Diocesan Formation and Education Program for Deacons and Laity

Ethics

Session I: Introductory: Ethics and Moral Theology

I. Ethics and moral theology.

A. Holmgren says he will use the two terms interchangeably, and for the most part so will we—but it is worth noting that there are distinctions between the two.

B. Ethics is more or less a branch of philosophy: broadly, inquiry into what is good, what is right, the virtues, how we ought to behave.

1. Ethics as such has no necessary reference to religious values or Christian witness.

2. There are and have been many sorts of ethics and ethical systems, not all of which we would consider compatible with a Christian view of the world.

a) So Aristotle considered the end or goal of life as happiness, defined as “the exercise of vital powers along lines of excellence in a life affording them scope,” and ethics as the inquiry into what will further the end or goal of life.

b) So John Stuart Mill could base his entire ethical system, “utilitarianism,” on the “happiness principle,” ie, “that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness,” where happiness is defined as “pleasure, and the absence of pain.”

c) So Niccolo Machiavelli could base a series of ethical reflections (though not a developed system) on the principle that “the end justifies the means,” and so an action is right, be it never so ruthless or destructive, so long as it serves the end of keeping the powerful in power.

(1) “It is necessary for a prince, who wishes to maintain himself, to lean how not to be good, and to use this knowledge and not use it, according to the necessities of the case…. Some things which seem virtues would, if followed, lead to one’s ruin, and some others which appear vices result in one’s great security and wellbeing.”

d) And there are “departmental” or “disciplinary” ethics: business ethics, medical ethics, “codes of ethics” for various professions; some, but certainly not all, will have reference to specifically Christian moral concerns.

C. Moral theology is, of course, more specifically religious and Christian; “faith seeking understanding” as applied to action.

1. The question here is not just “What is the moral good?” but “What is the moral good revealed to us in Christ?”

2. Here the moral life consists in some sense in “the imitation of Christ”; or, in contemporary parlance, “What would Jesus do?”

a) The inquiry of Christian ethics, then, is to ask, seriously and consistently,

(1) What would Jesus do, really?

(2) And how can we do likewise?

3. Or, to put the question in the formula we’ve used in these classes all along, “How can we live according to what we’ve come to understand about our faith?”

D. In the work we’ll do together, we will generally use the word ethics to mean Christian ethics, and as synonymous with moral theology; but we should know that the inquiry floats in a wider ethical pool as well.

II. Two approaches to morality: the good and the right.

A. The Good.

1. Sometimes called a teleological approach, because it focuses on the end or purpose or fulfillment of persons or things.

2. That is good which conduces to the fulfillment or highest realization of persons or things.

3. We make judgments about whether a thing or a decision is good or bad depending on how it leads to fulfillment or realization of a virtue.

B. The Right.

1. Sometimes called a deontological approach, because it focuses on duty.

2. That is right which conforms to a code or law or set of principles, which we are obligated to obey.

3. We make judgments about whether a thing or a decision is right or wrong depending on how it measures up to the law that is appropriate to it.

C. Two approaches in tension.

1. Does God will a thing because it is good, or is a thing good because God wills it?

a) The first presupposes some standard of good that God adheres to.

(1) This needn’t be some “higher power” that constrains God.

(2) The “standard of good” could be thought of as part of God’s character, not originating “outside of” or “against” God, but simply a constant factor in how God is God.

(a) Consider, eg, a human example: I do deeds that are more or less consistent with my character.

(b) My character is not an outside power that constrains my deeds.

(c) No one deed discloses all my character, but my character is a consistent principle of my being that can be abstracted from my many deeds.

(d) So the standard of good to which God’s deeds adhere is not separate from God, but is in God’s character.

(3) Note that the standard of good, being abstractable from God’s self, is at least in principle knowable by others not-God, ie, us.

(a) Ie, we can recognize something as good “in itself,” according to a standard of good, and therefore refer it to God.

(b) We don’t need to determine if something is of God first, before we can tell whether it is good.

b) The second stresses God’s sovereignty, God’s absolute freedom to determines the law and to act in accordance with it.

(1) Because God is the source of law, therefore whatever God does is according to law, by definition.

(2) There need be no abstractable “standard of good” to which God’s will adheres or can be measured.

(3) The only standard is conformity with God’s will as expressed in law.

(4) Therefore it is not appropriate to ask whether any thing or event is good “in itself,” since good can only be determined by reference to God’s law.

(a) And, it should be noted, God’s law can only be determined by revelation, not by the application of natural reason.

2. This all may sound like philosophical hair-splitting, but these two approaches do condition the sorts of things we say about God and what we consider to be good.

a) Eg, whenever someone says “I couldn’t believe in a God who would x,” where x is some act that most people would find morally problematic, that person is applying the principle that God wills something because it is good.

(1) So “I couldn’t believe in a God who would use the HIV virus as a punishment against people” is presupposing that punishing people with a virus is bad, and is recognized as bad by anybody with a conscience, and so cannot be an act of God.

(2) Sure, but this approach runs the risk of putting our human sense of good in the position of judging God.

(a) Eg, something like “I couldn’t believe in a God who would drown innocent Egyptian soldiers who were only doing their duty, just to get glory over Pharaoh.”

(b) Making the innocent suffer is generally considered wrong.

(c) Do we then need to reinterpret the Exodus story, because a God we’d recognize as good wouldn’t do such a thing?

(3) In statements like these, we use a standard of good that is (mostly) accessible to our understanding, and apply it to God.

b) Eg, on the other hand, whenever some says “X is God’s will” or “X is part of God’s plan,” especially where x is something tragic or bad, that person is applying the principle that something is good because God wills it.

(1) So responding to the killing of a child by a drunk driver by saying “It’s God’s will; God called her home,” is presupposing that whatever God wills is good, even if that good is not apparent to us, with our limited knowledge of the full scope of God’s will.

(2) Sure, but this approach runs the risk of portraying God as capricious or amoral.

(a) Eg, someone once told me that the massive deaths of Native Americans from syphilis after Columbus was part of God’s plan for opening up North America for white folks, and therefore was a good thing.

(b) It is hard to hear such a thing without picturing such a God as little better than a cruel and bloodthirsty monster.

(3) In statements like these, we refer first to God’s sovereignty and will, and derive a notion of goodness from God’s will.

3. And there are corresponding differences of emphasis in moral methods derived from these approaches.

a) Consider, eg, the question of gay and lesbian sexuality that currently exercises us so much.

b) Those who argue that such sexuality is bad because the Bible condemns it, and should be rejected by the Church, are essentially arguing that:

(1) something is good because God wills it,

(2) and we know God’s will only through what’s revealed in the Bible,

(3) so, conversely, what the Bible condemns must by definition be bad,

(4) and therefore the moral decision is against it.

c) Those who argue that such sexuality is good for those who are so oriented, and should be recognized by the Church, are essentially arguing that:

(1) there is a standard of good which we are capable of knowing,

(2) and some people are fulfilled in gay and lesbian sexual love, so that according to such a standard we can say that it is good,

(3) and God wills what is good,

(4) and therefore gay and lesbian sexual love must be of God,

(5) and therefore the moral decision is for it.

D. Looking for what is good and looking for what is right can produce tensions in moral theology.

1. In point of practice, of course, we use both, and both are needed to counterbalance each other.

2. Our moral lives are indeed shaped both by ends and by duties.

3. So we can never wholly divide the two approaches, but it can be instructive to distinguish them.

III. Close connection between ethics, spirituality, and pastoralia (moral theology, ascetical theology, pastoral theology).

A. Moral theology is about determining what is right and good in accordance with the Good News of God and Christ, with the guidance of the Spirit.

1. Or, as Holmgren puts it on p. 8, it is “how we live out in our daily lives our response to the saving reality of God in Jesus Christ.”

B. But living out in our lives our response to God is also the province of spirituality, the life of prayer and worship and sanctification.

1. Kenneth Kirk, the great Anglican moral theologian of the early 20^th century, defined the “end of life” as “the vision of God,” thereby claiming that worship is our highest and best activity, and those things are good and right which lead us to worship.

a) Therefore, as Holmgren sums him up on p, 4, “the duty of the ‘Christian moralist’ is to stimulate in us the spirit of worship rather than set before us codes of conduct.”

b) Kirk centered on the beatitude, “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God”; where becoming pure of heart is a matter of both spiritual discipline and moral conduct.

2. So we might distinguish moral theology as how we make judgments about what is good and right, and ascetical theology as how we gain the vision of what is good and right; but clearly they are deeply related.

C. But our vision and our judgment is also about how we get along practically in the world, how we care for each other, binding up the broken hearted and leading each other to green pastures and still waters—the province (as the Psalm 23 imagery implies) of pastoral theology.

1. The general and universal principles of moral reasoning need always to be applied to the special and particular situations of people who are hurting or striving or in doubt or in joy.

2. Likewise the special and particular situations of people need to be helped to transcend their limited visions by being referred to general and universal moral principles.

3. Eg, the case of a family needing to decide whether to insert a feeding tube in a family member who is dying; there are pastoral concerns regarding the family’s grief and hope, and there are also moral concerns regarding the sanctity and preservation of life. Neither concern is reducible to the other, although they are clearly related and must be considered together.

D. So moral, ascetical, and pastoral theology must all be distinguished, but not divided, in the living out of our understanding of our faith.

IV. Casuistry in the Anglican moral theology tradition.

A. In the Anglican tradition, this recognition of the close relationship of moral, ascetical, and pastoral theology has led to an emphasis on casuistry, or the making of cases, in moral reasoning.

B. Jeremy Taylor in the 17^th century was the author of Ductor Dubitantium, a massive treatise on judging cases of conscience; and also author of the Rule and Exercises of Holy Living and the Rule and Exercises of Holy Dying.

1. Look at the prayer “O God, whose days are without end…” on p. 489 of the BCP, which is adapted from Taylor’s Holy Dying; observe how spirituality, morality, and pastoral care are mingled in the prayer.

C. The particular style of Anglican moral theology has been to steer a middle way between fundamentalist moralism and canonical legalism, but to use scripture, tradition, and reason to build a case seeking consensus that, in this situation, given these considerations, this is the decision that is most good and most right.

D. Notice, though, that particular cases are not always clear-cut and neat.

1. We can’t always choose between what is simply good and bad, what is simply right and wrong.

2. Sometimes we have to choose between goods, or choose the lesser of two evils.

3. Sometimes the best we can do is make the best of a bad job.

4. Sometimes all we can do is choose between shades of gray.

E. The goal of our ethics is not to be perfect, but to do the best we can and be as faithful as we’re able: “will you persevere in resisting evil, and whenever you fall into sin, repent and return to the Lord?”

V. For next time.

A. As we read the chapters in Holmgren, we will come across some of these points again, in more detail or in more specific contexts.

B. Read Holmgren chapters 1-2.

C. We will look in more detail at the “ethical task”: what do we do when we start to do ethics?