1:98-CR-54 was issued on April 9, 1998.  The superseding indictment in case no. 1:98-CR-54 was issued on July 9, 1998.

Bradford Metcalf and his co-defendant, Randy Graham, addressed the following issues in their pre-trial motions:
 

1. The indictment was insufficient.

2. The meaning of the word "militia" in the Second Amendment and the fact that the word is part of a subordinate or dependent clause in the Second Amendment.

3. The fact that defendant Randy Graham has had a dislocated shoulder and has been denied proper medical treatment since his arrest.

The Order and Opinion signed by Judge Enslen denying the motions filed by the defendants is dated September 23, 1998.

The Order and Opinion was not authored by Judge Enslen, as the following quotes from the hearing transcripts of October 26, 1998 and November 17, 1998 clearly prove.  The statements made by Judge Enslen at these hearings clearly prove this, even though he states (falsely) that the motions "are DENIED as stated in this Court's Opinion."  The Opinion was not authored by the Court.  It was obviously authored by the prosecutor, Lloyd K. Meyer.

The following statements of Judge Richard Alan Enslen were made and recorded at Kalamazoo, Michigan on October 26, 1998, by U.S. District Court Reporter James L. Reinardy, CER 2532:
 

I've never read the superseding indictment.
In fact, I don't even know what you're charged with.
And I haven't read Count 1.

Hearing transcript, page 36, lines 12-17.

I haven't read the indictment.

Hearing transcript, page 51, line 21.

The obvious question is:  How could a judge who hasn't read an indictment be able to hold that indictment legally sufficient after that indictment had been challenged in five separate motions by two separate defendants?  Those motions were nos. 27, 39, 59, 60 and 78 in the master docket and DENIED in the “Court's Order" of September 23, 1998.  Note that Judge Enslen, without even reading the indictment, can issue a six-page Opinion finding an indictment sufficient that he hasn't read concerning charges of which he has no idea.  The Old Testament chastises such behavior.
 

To answer a man before hearing him out
Is foolish and disgraceful.

Tanakh, Proverbs 18.13, p. 1314 (The Jewish Publication Society 1985)

The obvious answer is:  Judge Enslen has committed a fraud upon his own court, in this instance and (undoubtedly) many others.  Not since the 1930s have the published opinions addressed a judge like this.

The indictment names as defendants Manton, Spector, Fallon, Lotsch and Davis, and alleges that they, together with Archie M. Andrews, now deceased, Alfred F. Reilly and Almon B. Hall, and divers other persons to the grand jurors unknown, conspired to commit offenses against the United States, to wit:  corruptly to endeavor to influence, obstruct and impede the due administration of justice in suits pending before certain courts of the United States; and to defraud the United States of and concerning its right to have the lawful functions of the judicial power of the United States exercised and administered free from unlawful impairment and obstruction, and more particularly its right to the conscientious, faithful, disinterested and unbiased judgment and action of the defendant Manton as the Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit free from corruption, partiality, improper influence, bias, dishonesty and fraud.

United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834 (2nd Cir. 1938).

Judicial behavior such as that exhibited by Judge Enslen has been addressed in more recent times, outside of published opinions.

I don't want to know what the law is, I want to know who the judge is.

Roy M. Cohn, quoted in New York Times Book Review, 3 April 1988, page 24.
 

The order [of lawyers] is becoming continually more and more powerful.      . . . There is danger of lawyers becoming powerful as a combined body.  The people should be guarded against it as it might subvert every principle of law and establish a perfect aristocracy . . .  This order of men should be annihilated.

Benjamin Austin, Observations on the Pernicious Practice of the Law, 1786, quoted in Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times 234 (1953).

On September 18, 1997 Judge James G. Carr dismissed Cumpian v. Nye, case no. 3:97CV7569, in which a young Hispanic man sued police officers for blocking his access to his lawyer and interrogating him until he confessed.

    Judge Carr could have "thrown out" the Cumpian case for any reason he desired.  Denying three out of four litigants their "day in court" and simply "throwing them out" for one reason or another (whether legitimate or not) is simply "business as usual" in the federal courts these days.  See Issacharoff and Lowenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 Yale Law Journal 73 (1990).

Judge Carr's Judgment Entry and Order of September 18, 1997 covers four pages addressing 28 U.S.C. § 1915, a statute that concerns proceedings in forma pauperis (no filing fees paid).  Apparently Judge Carr merely assumed that, seeing a Hispanic surname as the plaintiff in the case, he was dealing with a "free-loader."  Had he bothered to read the case he would have seen that the first entry on the master docket sheet in that action stated, "8/12/97--FILING FEE: on 8/12/97 in the amount of $150.00, receipt #302272."

Judge Carr's rulings indicate a blatant (and unacceptable) hostility to Hispanics and other minorities.  Judge Carr's bias and quirkiness has not gone unnoticed:
 

"He's a little goofy.  He gets things wrong sometimes, though.  Sometimes he'll make correct statements but really lose sight of the big picture.  Lawyers need to help him get to the right place.  He doesn't always have the best judgment."

"He's not very good at recalling proceedings and remembering what's happened from appearance to appearance."

" . . . I have to say that I think he is very biased in favor of law enforcement.  He just won't allow for the fact that sometimes these guys inaccurately convey what happened, which is bothersome.  Also, he's sensitive to due process--so long as no one is going to get acquitted."

"He has a very distinct pro-law enforcement bent."

"I think he tries to be fair, but he favors the government."

"Lawyers' Evaluation" in I Almanac of the Federal Judiciary, page 48.6th Circuit  (1998).

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in an en banc decision reversed the conviction of Tennessee Judge David W. Lanier.  Chief Circuit Judge Martin concurred in full with the opinion.  Luckily for the victims of Judge Lanier, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Circuit employed the wrong standard for determining whether particular conduct falls within the range of criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 242.

    Even more shocking than the Lanier opinion of January 24, 1996 was the recording of laughing and joking (among the good old boys) from the bench during oral argument which was later broadcast on national television and reported in major newspapers across the United States.

Some of the federal judges who heard Lanier’s appeal made jokes from the bench about what crimes they could be charged with if they had been wearing their black robes at the time. One joked about whether the federal law would apply if a judge “beats the hell out of a . . . scalper for a ticket to the Reds game.”

David G. Savage, Tennessee Judge Convicted of Sex Assaults Is Missing, Los Angeles Times, September 13, 1997, page A-1.

Another line from the L. A. Times article bears repeating:

The son of the county’s Democratic political boss and brother of the county district attorney, Lanier had been seen as virtually above the law until 1992.

Which is obviously the way Chief Circuit Judge Martin sees himself and his cronies.

Benjamin Austin’s predictions of 1786 have been fulfilled by the behavior of Chief Circuit Judge Martin.  Chief Circuit Judge Martin has subverted every principle of law and established a perfect aristocracy.  Those principles of law subverted by Chief Circuit Judge Martin are as follows:

There must be a means of punishing public officers.  Granger v. Marek, 583 F.2d 781, 783 (6th Cir. 1978) (quoting Learned Hand).  Judges are not above the law.  United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1143 (7th Cir. 1974).  Tyranny cannot come to America except by a failure of the judiciary to consistently be intellectually honest.  Kilgore, Judicial Tyranny, page 14 (1977).

[T]he courts have an interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them.  United States v. Sepe, 1 F.Supp.2d 1372, 1377 (S.D. Fla. 1998).

Chief Circuit Judge Martin’s behavior violates the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct as well.

Our legal system is based on the principle that an independent, fair and competent judiciary will interpret and apply the laws that govern us.  The role of the judiciary is central to American concepts of justice and the rule of law.  Intrinsic to all sections of this Code are the precepts that judges, individually and collectively, must respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to enhance and maintain confidence in our legal system.

ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, page 1 (1998 Edition)