History of Mobilization

The national mobilization effort of the United States during World War II was not accomplished under a master plan. Much of it was piecemeal involving a complicated succession of agencies and programs. The U.S. moved uncertainly. Controls and administration were improvised. Many mistakes made during World War I were repeated. Yet, two events helped to make the piecemeal approach successful. These were:

1. The national economy in 1939 contained much slack that permitted major increases in war production and military mobilization without initially generating pressures that required close governmental direction.

2. The U.S. partially mobilized before Pearl Harbor and after that tragic event, the country was permitted the luxury of fighting the war to a considerable degree on its own time table.

The general thrust of mobilization during World War II falls into two general periods: September 1939 to December 1941 during which the economy was directed almost entirely by advisory methods; the period beginning January 1942 during which there was total wartime national mobilization with emphasis on the mobilization of the economy and industry.

The war in Europe was conducted for some time before the U.S. began to take any action. In May 1940, based upon the laws still in effect from World War I, President Roosevelt set up the Office of Emergency Management (OEM) within the Executive Office of the President. He also established the National Defense Advisory Commission (NDAC). OEM was destined to be the point of liaison between the President and defense agencies. It became the legal hook that supported successive war agencies. Most of the emergency agencies later set up by executive order were legal tenants within OEM.

The President requested Congress to undertake a massive rearmament and mobilization program. In July 1940 the Congress approved a two-ocean Navy, gave the President authority to induct the National Guard, and call up the organized reserve. During the same month, peacetime selective service act became law for the first time in U.S. history.

In a speech at Charlottesville, Virginia, on June 10, 1940, Roosevelt said: "We will extend to the opponents of force the material resources of this Nation; and at the same time we will harness and speed up the use of those resources in order that we ourselves in the Americas may have equipment and training equal to their task of any emergency and every defense. Although amounting to a violation of both the spirit and legalities of neutrality, the statement put the Nation on record as prepared to undertake a de facto partnership with the anti-Axis powers, through the supply of war materials and services. In other words, the United States would serve from now on as the "Arsenal of Democracy," and mobilize its industrial might to arm the manpower of its allies" ( The American Arsenal Policy, p 225).

It soon became apparent that a stronger agency was needed to handle production responsibilities. In January 1941 NDAC production responsibilities were transferred to what was intended to be a stronger agency, the Office of Production Management (OPM). This office was to stimulate production. The agency was organized into three fundamental divisions: Production, Purchases and Priorities. OPM's real power was in its power to set priorities for materials essential to defense production. Because prices began to rise for consumer goods, the Office of Price Administration (OPA) was established.

The promise to provide material aid to Allies became formal when Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act in March 1941. This act provided for the administration to sell, transfer title to, lend, or lease any defense item to any eligible government. The President could transfer defense articles on hand up to a value of $1,3000,000,000 and to authorize the manufacture or procurement of any defense article for any country whose defense he deemed vital to the defense of the United States.

The United States had two years of warning of the possibility of involvement in war when the Japanese attacked Peal Harbor in December 1941. Yet the government was far from organized for an all out effort.

The entry of the United States into the war required a tremendous spurt in industrial and manpower mobilization. In January 1942 the Office of Production Management was replaced by a War Production Board (WPB) that became the agency for directing the Nations's industrial mobilization effort for the rest of the war. The WPB could have taken over the war procurement activities of the War, Navy, and other departments; still, it never did. Many hoped that the WPB would take action to cure many economic problems; butit did not. Therefore, in May 1943, The Office of War Mobilization (OWM) was established to assume the leadership of the war effort.

Creation of the OWM completed the governmental structure of the United States. It is interesting that after three years of temporizing and experimenting, an agency came into being whose director was in a position similar to that envisioned in the pre-war Industrial Mobilization Plan but rejected in 1940.

Mobilization of industry in World War II was accomplished by three methods:

1. Maximum use of existing facilities such as government arsenals;

2. Conversion of certain industries from peacetime to war production;

3. Expanding existing and constructing new industrial facilities.

Expansion and conversion created another problem of how to finance the process. Since many facilities were designed for the production of war items exclusively, it was impossible to rely wholly on private enterprise to shoulder the cost. Five major devices were used to meet this need:

1. Advance payments were made by the government to the industry concerned before production under the contract.

2. Progress payments were made as certain parts of the contract were completed.

3. The government supplied expensive subassemblies and scarce material to the contractor.

4. The government insured necessary machine tools were available to the contractor when needed.

5. The government made direct loans to the contractor.

Like industry, agriculture approached American involvement in World War II still reeling from the effects of the nation's worse depression. Farmers sometimes showed reluctance to follow any new course. After almost two decades of farm poverty, they felt entitled to enjoy higher prices. With memories of World War I still fresh, they did not wish to find themselves again borne down by excess capacity in the wake of another war. The American farmers quickly did their miracle of production.

The wartime increase in the GNP meant a roughly comparable growth in disposable income. This growth required the government to control the potential increase in civilian purchases or risk inflation.

Traditional measures were used to limit the inflationary consequences of increased civilian buying power. Between 1040 and 1944, the government passed five revenue measures that lowered the minimum taxable individual income by at least 50 percent. This action brought nearly all Americans within the Federal tax system and made income taxes the source of nearly three-quarters of all Federal revenues.

The Federal Government also conducted eight war-loan drives. This helped curb buying and reduced competition for few consumer goods available.

The Treasury Department took informal control of the Federal Reserve System following a precedent set during World War I. As a result the Federal Reserve kept the rediscount rate low and made certain that banks had sufficient reserves to purchase Federal securities when they came on the market. Interest rates were kept low leading to easy money. Thus, there was a tremendous inflationary potential: the large gap between the wartime increase in national income and the money returned to the government in larger collections from taxes and loans.

To limit the inflationary potential of that gap, the government set up on a wide scale two kinds of regulation only hinted at during previous conflicts: price controls and rationing.

With more that eight million workers still looking for jobs in 1940 and two million farm workers underemployed, the government saw little need initially to intervene in labor markets. As time progressed, it became necessary to avoid labor disputes and other similar events. The result was that in 1941 the National Defense Mediation Board (NDMB) was set up to avert labor shortages. Later in the year after Pearl Harbor, The National War Labor Board (NWLB) was set up to negotiate guidelines to prevent strikes and work stoppages.

In April 1942, President Roosevelt also created the War Manpower Commission (WMC) in part to give the unions a voice in determining manpower policy they believed they had been denied earlier.

Some assert that President Roosevelt first " thought of American mobilization as, at the bottom, an industrial effort and the production of munitions as the key to eventual victory" ( Leighton, The American Arsenal). He seems to have held close to this view even after Pearl Harbor and the use of millions of U.S. troops overseas. The U.S. accounted for more than 50 % of the combat munitions produced by all the anti-Axis powers. By 1944, 60 % of all the combat munitions being used by the Allies were being produced in the U.S.

The record of American industry and agriculture in support of the war effort is impressive in most parts. When one contemplates the degree of industrial effort put forth by the United States, it is tempting to support the view that just as Roosevelt had anticipated, America's decisive contribution to the defeat of the Axis powers was the supply of munitions to the Allies. This supply was not a substitute for the large-scale involvement of U.S. forces in the conflict. In the end the United States fielded larger forces than most of its allies and mobilized as large a proportion of its population as most of the major belligerents on both sides.

The experience of the U.S. in World War II resulted in various lessons. A few critical ones are summarized as follows:

1. Almost the same trials and errors were made as had been made in World War I. In World War II mobilization machinery was improvised by a "cut-and-try" system that takes a long time and is very wasteful of money, economic resources, and lives.

2. National preparedness planning must be a joint military-civilian undertaking if it is to prove readily acceptable to the American public. Plans must be flexile to permit adjustment to the political realities prevailing at the time they are executed.

3. Public support is necessary for the successful launching of any large-scale mobilization effort.

Perhaps it is advantageous to stop for a moment and reflect on a few generalizations about war and society in America. The actions over the past two hundred plus years have managed to preserve our Nation well. As we will see, actions taken after World War II were in many ways different from those taken after previous wars.

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. wrote: "All thought which leads to decisions of public policy is in essence historical. Public decision in rational politics necessarily implies a guess about the future derived from the experience of the past. It implies an expectation, or at the very least a hope, that certain actions will produce tomorrow the same sort of results they produced yesterday. This guess about the future...involves, explicitly or implicitly, an historical judgment."

These observations on the essentially historical nature of intelligent policymaking suggest that military and civilian officials who must plan against the possibility of war can profitably draw upon the historical record described in the preceding pages. On the contrary generalizations sometimes fit only the war fought and period of history covered. Extrapolation to future wars is not always accurate. Wars that have demanded a lesser effort have often produced important results: the stimulus to manufacturing given by the Jeffersonian embargoes preceding the War of 1812, the destructive dispute over the territorial extent of slavery resurrected by the Mexican War, or the debate over America's proper role in world affairs that emerged during the 1898 war with Spain and revived with virulence during the Vietnam conflict. Despite the significance of items, smaller wars seem less comprehensive in their total effects. They do not set in motion all the forces described over the next few pages. Let us look at some conclusions drawn from the four major wars fought by the U.S.

1. War stimulates the economy. Wartime growth in demand has usually over stimulated the economy resulting in inflation. Thus, government must take action to balance the needs for a free market and the need to maintain a sound fiscal basis.

2. Industry and agriculture have profited from wars. There are balances to this. Gains in one sector of agriculture are often balanced against losses in other areas. The general result, though, has been an increase in productivity and land devoted to agriculture. Supplying the wartime market has also encouraged large-scale machine production and expansion of the industrial base.

3. War has provided the reason for increases in control over American society by the Federal government. Originally, such direction was limited to finance and banking. Frequently, controls were brought to bear and the population became more tolerant to them because of familiarity. Imposition of controls continues today.

4. The trend toward centralization has affected the market economy. As warfare demanded more resources, the federal government lessened its reliance upon the marketplace for diverting production to military use. The government rarely resorted to seizure or other direct controls, but sought to influence the behavior of farmers and businessmen through various indirect methods.

5. The wartime growth of Federal power has also affected the relations among the government's three branches. The Supreme Court has generally supported the sometimes extra- Constitutional authority claimed by the President and Congress, or at least postponed a challenge until after the crisis.

6. The relationship between the executive and legislative branches have been more complex. The trend has been toward executive leadership, expansion, and domination of the Federal government.

7. Warfare has not ceased competition between political parties except for the Civil War. 

8. Wars have provided the grounds for restricting the civil liberties of various groups. One war provided help to a minority group: The Civil War resulted in freedom for Blacks.

9. Labor increased its membership and voice in policy making during wars. The government assumed new responsibilities to improve hours and work conditions.

The record of history of life on the American home front is one of change. Major wars usually test a nation's tradition and institutions. The society must adapt to create a large, well-armed military force. Unpopular actions are required to suppress traditions and activities that impede the war effort. Without such practical actions, society risks defeat and the possibility of a hostile victor forcibly changing the society of the conquered. The population of the U.S. may have thought that war was gone forever after World War II. Yet, the next 45 years were filled with both shooting and non-shooting wars requiring many additional actions and the presence of large military forces, well- equipped for any eventuality. Meanwhile, Korea caught us somewhat unprepared. (Back)

The experience gained from previous wars resulted in a mixture of actions following World War II. There was a clear recognition of the need to develop mobilization capability and procedures. This recognition was shown by the legislation enacted, the organizations established, and the planning done. Yet, there was a wholesale disposal of government-owned industrial facilities to the civilian sector. This disposal helped stimulate the civil sector and renewed the flow of goods to the consumer. Due to a lack of money, many government facilities were allowed to deteriorate. One example was the dumping of machine tools for $.15 on the $1.00 by the War Assets Administration. This action resulted in the closing of 34 machine tool companies because of the loss of business. By 1951 the U.S. machine tool capacity was about 1/3 what it had been at the start of World War II.

While rapid draw down occurred in the physical realm, progress was made in the enactment of key legislation. Some of this legislation retains relevance today.

The first was the Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act of 1946 that provided for the acquisition and maintenance of the strategic stockpile. In 1979 another piece of legislation redefined the stockpile idea.

A major piece of legislation was the National Security Act of 1947. Most recall the provisions of this act that established the Department of Defense, the Department of the Air Force, and the Central Intelligence Agency. It also established the National Security Resources Board (NSRB). This agency was charged with the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization for the entire executive department. The act gave approval for the Munitions Board that had been reconstituted in 1945. This board was charged with the planning for the military aspects of mobilization. The NSRB assumed the role of long range planning and the Munitions Board focused on short range planning. Another major provision of the National Security Act was that the military departments could except contracts from competitive bidding when it was determined that facilities and suppliers should be retained in the interests of national defense.

Another act, The National Industrial Reserve Act of 1948, authorized the Secretary of Defense to retain surplus machine tools, manufacturing equipment, and industrial plants required to supply the needs of the armed forces for emergency production.

A milestone was passed when the Munitions Board prepared the Industrial Mobilization Plan of 1947. This very detailed plan was in consonance with the National Security Act of 1947. Several items of the plan are interesting. First, the plan drew heavily upon the experiences of the U.S. Secondly, it recognized the need for public acceptance of mobilization planning, and thirdly, it established the time phases for preparation for mobilization. This phasing idea was refined as the years passed and came to fruition in the Graduated Mobilization Response that will be discussed fully in another session. Annex 47 of the plan was the precursor to industrial preparedness planning of the 1980s. Annex 47 were put into effect and by 1950 mobilization planning with industry was being done to meet the objectives of the plan. The idea of planning for industrial mobilization had been recognized and accepted by American industry.

Little did the planners realize that their work would be needed so soon. 1950 marked the beginning of the Korean War. This war was the catalyst that crystallized the growing differences between the United States and the Soviet Union. The war triggered an industrial mobilization response far in excess of that required by the Korean War alone. The war served to begin the build-up for perceived to be required to build a military power to offset Soviet designs for world domination.

NSC 68: A Report of the National Security Council, dated April 14, 1950, became a key to mobilization measures. This report was the result of prolonged study. The major theme was the necessity for the United States to take the lead in the free world and pursue a deliberate policy of "containment" vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Although President Truman never approved the NSC 68 formally, clearly the document provided the philosophical and intellectual bases for the national security policy of the U.S.

The invasion of the Republic of South Korea two months later on June 25, 1950, by North Korean forces, provided a real sense of urgency that otherwise may have taken many more years to develop. Three months after the beginning of the war, the Defense Production Act of 1050 was passed. This act has been extended ever since and is in effect today. The President was given the power to develop and maintain whatever military and economic strength was necessary to oppose aggression and promote peace. The seven titles gave authority to him to:

1. Establish a priority and allocation system;

2. Requisition personal property and condemn real property;

3. Expand productive capacity and supply of metals, minerals, and other materials;

4. Establish wage and price controls;

5. Establish procedures to settle labor disputes;

6. Impose consumer and real estate credit controls;

7. Encourage small business participation in the program.

On December 16, 1950, President Truman proclaimed a national emergency and created the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM). The President authorized the Director to direct, control, and coordinate all mobilization activities of the Executive Branch of the Government. This included production, procurement, manpower stabilization, and transport activities. The Director was made a member of the Cabinet and the National Security Council to ease the implementation of governmental policies with mobilization actions.

Throughout all this, the Korean War effort must be viewed as only a part of the program underway. The most important program was the preparation for a possible full- scale war with the Soviet Union through the building of a war reserve large enough to last one year. A two pronged approach was used to building the mobilization base. First, dedicated military production lines were built larger that those required for Korea. Secondly, the economy and industrial base was expanded to provide both and improved standard of living and growth potential for military production.

On September 9, 1950, the Economic Stabilization Agency was established as required by the Defense Production Act. The administrator had the responsibility to preserve and maintain the stabilization of the economy and to develop both short and long-range price and wage stabilization policies.

Two other agencies were created concurrently: The Office of Price Stabilization and the Wage Stabilization Board.

On January 3, 1951, the Defense Production Administration was formed to coordinate industrial production and to centralize programming and coordination of the priorities and allocation functions. In August 1951 the Defense Materials Procurement Agency was created and assigned the Title III functions of purchasing, and making commitments to purchase, metals, minerals, and other materials.

The Federal Civil Defense Agency was formalized when President Truman signed on January 12, 1951, the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. We will return to this when we examine the formation of the current organization for mobilization and civil defense.

The major devices used during the Korean War were:

1. Accelerated Tax Amortization: The Revenue Act of 1950 authorized the amortization of emergency facilities over a five year period for tax purposes. This was the same as during World War II.

2. Guaranteed markets at guaranteed prices. Provision was made for government purchase of output when a project involved an abnormal risk or when an assured market was required to induce either investment or production.

3. Direct loans by the government and guarantees of commercial loans. This provision was used when private financing was unavailable due to risk involved.

4. Financing of plant construction and equipment. The original contracts for equipment often contained a provision for the financing of the facility required to produce the equipment.

5. Installation of government-owned equipment and the construction of government-owned facilities. Production equipment owned by the government was installed in contractors' plants when the contractor was unable or unwilling to pay the cost.

6. Grants for research, exploration, and development.

The achievements of defense production during the Korean War were many. One must remember the two-fold nature: one aim was to produce war material for the Korean War; the other was to build-up forces to counter the Soviet Union.

1951 was largely a year of tooling. Trucks and other equipment were salvaged from the jungles of the South Pacific and elsewhere. Then, these vehicles were put through assembly lines in Japan and refurbished. Similar rehabilitation of discarded World War II equipment helped put needed equipment in the hands of the troops as quickly as possible.

By 1952 deliveries of all types of equipment were growing. Remember that the spare tires and chrome trim on civilian automobiles were removed in 1952! This action helped the population have a more direct feeling of urgency as well as to divert some needed material to war making equipment.

January 1953 found production of military aircraft at 1000 per month with many new types scheduled such as the B- 52, F-100. Guided missiles were given impetus. Divisions were provided with increased firepower resulting in a 75% increase in firepower over World War II divisions. Progress was so good that by late 1953, programs were beginning to be "stretched out."

A few more programs should be examined that encouraged the expansion of industry:

1. Korean Pool Order Program. The government ordered about 87,000 general purpose tools. By 1958, all but 400 tools of the original order had been sold to industry.

2. Toolbuilder's Facilities Expansion Program. The government purchased and leased 2,375 tools to toolbuilders to enlarge their capacity to build other tools.

3. "Elephant Tool" Program. The government financed production of large-size, general purpose tools required to make other large tools. Rental fees were charged on most cases.

4. M-Day Pool Order Program. This program furnished toolbuilders with mobilization requirements for general-purpose tools that would be "triggered" automatically in the event of emergency. This has been called the "trigger" program and is still in effect today.

An Advisory Committee on Production Equipment was established in 1952 to examine issues relating to the condition of the machine tool industry. It recommended that the government substitute production capacity for stockpiling. A balance had to be struck between stockpiling and idle industrial capacity. Thus, the Committee proposed the "D to P" policy that remained in effect in the Defense Department into the 1970s. The "D to P" concept provided for the acquisition of a war reserve stockpile to be on hand at the start of a war that would be adequate to satisfy consumption requirements until the industrial base could build production to the level of the consumption requirement.

The initial goal of creating production capacity beyond that needed to support the Korean War and a one- +ear war reserve for a full scale war evolved into the mobilization base concept. A natural outgrowth of this broader idea was the dedicated military mobilization base. The Defense Mobilization Order VII-7, August 25, 1954, provided the policy to maintain the total mobilization base. The order declared that is was essential that the facilities, machine tools, production equipment, and skilled workers required to meet minimum wartime mobilization requirements be maintained so that they could be used or converted in time of emergency. Thus, government-owned facilities and tools were placed in a standby status and some privately owned facilities using government owned tools were similarly placed in storage or the tools moved to a central place.

The Korean War era was unique for many reasons. As discussed, mobilization was implemented for two purposes. Also there was a faster implementation of legislation. For the first time in its history the United Stated established the policy and the fact of peacetime readiness for war. This war done in both military readiness and industrial readiness. The economy was expanded with specific goals set for basic industry and the capacity essential to the production of military items. It recognized that preparedness was a long term process. It began the process designed to preserve the state of readiness by adopting the mobilization base concept. (Back)

A shift in strategic thinking occurred during the mid- 1950s. The Air Force adopted the "Force-in-being" concept in 1955. This concept was based on the assumption that the next war would be a total nuclear war fought with the weapons on hand at the start. Thus, the need for industrial mobilization was discredited. From 1958 to 1967, the Air Force conducted no industrial readiness planning with industry except that required as part of the procurement cycle.

Meanwhile, the army was trying to do industrial mobilization planning with industry. Since the Air Force and the Navy to some extent, did not regard such planning as important, industry was reluctant to participate on a voluntary, non-reimbursed basis. As time progressed, the Air Force position became that of the Department of Defense. The focus was on the short war scenario. The Air Force position was contrary to the principles of NSC 68 that held that strong conventional forces were essential to avoid use of a nuclear capability.

In 1962, the Defense Department announced a policy of "Flexible response." This meant that the U.S. would be prepared for any degree of conflict of any scale or duration. Adoption of this policy caused the Air Force to assess their policy and reexamine the stockpile policy. Eventually, the Air Force returned to mobilization planning in 1967, at least for spare parts. The Office of Emergency Planning (OEP), successor to the ODM by two generations, developed a Resource Mobilization Plan for Limited War and completed it by summer, 1966. The plan provided for several responses including those of the Korean mobilization such as wage and price stabilization and price controls.

This new idea of limited war came into fruition in the Vietnam War. Mobilization planning is based on a declaration of emergency and the imposition of certain controls to provide prompt response by industry. Such a national emergency was never declared for Vietnam although the declaration of December 16, 1950 was still in effect.

Competitive bidding was used to obtain equipment to reduce the cost of the Vietnam War. This policy invalidated the planning agreements made with industry. The effect of this policy was to place military orders in competition with civilian work. Thus, without mobilization agreements, industry thought that there must be no military urgency. The U.S. was destined to prosecute the longest war in its history in an almost total peacetime economy.

Industry was unwilling to give up firm civilian business. Those factories and industries with idle capacity usually bid. Sometimes, government equipment had to be moved from the supplier hoped for but not selected because their bid was not the lowest.

The priority and allocation system retained from 1950 was not used effectively. Equipment in storage had not been maintained and its condition required upgrading before use. Technology had changed creating obsolescence.

The debate over government owned equipment and facilities continued. Business was not ready to build for a short time need. Critics of the governmental policy wanted to see the ownership transferred to private enterprise. Few businesses bought any government items unless priced at a bargain and useable for other purposes.

By 1965, the situation for producing munitions was worse than that encountered in 1950. Nothing had been done to update facilities or to maintain them. Millions of dollars were required to bring the plants back into production.

With the coming of the 1970s, many were concerned whether the United States would have sufficient industrial capability to support any future military emergency. In November 1970, the Deputy Secretary of Defense appointed an Industry Advisory Committee (IAC), subcommittee, to examine the condition of the U.S. industrial base and the adequacy of current mobilization base planning. The final report was produced in June 1971. Some general findings are as follows:

1. No consistency existed between the military services in terms of the planning periods and the assumed M-Day. Each service assumed different types of war to be fought during different times.

2. The Department of Defense was trying to plan for too many nonessential items resulting in insufficient in-depth planning for more critical items.

3. The credibility of the Department of Defense mobilization planning was weakened by such anomalies as a quality industry planning while failing to provide adequate material incentives.

4. The Defense Department's failure to resort to methods of "buying time" such as the use of the machine-tool "trigger order" program of the 1950s, placement of contingency contracts with planned producers, and maintenance of hot production lines for essential weapons systems.

Perhaps the most telling indictment of the subcommittee was the failure of the Nation to give industrial mobilization planning continuous and strong emphasis over the years. Thus the emphasis given in the 1970s was much less than that given in the 1950s. Time would show that downward slide would continue. (Back)

We have examined the mobilization experience and actions resulting from that experience in the United States. Now, we turn our attention to a brief look at the mobilization experience in other countries.

Probably the one effort best-known to most people is the NATO Alliance. As discussed during the Korean War period, the United States had a two-fold purpose in mobilizing: to fight in Korea and to preserve the peace world-wide against the USSR. Because of this concern, the U.S. decided in consort with their NATO Allies that additional ground forces were needed in Europe. Thus, the U.S. sent two plus divisions with support packages to Germany. The idea was for these forces to remain until NATO forces were stronger and the threat of World War III was lessened. As we know, the cold war became colder and the U.S. continued to augment forces in Europe.

The maintenance of U.S. forces in Europe required much provisioning and a constant state of "mobilization" to be ready for whatever might occur. Each country of the alliance had mobilization plans to support that portion of the NATO land mass to which assigned. Each country drew heavily upon their wartime experience. For instance, the Federal Republic of Germany had great success in maintaining the railroads during World War II; thus, their planning relied heavily upon rail transport. The Netherlands could maintain citizen soldiers in a fair state of readiness, so they rotated many such troops through their active units. The Alliance provided for the sharing of experiences and procedures. While it may have been prudent to have adopted similar procedures in each country, political autonomy prevented such action. It is a credit to the NATO planners that they could bring into focus the diverse plans of each nation to provide a realistic deterrent to the Warsaw Pact.

The United States eventually established large depots in which complete sets of equipment were maintained in readiness for use by troops to be flown to Germany in the event of war. These reserves called POMCUS, were drawn upon during emergencies in other parts of the world. Constant replenishment of those equipments was required to keep the POMCUS at a reasonable level. The deployment of large forces places great demands on the logistical base that is not on a war footing. Thus, drawing down reserves and forcing some cannibalization of moth-balled production and storage facilities. The U.S. found provisioning of larger forces during peacetime on another continent required a more consistent defense industrial base.

Looking back at the Alliance, the original reason for force deployments became obscured as time passed. Each country continued to plan for the same type of force, deployed in the same manner whether such force or deployment was suitable for the threat. Many mobilization efforts of the NATO countries were directed against a World War II scenario. Worse yet, many plans were directed against the short war scenario during which one would fight with what was on hand for two weeks. Whoever was ahead then won!

Each country reinforced the reality of stationing large forces in foreign countries over extended years created new political and military problems. Sometimes, relations between sister countries became tense. (Back)

Often, we look at the experiences of other counties and tend to exaggerate the success they had in a certain area. The "halo effect" seems to fit well in the mobilization experiences of a few countries that have done it well over the years. This success does not translate directly to a different political/economic system. For example the experience of Switzerland would not fit a country which had to be prepared to fight modern wars outside of its boundaries. We will look briefly at three countries: Germany, Switzerland, and the USSR.

As the aggressor in previous wars, Germany built an industrial base to provide supplies necessary to support the war machine under a wide range of scenarios. Germany was an international supplier of arms. As such, she could maintain a vast armaments industry well above that needed for "defense." Therefore, the industrial base could swing into mass production to support war-making. Throughout her wars, Germany proved that planning for war involves a total range of support activities including transportation, medical, communication, public relations, industry, agriculture, and the armed forces.

Because of the German experience, one can conclude that a warm industrial base can be converted easily to war- making products. Commonality of parts between civilian and military equipment provides for ready supply in time of war. Assigning personnel military duties similar to civilian occupations eases the rapid expansion of high quality forces. Planning with industry provides facilities that can be converted rapidly to war materials or the support of military operations.

A country often cited for its excellence in mobilization in Switzerland. Almost all its activities are conducted to provide for its defense in any emergency. Many call the defense forces "boy scouts" because of the basic nature of the citizen soldier forces. Each citizen is a soldier maintaining weapons and munitions within the home. Highways double as aircraft runways and highway tunnels serve as entrances to underground hangers for aircraft. Underground parking facilities serve as population protection shelters. Hospitals are built to serve military and civilians. The concurrent planning for national preparedness with normal peacetime pursuits provides for people, facilities, and products that are ready for almost instant mobilization. This readiness requires both the expenditure of large amounts of money and the willingness of people to live their lives in a state of readiness.

During the Cold War, the focus was on the USSR. The cold war has thawed and many believe peace in upon us. The USSR had prided itself in fighting off the invader. In so doing, the people have suffered greatly in a tragically high price in lives lost and a reduced standard of living. Rarely has the USSR had enough supplies for its forces or protection for its people. These lessons have not fallen upon unheeded ears. Soviet (because the Russian thinking) planners are almost paranoid about having enough forces and equipment to protect the "motherland." This in one reason the Soviets have pursued the paths they have reference forces and equipment. They have recognized that one cannot mobilize without the needed industries. Because they have usually needed large amounts of equipment, they rarely discard any equipment. They maintain it for possible use with the reserve forces, cadre, youth, para-military forces, border police, and local police. In an attempt to maintain equipment in open storage, they have expended large amounts of money to insure that it ready. Often, this equipment fails when taken out of storage and used. The Soviets have learned that an active foreign military sales and grant program provides a source of foreign money and a way to maintain the armaments industry. Russia tries to continue the classic thinking, but does not have the resources to do so. (Back)

Returning to the United States, we need to look at three pieces of legislation before we turn our attention to the organization for civil defense and mobilization.

The first is the National Emergency Act of 1976. This act cancelled all existing states of national emergency effective as of September 14 1978. It prescribed how the Executive might exercise emergency authority in the future. The act provided no such authority without specifying the precise authority or authorities the Executive was using. Congress could end any declaration of emergency whenever by joint resolution. The Congress was directed to review any emergency every six months. Unless the declaration was stopped then by concurrent resolution, it was to cancel automatically upon its anniversary unless the President extended it ninety days before the anniversary.

The second is the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Revision Act of 1979. This was the first major revision of the stockpile since 1946. The Act consolidated the management and administration of the stockpile while clarifying goals and procedures. The three existing stockpiles were combined into the National Defense Stockpile to simplify management.

The third is the National Materials and Minerals Policy, Research and Development Act of 1980. The purpose of the act was to promote an adequate and stable supply of materials necessary to maintain national security, economic well-being and industrial production but with appropriate attention to a long-term balance between resource conservation and social needs. In 1982 President Reagan submitted to Congress a plan in response to the Act of 1980. In part this plant provided for an easier method to withdraw land from Federal Government protection for exploration and mining. The plan called for a substantial buildup of the national stockpile, updating current holdings and getting the necessary additional supplies. The plan mentioned the intention of the administration to increase the effectiveness of the operation of the Defense Materials System (DMS) and Defense Priorities System (DPD). This was to be done by promoting better understanding between government and industry of the principles and advantages of the system.

An outgrowth of the legislation and emphasis of the early 1980s was the development of the Machine Tool Trigger Order Program inaugurated in August 1982. It was developed by an interagency group chaired by FEMA. This program represented a government-industry cooperative effort to reduce mobilization lead-times by speeding delivery of machine tools to defense contractors.

Legislation later in the decade focused on organization and delineation of responsibilities. (Back)

As you remember, the National Security Resources Board (NSRB) was established by the National Security Act of 1947. This board was a part of the Executive Branch. In 1948 the secretary of Defense created the Office of Civil Defense Planning. In 1949 that office title was changed to the Office of Civil Defense Liaison when President Truman created the National Security Resources Board (NSRB) of Civil Defense White House.

President Truman created the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), White House, at the beginning of the Korean War. The ODM was under the NSRB. A Federal Civil Defense Agency (FCDA), White House, was started as a result of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950.

In 1953 President Eisenhower merged the NSRB into the ODM and widened the responsibility of the ODM. In 1955 Eisenhower established the Civil Defense Coordinating Board. This board assisted development of an orderly and integrated plan to facilitate participation of all federal departments and agencies in the civil defense of the nation.

The result of the plan was the Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958 which consolidated the Federal Civil Defense Agency and the Office of Defense Mobilization into a single unit. This unit was located in the Executive Office and called the Office of Civil Defense Mobilization.

In 1961 President Kennedy assigned emergency preparedness operations to the Department of Defense and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The planning and coordinating tasks for civil defense were reconstituted in the Executive Office in a new office called the Office of Emergency Planning (OEP), White House.

The operation civil defense function in the Department of Defense were carried out by the Office of Civil Defense. That office was elevated to Assistant Secretary level.

In 1964 the Department of Defense transferred civil defense functions to the Army. The Army office was called the Office of Civil Defense, Department of the Army.

Meanwhile, the Office of Emergency Planning (OEP), White House, was given a new title of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP), White House.

In 1972 the Department of Defense created a new office to discharge DOD civil defense functions. This office was called the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA), DOD.

In 1973 President Nixon abolished the Office of Emergency Preparedness, White House. Its various functions were assigned to other agencies. Natural Disaster functions were assigned to the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). HUD created the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA) to carry out natural disaster relief.

The General Services Administration created the Office of Preparedness (OP), GSA in 1974 to carry out stockpile functions. In 1975 the office title was changed to the Federal Preparedness Agency (FPA), GSA.

A milestone was reached on July 20, 1979, when President Carter signed Executive Order 12148. This Order set up the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). All functions relating to civil defense and emergency management were shifted to the new agency. The following agencies and offices were transferred to FEMA:

1. Defense Preparedness Agency, Department of Defense;

2. Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, Department of Housing and Urban Development;

3. Federal Preparedness Agency, General Services Administration;

4. Functions of the Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977;

5. Office of Science and Technology Policy.

Since 1979, FEMA has continued to consolidate functions and to perform its role of coordination and direction. The intervening years have seen many changes in the direction and policy formulation at the national level.

In July 1982 the National Security Council published National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 47. This is considered to be another landmark document. A full range of topics were addressed. Provision was made for wage and price controls and relocation of large numbers of people. A major section provided for intensified counterintelligence effort during major domestic or national security emergencies. A new administrative body was created and called the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board (EMBP). The EMPB was to coordinate some 23 Federal agencies and develop a plan of action to upgrade preparedness.

The National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 188 was published by the National Security Council in September, 1985. This NSDD created the still current National Emergency Coordination Structure (NECS). Essentially, this structure set up a two prong requirement for a President of National Security Affairs and Domestic Affairs. It established the National Security Council for Domestic Policy. Four Senior Inter-Agency and six Inter-Agency Work Groups were created. The Emergency Mobilization Planning Board (EMPB) was disestablished and its functions transferred to the FEMA. FEMA was required to perform the function of facilitating and coordinating the planning between Federal agencies as well as state and local agencies.

For all practical purposes, this NSDD set up a successor to the old National Emergency Planning Board providing an umbrella under which the National Security Council could oversee the national security preparedness of the United States with FEMA coordinating certain aspects.

The Inter-Agency Working Group, Policy Coordinating Committee has almost finalized a significant document. This will be reviewed later.

NSDD 47 focused on the Executive level organization. Another document, NSDD 259, dated February 4, 1987, set forth the objective of the civil defense program. Its thrust was down to the local level. FEMAs role in civil defense was delineated. General policy guidance was reserved to the National Security Council. Financial assistance to state and local governments is specified. States are designated to have the primary responsibility for attack preparedness. Local governments were assigned primary responsibility for peacetime disasters. Coordination is emphasized.

On November 18, 1988, Executive Order 12656 was published. This Order established responsibilities for emergency preparedness. It is a very detailed document. The head of each Federal department and agency was tasked to:

1. Be prepared to respond adequately to all national security emergencies, including those that are international in scope and those that may occur with any region of the Nation;

2. Consider national security emergency preparedness factors in the conduct of his or her regular functions, particularly those functions essential in time of emergency. Emergency plans and programs and an appropriate state of readiness including organizational infrastructure, shall be developed as an integral part of the continuing activities of each federal department and agency;

3. Appoint a senior policy official an Emergency Coordinator, responsible for developing and maintaining a multi-year, national security emergency preparedness plan for the department or agency to include objectives, programs, and budgetary requirements;

4. Design preparedness measures to permit a rapid and effective transition from routine to emergency operations, and to make effective use of the period following initial indication of a probable national security emergency.

5. Base national security emergency preparedness measures on the use of existing authorities, organizations, resources, and systems to the maximum;

6. Identify areas where additional legal authorities may be needed to assist management and consistent with applicable executive orders, take appropriate measures toward acquiring those authorities;

7. Make policy recommendations to the National Security Council regarding national security emergency preparedness activities and functions of the Federal Government;

8. Coordinate with State and local governmental agencies and other organizations including private sector organizations in the response to national security emergencies;

9. Assist State, local and private sector entities in developing plans for mitigating the effects of national security emergencies and for providing services that are essential to a national response;

10. Cooperate in compiling, evaluating, and exchanging relevant data related to all aspects of national security emergency preparedness;

11. Develop programs regarding congressional relations and public information that could be used during national security emergencies;

12. Ensure a capability to provide, during a national security emergency, information concerning Acts of Congress, presidential proclamations, Executive orders, regulations, and notices of other actions to the Archivist of the United states, for publication in the Federal Register, or to each agency designated to maintain the Federal Register in an emergency;

13. Develop and conduct training and education programs that incorporate emergency preparedness and civil information necessary to ensure an effective national response;

14. Ensure that plans consider the consequences for essential services provided by state and local governments, and by the private sector, if the flow of Federal funds is disrupted;

15. Consult and coordinate with the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency to ensure that those activities and plans are consistent with current National Security Council guidelines and policies.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency was tasked to:

1. Coordinate and support the initiation, development, and implementation of national security emergency preparedness programs and plans among Federal departments and agencies;

2. Coordinate the development and implementation of plans for the operation and continuity of essential domestic emergency functions of the Federal Government during national security emergencies;

3. Coordinate the development of plans, in cooperation with the Secretary of Defense, for mutual civil- military support during national security emergencies;

4. Guide and assist State and local governments and private sector organizations in achieving preparedness for national security emergencies, including development of plans and procedures for assuring continuity of government, and support planning for prompt and coordinated Federal assistance to States and localities in responding to national security emergencies;

5. Provide the President a periodic assessment of Federal, State, and local capabilities to respond to national security emergencies;

6. Coordinate the implementation of policies and programs for efficient mobilization of Federal, State, local, and private sector resources in response to national security emergencies;

7. Develop and coordinate with all appropriate agencies civil defense programs to enhance Federal, State, local and private sector capabilities for national security emergency crisis management, population protection, and recovery in the event of an attack on the United States;

8. Develop and support public information, education and training programs to assist Federal, State and local government and private sector entities in planning for and implementing national security emergency preparedness programs;

9. Coordinate among the heads of Federal, State, and local agencies the planning, conduct, and evaluation of national security emergency exercise;

10. In conjunction with other agencies, develop and maintain capabilities to assess actual attack damage and residual recovery capabilities as well as capabilities to estimate the effects of potential attacks on the Nation;

11. Assist the Secretary of State in coordinating the formulation and implementation of United States policy for NATO and other allied civil emergency planning.

President Bush issued National Security Directive Number 10 which established an inter-agency policy coordinating committee. This committee was mentioned previously . It is for Emergency Preparedness/Mobilization Planning (PCC-EPMP). and chaired by the Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency. Its full membership is comprised of senior policy official at the Assistant Secretary level or equivalent. The Charter for the group contains a listing of some 17 areas which include:

1. National Security Emergency Preparedness Guidance.

2. Mobilization.

3. Financial Mobilization.

4. Strategic Airlift.

5. Energy Infrastructure.

6. Search and Rescue.

7. Financial Infrastructure.

8. Casualty Evacuation.

9. Restore Monetary basis.

10. Grain reserves.

11. Major Emergency Actions (MEAs).

12. Situation Assessment.

13. Surge Civil Defense.

14. Rewrite EO 10480.

15. Industrial Base.

16. Law Enforcement.

17. Critical Facilities.

Another organization which we should know about is the North American Defense Industrial Base Organization (NADIBO). This organization was formalized by a Letter of Guidance approved and implemented by the defense departments of both Canada and the United States. The Charter outlines the mission, composition, and administration of the NADIBO. The major objective is to strengthen the North American Defense Industrial Base.

The NADIBO consists of:

- An Executive Committee that organizes and conducts meetings and workshops acting as the conduit for addressing recommendations to Canadian and U.S. planners.

- Various committees and task forces that address specific areas of concern and propose courses of action.

- A Secretariat responsible for all administrative functions in support of the NADBIO.

- Industry participation by invitation.

There are four active committees and one task force as follows:

- The Requirements Committee. The work of the Requirements Committee focuses on the critical operational requirements of the two countries military forces.

- The Mechanisms Committee. This group examines the resources available from each country for implementing industrial planning policies and procedures.

- The Data Committee. The mission is to promote the exchange of data between the nations' military services, government agencies and industries to improve industrial responsiveness and the effectiveness of industrial base analysis.

- The Education Committee. This committee is responsible for developing education and informational material and disseminating these resource materials to target audiences.

- The Ammunition Task Force. This body is tailored specifically to the maintenance of adequate ammunition production capacity to meet projected mobilization requirements. (Back)

The United States has responded to the changing threats over the years in a variety of ways. Most people think that the U.S. is slow to mobilize but once started, does a relatively good job. One cannot say what the future holds. Some argue that mobilization is no longer required since the tensions in the world are reduced greatly. But, there are a variety of threats to the security of a country and each threat requires mobilization of different resources with which to cope with that threat.

The Russia and China are possibly the only countries capable of waging a major nuclear or protracted conventional war against the U.S. or NATO at this time. The easing of tensions in Europe decreases the likelihood of war. As the risk of war decreases, the need for accurate intelligence and sound, constantly evolving mobilization plans increases.

There are other military threats such as:

- Miscalculations by a third world country resulting in an indirect or inadvertent attack on the U.S. or an ally.- Closing of oil routes or other major lanes of commerce, requiring the U.S. to open and maintain passageway.

- Drug wars escalating to involve several countries requiring U.S. military presence.

- Acts of terrorism as a surrogate for war or shock requiring U.S. Action.

- International nuclear or chemical incidents leading to escalation requiring U.S. intervention to protect national interests.

These changing and diverse threat argue for tailored military forces and mobilization plans to fit the threats envisioned. (Back)