[Exit menu]

In the final chapter, we argued that world order would be benefitted by an accrediting or credentialing mechanism which effectively monitors and responds to oppressive leadership well before mass violence -- internal or exteral -- occurs. Such a mechanism could be provided by a global Council of Heads of Government (CHG), developed along these lines.

The members would be all who are legally selected as heads of government of any nation. The system would of course recognize the right of peoples to select varying types of government. Staff support could be provided by the Secretariat of the United Nations, but the CHG would be independent of the General Assembly and Security Council. A newly elected (or legally appointed) head of government would automatically become a member of the council, after an appropriate provisional period, if there were no challenge within the CHG of the new member's credentials.

Upon presentation of evidence of malfeasance in office by a head of government, and in the absence of evidence of operative internal mechanisms by which the nation's people could legally and non-violently effect redress, a group of members of the CHG (perhaps five), could request a preliminary investigation at the staff level. If warranted, that would be followed by investigation by a commission appointed for the purpose.

The results would be made known formally to all members, and would be made public. The members would vote electronically, without requiring all heads of government to meet in one place. By an adverse finding (by some agreed percentage of members) the accused member would be denied credentials to govern.

(An alternative: The adverse finding would constitute an "indictment" by the CHG, which would be submitted to the UN Security Council for formal resolution.)

Upon being denied credentials to govern, that head of state would be legally required to resign or submit (within a very short time) to a new (monitored) election by the people. If neither occurred, the nation would lose membership in the General Assembly and all UN member agencies, and lose all benefits including financial grants and loans. The government would lose all claim to represent its nation's sovereignty. Other nations could provide such humanitarian assistance to oppressed peoples as needed, without regard to sovereignty questions.

After an additional period, an automatic and progressive series of further sanctions would be invoked by all members of the United Nations, until the Security Council determined that the cause of action had been redressed or no longer existed; or until the Security Council determined that more forceful action was authorized.

A mechanism could also be provided for a partial "loss of credentials." For example, if the CHG (or Security Council) action so specified, sanctions only against arms purchases, or certain arms purchases, or certain dangerous substances, could be ordered. Observance of the sanctions would be incumbent upon all nations and all corporations and individuals.

This proposed mechanism would provide several additional levels of very public investigation and debate which would bring increasing pressure over a period of time. It would probably have little value in dealing with the long-entrenched Palestinian question; it could help in dealing with Saddam Husseins before they invade their neighbors, or with future Duvaliers and Amins who threaten primarily their own people.

The success of the proposal would require that heads of government see themselves not only as servants of their own people, but also as responsible to the concept of world order and sovereignty of all people. If supported by them, it would lower the need for internal insurrections, and reduce the probability of future Iraqi wars. Incidentally, it might also reduce the temptation to use assassination to redress grievances. Not only the world, but the heads of state themselves, would stand to benefit.