“It would be tedious to recount instance
after instance, outrage after outrage, atrocity after atrocity, to illustrate the true nature and extent of the widespread
conditions of lawlessness and violence which have prevailed. During the last
nine months in particular, the frontier of the United States along the lower Rio Grande has been thrown into a state of constant
apprehension and turmoil because of frequent and sudden incursions into American territory and depredations and murders on
American soil by Mexican bandits, who have taken the lives and destroyed the property of American citizens, sometimes carrying
American citizens across the international boundary with the booty seized. American
garrisons have been attacked at night, American soldiers killed, and their equipment and horses stolen; American ranches have
been raided, property stolen and destroyed, and American trains wrecked and plundered…
Representations were made to General Carranza
and he was empathetically requested to stop these reprehensible acts in a section which he has long claimed to be under the
complete domination of his authority. This Government has repeatedly requested
in the strongest terms that the de facto government safeguard the lives and homes of American citizens and furnish the protection
which international obligation imposes.”
Robert Lansing
Department of State,
Washington, June
20, 1916
Introduction
Beginning in the summer of 1915, a sequence of Mexican raids denoted
by thievery, kidnapping, and murder transpired in the lower Rio Grande valley
of the United States.
The rationale for the raids was the result of a revolutionary movement identified as the Plan of San Diego, whose supporters
aspired to recover all U.S. territories formerly under the
jurisdiction of Mexico.
To attain their objectives, the members vowed to murder all Anglo-Saxon males over the age of sixteen, and choose Texas
as the preliminary location to launch their operations. The regularity and magnitude
of violence escalated to such an unprecedented degree that by November of 1915 nearly half of the armed forces in the United
States were deployed to the border of South Texas by the U.S. War
Department. Such measures were taken by both the State and Federal Government
in an attempt to deliver improved border security to safeguard American lives during an era of questionable stability in U.S.
and Mexican foreign relations.
To some extent, Francisco “Pancho” Villa’s raid of Columbus, New
Mexico on March 9, 1916 must be regarded in conjunction
with previous border disturbances that occurred during the early years of the Mexican Revolution. Americans had once again been murdered in their homes on American soil.
While the majority of historians and scholars that have researched Villa’s attack on Columbus
refer to the incident as an act of vengeance perpetrated by a madman, they underestimate Villa’s ability to strategically
implement his ideas into a coherent approach that could justify his actions. Their
explanations simply do not justify Villa’s intelligence or ability to manipulate circumstances for his favor.
However, the historian Frederick Katz of the University of Southern
California does portray Villa’s attack as a calculated and premeditated political endeavor. His interpretation asserts that Villa’s motivation was to provoke U.S.
intervention in Mexico that would ultimately discredit de
facto president Venustiano Carranza’s ability to effectively govern the nation.
While Katz’s interpretation provides a sound basis for understanding Villa’s underlying motivation in addition
to acknowledging his intelligence, it ignores the importance of border security during the era – an avenue of thought
consistently overlooked when reexamining the circumstances surrounding the Columbus
affair. Thus, Villa’s attack on Columbus,
New Mexico was an intellectual and strategic display of articulated defiance in order to
demonstrate Carranza’s inability to pacify Mexico and
in turn provide border security to safeguard American lives.
Motivations for Attacking
Columbus
Pancho Villa’s attack on Columbus, New Mexico
is perhaps one of the most controversial issues in the relations of U.S.
and Mexican history. It remains uncertain why Villa chose the small town of Columbus
because the town contained no more than a few hundred residents and a considerably substantial U.S.
garrison of 600 men. The majority of Americans assumed Villa’s clear defiance of the supremacy
of the United States was the undertaking of a crazed lunatic
and nothing more. They concluded the attack was the final defiant stand of a defeated and desperate
man who simply could not come to terms with the harsh reality administered to him. In
the mindset of many Americans, Villa had been reduced to a mere bandit with nothing to lose.
However, the Columbus affair must not be over simplified. The circumstances surrounding the incident are complicated and controversial, ensuing into a number of
convoluted speculations that attempt to clarify Villa’s motivation for attacking the town.
One popular explanation among historians regarding Villa’s motivation for attacking Columbus
is that the Villistas raided the town in search of supplies. The 13th
Cavalry stationed at Columbus had precisely the resources Villa needed for his
ravaged army. He desperately required machine guns, and there was an ample supply
available within the garrison. The military camp and the town’s general
stores contained food, clothing and other provisions vital to Villa’s survival as well.
Advocates of this theory contend that Villa did not vengefully descend upon Columbus,
but rather focused on obtaining resources unavailable to him elsewhere. The assertion
is that if Villa’s intentions were to massacre Americans he would have inflicted many more fatalities during the attack. In contrast, only eighteen Americans were killed during the affair because the Villistas
focused the majority of their efforts on acquiring much needed supplies. The
Villistas especially ignored non-combatants. They concentrated mainly on the
hotels, whose guests were robbed of their money and valuables, and on stores that were well-stocked. Single residences were largely disregarded, especially the homes of Mexican-American citizens who were
judged to be not fit for looting. The Villistas were more concerned with stealing
horses and acquiring accessible arms and ammunition. Unfortunately for the Villistas,
the majority of the arms and ammunitions were locked up or well guarded.
The few murders that did take place
in the raid ensued essentially as an subsidiary to an authentic guerilla undertaking, even though they were indeed appalling. The raiders commonly ignored fleeing individuals, particularly the women. No one was taken hostage to be detained for ransom, and the captives obtained were eventually set free. Moreover, no women were raped and no murders were committed unmercifully.
As inviting as this theory is, it ignores
facts essential to understanding Villa’s attack on Columbus, namely that
the raid was premeditated months in advance. Why would Villa plan to raid Columbus
for supplies months before the attack occurred if he so desperately needed provisions?
The theory can be further overlooked when one considers the composition of the town.
Why would Villa make an attack on Columbus when he was aware that a garrison
with well-disciplined American soldiers existed there, especially when there were neighboring towns that also possessed provisions
but were less fortified? These factors clearly demonstrate that Villa’s
primary intentions in Columbus were not merely related to acquiring supplies,
although this was most likely a supplementary decision to do so.
Another popular explanation amongst
historians to discern Villa’s motivations for attacking Columbus is that
Villa was nothing more than a meager outlaw. Historians that prefer this interpretation
perceive Villa as a bandit whose love of money and spoils outweighed his virtue, integrity, and regard for the greater good
of his country. In other words, if he was offered money to cross the border and
attack Americans, he would do so without the slightest consideration of the repercussions for Mexico. If this theory does in fact sustain any truth regarding Villa’s decision to
attack the United States, then the question of what external
influences contributed to his decision to do so surfaces. In particular, there
are two external factors that could have potentially influenced Villa’s decision to attack Columbus.
The first external factor that potentially
could have influenced Villa’s decision was the German secret service. With
the outbreak of World War I, German leaders became progressively more concerned about the role of the United
States as American weapon factories were distributing arms, ammunition, and other provisions
to the British, Russian, and the French at a rate that continually intensified. Felix Sommerfield, a long-time provider of arms and ammunition to Villa and
eventual aid to the German secret service, decided he could convince Villa to make an attack on the United
States. Sommerfield had been supplying Villa
with arms as a result of Villa’s inability to acquire them elsewhere due to restrictions imposed on him by the United
States. He genuinely believed that if the United
States were absorbed in a war with Mexico
subsequent to an attack by Villa, the U.S. would be too preoccupied
to enter the war on the side of the Allies. Germany’s
foreign secretary Gottlieb von Jagow favored the idea, affirming that “it would be highly desirable for America
to become involved in a war and be diverted from Europe, where it is clearly more sympathetic to England,”
adding that “an intervention made necessary by the events in Mexico
would be the only possible diversion for the American government.” It is clear that Germany
would have benefited from the strategic importance of distancing the neighboring counties.
After Villa’s attack on Columbus,
there is reasonable certainty the German secret service did in fact provide Villa with arms since his ability to acquire them
elsewhere was limited yet he and his men were well equipped. Nonetheless, there is no evidence that suggests that the Germans did participate
in any aspect of Villa’s attack on Columbus.
Although it is very doubtful the German’s were a principal influence for Villa’s attack, their offer may
also have been a supplementary factor in his decision to do so.
The second external factor that could
have potentially influenced Villa’s decision was conservative American businessmen hoping to instigate U.S.
intervention in Mexico.
The theory, largely derived from both the Labor and Liberal press, contends that conservative businessmen, eager for
Wilson to intervene and encompass significant portions of Mexico,
paid Villa to attack Columbus so that their own interests could be maintained
in the state. At the time it was widely believed by the vocal body of American ultraliberals
that Mexican attacks upon American soil were encouraged by and compensated for by American interests, and many people referred
to Villa “as an agent of Wall Street and his men as Mexican mercenaries.” Socialite congressmen Meyer London of New York
claimed that no other feasible argument could be made:
It is scarcely believable that this satanic performance of Villa was a mere accident. The truth will be known some day, and the world will learn that the bandits, Villa, was the mere tool of
interests which sought to embroil the United States in a war with Mexico.
That there are powerful interests whom nothing would suit better than the annexation of Mexican territory can not be
successfully contradicted.
However, these beliefs were not limited to the American left. The
Christian Science Monitor, not associated with endorsing leftist’s ideals, came to comparable conclusions in
its editorial column two days after the raid on March 11:
Villa is but a tool
operated by an unseen hand…He serves the purpose of keeping Mexico in a turmoil, of preventing the accomplishment of
Carranza’s task of pacification, or at least he helps materially in postponing this accomplishment, and in keeping the
way for some such favorite of
the clericals and aristocrats as Felix Diaz.
Manifestly the purpose
of the raid in New Mexico was to provoke intervention by the United States, that all of Mexico might rally to the Villa standard. There are people
of great influence on the northern side of the border who would, all unwittingly, play into the hands of those who are behind
the bandit and who are spurring him on.
The debate was so heated amongst certain
individuals that ultimately the rumor went as far to state that Villa was in no way responsible for the raid. These people genuinely believed the Columbus affair was the
result of the Republican Party scheming to invoke a Mexican attack in order to generate sentiment against President Wilson
in his Democratic candidacy for reelection. If this was achieved, American capitalists’
interests in Mexico would be maintained. One individual that supported this premise was the historian Edgcumb Pinchon
who said:
Why to this wretched
desert hamlet forty miles from the nearest city…should come brisk gentlemen in smart New York clothes but a week before the
raid? What was their business? How
did it happen that the raid was made immediately after a part of the garrison had been withdrawn, and while but one officer,
a lieutenant, remained on duty in the camp southeast of the town? Why did the
attackers, apparently some four hundred strong, and easily in force to penetrate a massacre, persistently fire their rifles
in the air, and, in the course of a three-hour occupation of the hamlet, confine their attention chiefly to looting, inflicting
only such casualties as…would seem inevitable even if their instructions had been merely to make a gesture? Why, when it is the invariable custom of Mexican troops to charge with a battle-cry, and then save their
breath for the business in hand, did the attackers monotonously chant for three hours, “Viva Villa! Viva Villa!”
Pancho Villa, busily
absorbed on March 9, 1916 – the day of the raid – in his cat-and-mouse game, at Casas Grandes, two hundred miles
to the south hears the first word of mouth rumor of the raid only some hours after the American breakfast table has absorbed
the last morning extras?
Although this extract is noteworthy,
it is not confirmed by any proof. Pinchon was simply steadfast in his belief and disillusioned with the American
political system. Moreover, the entire notion that Villa attacked the United
States because of American business interests is mere speculation, and there is no substantial
proof to support the assertion. However, this does not suggest that conservative
American businessmen did not try to manipulate Villa. Villa’s policies toward U.S.
business had always been lenient in his attempt to secure arms and ultimately receive official recognition by the U.S. Government,
and in turn American businessmen may have viewed this as an opportunity to exploit him for their own personal gain.
Yet another popular explanation to discern
Villa’s motivations for attacking Columbus is that Villa had no other choice
but to fight if he wished to live. In this sense, Villa is portrayed as an ensnared
man with no viable alternatives other than to run and fight. Historians that
prefer this interpretation contend that Villa had aspired to obtain political asylum in the United
States, but was prevented from doing so when he discovered he would be indicted for the murder
of William Benton.
Benton
had lived in Mexico for many years and was the owner of a
hacienda, a large ranch located near Gallegos, Chihuahua. Factions of rebels frequented the area often, occasionally slaughtering cattle and
stealing what they desired. On one particular instance Mrs. Benton was warned
by a rebel that she would be murdered if she ever refused any of the marauder’s requests. This greatly upset Mr. Benton, who left for Jaurez to personally meet with Villa at his headquarters.
However, Villa was notorious for becoming
angry under the smallest of circumstances. Benton
allegedly approached Villa and spoke aggressively to him before ultimately grasping for his gun. He was overwhelmed and disarmed by Villa and his friend Rodolfo Fierro, who later killed Benton.
When American officials discovered Benton’s
death, they insisted that his body be returned to the United States. Villa’s attorney revealed to him that Benton
should have been tried in court so Villa would not be charged with his murder. In
turn, Villa commanded that Benton’s body be excavated. Once this was achieved, the Villistas positioned the corpse against a wall, announced the charges, and
indicted him guilty of assisting the adversaries of the revolutionaries. They
condemned him to death, and reburied the corpse. Furthermore, Villa never relinquished
the body to the U.S. Historians that prefer this interpretation contest Villa had no alternative
other than to reside in Mexico and continue fighting, and
in turn may have felt compelled to inflict retaliation upon the United States
as a result of the Benton affair.
Although this event may have added to
the tension accumulating between Villa and the United States,
it seems improbable that Villa would make an attack upon the U.S.
largely based on this one incident. Villa clearly understood the United
States’ military capacity in relation to his own strength. Furthermore, he did not make his attack on Columbus because
he was denied political asylum. Villa never intended on seeking refuge in the
United States, but rather wanted to lead U.S.
officials to believe so in order to achieve other personal ambitions. In this
regard Villa was simply pacifying his adversaries while he developed his strategy and measures for his next move.
A fourth popular explanation amongst
historians to discern Villa’s motivations for attacking Columbus is that
Villa wanted to take revenge upon a man named Sam Revel. Villa had been involved
in an extensive business with Sam and Louis Revel’s store in Columbus, buying
large quantities of guns and ammunitions. Villa was said to have given a considerable
sum of money to Revel to procure weapons for him and his men, and evidently Revel declined to relinquish these arms to Villa. The rumor was verified by one of Villa’s own men, who later commented
that “Villa was angry because he did not receive ammunition that he paid for there.” The notion was also endorsed by the El Paso
Herald Post, proclaiming that General “Cervantes reported to Villa that Sam Revel refused to sell him guns. He said that Ravel refused to return money left for a deal in 1913.”
However, the likelihood that Villa chose
to attack Columbus on account of Sam Revel is improbable for three reasons. First, Columbus was not Villa’s
initial target because he originally planned to attack Presidio, Texas. Secondly, Sam Revel’s youngest brother, Arthur, noted that although his brother
Sam conducted business with several of the revolutionary groups near the Columbus
border, Villa was never one of them. Arthur vehemently denied any connection between his brother and Villa. Third, there is no record of Sam Revel’s name in any of the information collected
by U.S. intelligence officers that sought to establish Villa’s
intentions. Nonetheless, it is reasonably probable that Ravel became a consequential
target after Villa chose to attack Columbus, but Revel was not present when the
raid transpired.
While these speculations shed some light upon Villa’s motives for attacking Columbus,
they regrettably fail to illustrate his genuine intentions. In contrast, Katz’s
interpretation provides the most logical and cohesive argument for determining Villa’s motivation for attacking Columbus. Villa truly believed that Carranza was unable to bring peace and stability to Mexico,
and realized that an attack on the United States would provoke
U.S. intervention in Mexico
that resembled that of the invasion of Veracruz years before. This would bring about a similar response among the Mexican populace who would identify Villa as an advocate
of anti-Americanism, and Carranza would once more be compelled to proclaim a fervent declaration against the Americans, which
would lead to an additional weapons embargo against him. Villa also probably realized that Carranza’s patriotic generals would
coerce him to make peace with his internal adversaries in order to establish a cohesive Mexican front against the northern
aggressors.
Furthermore, Villa’s deliberate attack on Columbus ultimately presented
Carranza with a devastating setback he was unable to recover from. The attack
destroyed his expectation for a swift economic restoration in Mexico,
and for diminishing the strength and size of the army to which he had promised his supporters.
It clearly demonstrated Carranza’s inability to pacify and rule Mexico
effectively, consequently impairing his relationship with the United States,
and in turn prohibiting him from acquiring access to either U.S.
financial aid or arms. The discredited Carranza was now as susceptible as any
other revolutionary force in Mexico, and as a result sequentially
nurtured the astounding resurgence of Villa.
Thus, Villa’s motivation for attacking Columbus was essentially the
result of the official recognition of Carranza as de facto president by the Wilson
administration that ultimately led to his defeat at the battle of Agua Prieta in 1915.
However, while Katz’s argument portrays Villa steadfast in his belief that Carranza was unable to pacify Mexico,
it disregards the relevance of the issue of border security. Villa understood
that a deliberate attack on American soil would not only cast significant doubt on the ability of Carranza to pacify Mexico,
but completely undermine President Wilson’s decision to recognize Carranza as de facto president in the first
place – the identification of an accountable authority figure that could provide border security and safeguard American
lives. Furthermore, this explains why so few murders occurred in Villa’s
attack on Columbus. Villa did not
hate Americans, but recognized the necessity of casualties to amply demonstrate Carranza’s inability to provide border security and
protect American lives.
The Battle
of Agua Prieta, 1915
In October of 1915, the Division del Norte remained a potential influence on the outcome of the Mexican Revolution. Despite suffering heavy casualties that resulted from engaging in war with Carranza’s
revolutionary forces, Villa still commanded an impressive army. Although his
forces were poorly disorganized they were nowhere near overcome, and nobody questioned Villa’s absolute authority over
the troops under his immediate control and scrutiny. The majority of his subsidiary
commanders were still devoted to him, even if his absolute control over them under the newly arisen conditions was convoluted. However, as Villa’s abilities to compensate his supporters quickly diminished,
more desertions ensued that included many of his long-standing and esteemed lieutenants.
The same month Villa was notified that the U.S. Secretary of State and the Latin American diplomats had acknowledged
the Carranza regime as the legitimate de facto government in Mexico. The recognition of the Carranza government appointed a firm embargo established on
all arms and supplies crossing into Mexico to which only Carranza
and his chief General Alvaro Obregon had access to. Wilson’s resolution to support
Carranza is unusual for several reasons. The decision came shortly after Wilson
had requested that Villa send delegates to Washington to participate in a peace
conference, a pretense that clearly demonstrated Wilson’s intent to support
Villa. Furthermore, only weeks before the official recognition of Carranza, Villa
was suppose to receive assurances from General Hugh Scott that Wilson would under
no circumstances support Carranza. While it was eventually revealed that this
message was never conveyed to Villa, his agents in the U.S.
were informed of Wilson’s guarantees, and it is probable that Villa was
notified as well.
Villa’s initial response to the acknowledgment of Carranza as de facto president was docile and clearly
demonstrates that his motivation for attacking Columbus in the following six months
was not out of sheer disdain for Americans, but was rather a meticulously deliberate act.
In fact, he never openly acknowledged contempt towards the Wilson administration,
and no Americans in the territory he controlled were mistreated. On the contrary,
Villa was optimistic that he would be capable of eluding the arms embargo placed on him by effectively invading and procuring
authority of the border state of Sonora.
If successful, the efficiency of the arms embargo against him would have decreased considerably due to the enhanced
prospect of acquiring arms illegally from the United States. Furthermore, the addition of Sonora
would have substantially extended the amount of American property under Villa’s authority, which in turn might compel
the U.S. administration to support him to some degree.
Nonetheless, other rationale existed that perpetuated Villa’s desire to assume control over Sonora. Because he no longer controlled either his seaports or main border ports except at
Jaurez, the garrison at Agua Prieta occupied by the Carranzistas was an imminent danger to his back. Villa therefore resolved to acquire the garrison at Agua Prieta from the Carranzistas from which he could
initiate new undertakings. This in turn would add a supplementary port of entry,
overcome the only remnant of Carranza’s influence in northern Sonora,
and eradicate the danger presented at his rear. However, the Carranzistas recognized
this impending threat. Villa’s regiment was estimated to posses ten to
fifteen thousand troops, and the garrison at Agua Prieta was secluded from all other Carranzista forces. The Carranzistas understood how vital and accessible the port
of Agua Prieta was to Villa if not fully reinforced. The impending nature of the threat was made ultimately clear to the Carranzistas when Villa’s regiment
unexpectedly disappeared from Chihuahua in mid October.
While Villa’s army roamed the vastness of the Sierra Madre towards Agua Prieta, the United
States blessed the Carranzistas with an instance of good luck. From the beginning of the Revolution the United States
had not provided any assistance to either side. However, after officially recognizing
Carranza as the de facto president, the United States
did not want Villa to recover his potency by securely establishing himself alongside the border of Sonora
and Chihuahua, and was resolute to assist Carranza. President Wilson therefore endorsed an appeal from the Carranzista government and permitted the Carranzistas
to fortify Agua Prieta through the United States.
The initial indication of escalating military development on the border began on October 21 when trains loaded with
artillery, munitions, soldiers and other equipment were shipped to Mexico
through Douglas, Arizona which lay opposite the border
of Agua Prieta. Through rigorous toil and the advantage of transporting munitions
and material through the United States, the Carranzistas were
able to render Agua Prieta nearly impenetrable before the first Villistas arrived. Under
the command of General Plutarco Calles, Agua Prieta was encircled by vast entrenchments, barbed wire, and machine guns strategically
placed to cover all advancement.
The Villista progression across the exposed plain was unmistakably discernible to the Carranzistas and American soldiers. The battle at Agua Prieta is exceptional in that for the first time in military history
spectators were able to observe the warfare at a reasonably safe distance from the margins.
At one-thirty in the morning, Villa gave the order to attack. However,
the Villistas soon discovered, as both sides on the Western Front in Europe had previously discovered,
that an attack against a position so secure amidst barbed wire, machine guns, and artillery was destined to be unsuccessful.
Nevertheless, the preparedness of the Carranzistas was not the only strategic aspect on the battlefield that complemented
Villa’s defeat. Villa’s previous victories in battle usually occurred
at night under the cover of darkness, but the battle of Agua Prieta was illuminated by searchlights, the rays of which not
only exposed the impending assault but blinded the assailants as well. The addition of searchlights on the battlefield instigated much resentment among
the Villistas and promptly added to their mounting hatred of the United States. Furthermore, during the following days it became obvious that the Villista’s
loss was in part due to the new policies of the United States. Their hatred of the U.S.
peaked when rumors began to disseminate throughout them that the United States
had provided and operated the spotlights from the safety of their own border.
After his defeat at Agua Prieta, Villa’s enmity against the United States
and his animosity at the American ingratitude must have mounted increasingly as the enormity of the catastrophe descended
further into his mind. Although Villa had always considered himself a friend of the Americans, from
this moment on his attitude in regard to the United States
was vastly different from what it had previously been. The Villistas were positive
that the outcome at Agua Prieta would have been different if the garrison had not been fortified through the efforts of the
United States, and they unmistakably held the U.S.
accountable for their failure. This event was more than a mere setback for Villa and his men; it completely
devastated their ability to influence the outcome of the revolution.
Nonetheless, it was never Villa’s intention to engage in a two front war with both the Carranzistas and the United
States. He clearly recognized the capacity of
his own strength in relation to the power of the U.S., and
understood that a vengeful attack on the United States would
only worsen his already dire situation. Villa realized that if he could amply
demonstrate Carranza’s inability to protect American lives, the legitimacy of Carranza’s government would be suspect
and a resurgence of his own strength would be possible. With his premeditated
and strategic attack on Columbus, Villa was able to achieve his objectives as
well as modify the course of history.
Villa’s Decision
to Attack
At Los Tanques on January 18, 1916, Villa and his two hundred men,
many of whom were comrades from his Dorado elite guard, congregated to discuss upcoming campaigns. Because Villa’s army had regained some of its strength and Carranza’s stronghold over Mexico
appeared to be increasing, Villa informed his men that the moment to attack the Americans had come. However, Villa’s initial expedition plans were not geared towards attacking Columbus,
New Mexico, but rather the small American town of Presidio
across the Rio Grande from Ojinaga in Texas. This is peculiar because Presidio was one of the most destitute and impoverished towns
in the United States.
The Villistas clearly could not expect to acquire a large quantity of goods or supplies in such a town, but this was
true for the majority of the small border towns in Texas. Nonetheless, the anticipated expedition to the Ojinaga region failed due to an unprecedented and highly
unexpected degree of desertion. Consequently, Villa’s strategies and approach
changed drastically in the following weeks.
Villa knew that his plans to attack the United States
could not be achieved without a passionate and dedicated army on which he could rely.
He therefore decided to modify his approach to halt increasing demoralization and eliminate further desertion. One way Villa achieved this was rewarding his soldiers by allowing them to loot at
will as longed as no one was harmed. Nonetheless, Villa realized that overtly
declaring his intention of attacking the United States would
not ensure volunteers but would instead encourage some of his most loyal and dedicated supporters to desert. His men were aware that the border had been reinforced when the number of Americans
murdered had escalated during the summer of 1915. Therefore, Villa had
to utilize new techniques to ensure discipline and obedience in his men. He resorted
to obligatory conscription in which he exploited the use of force to coerce men into joining his army and remaining under
his control. It was unlike any other mandatory conscription used in Mexico
during the Porfiriato, but brutal just the same. Villa made it clear that the
men who neglected to join his army would suffer dire consequences and be executed, while the families of those that ran and
hid would undergo the same fate.
Villa was now assured that the conscripted men under his control would be loyal as long as they valued their lives
and the lives of their families. His army was well equipped and prepared to strike
the newly chosen target of Columbus, New Mexico. However, the men that rode to Columbus with Villa were quite
unlike the men that composed his former army, known as the Division del Norte. Villa’s
new forces consisted of an assortment of Mexican peons, muchachos fourteen to sixteen years old, and Yaqui Indians
from Chihuahua. Nevertheless, what they lacked in experience they made up for with determination. Villa’s secret power over his men was the result of both the fear and love he
possessed over his troops. However, Villa revealed nothing about the true nature of his plan because of
his concern of the response of his men if they were informed about a premeditated attack on the United
States. Thus, Villa marched his men blindly through northern Mexico
to the border of the United States.
Prospects of Villa Border
Attack
Before the assault on Columbus, prospects of Villa initiating a border
attack had long been considered. Evidence that Villa and his men were making
their way towards the New Mexico border was made known to U.S.
officials in February of 1916, but they were unable to successfully track his movements due to a lack of financial resources
that prevented them from hiring secret service agents. As a result, the only
means they had to acquire information in regard to Villa’s location was based solely on information the Carranzistas
offered, but the majority of such accounts were questionable.
Information that appeared both genuine and credible was telegraphed on March 3 to the State Department by Zach Cobb,
the U.S. collector of Customs at El Paso,
Texas. Cobb delivered this information after
he allegedly witnessed Villa and approximately three-hundred men near Madero, Chihuahua
heading north towards Columbus, New Mexico. In the telegraph Cobb stated that there was “reason to believe” that Villa intended “to
cross to the United States and” hoped “to proceed
to Washington.” Villa was previously reported to be near the Casas
Grandes River, forty-five miles southwest of Columbus,
and at the Rancho Nogales, nearly sixty-five miles southwest of Columbus. Although this newly acquired information was believed to be reliable, its credibility
was short-lived.
Three days later on March 6 reporters were notified by the Carranzista General Gavira in Juarez
that, contrary to popular belief, Villa had no intention of reporting to Washington. Instead, Gavira stated to George L. Seese, a U.S.
correspondent to Villa, that Villa “intended to cause some incident that would force the United
States to intervene in Mexico.” This information was conveyed to General John J. Pershing of the United States
Army, who questioned its credibility due to the contradictory nature of all the reports regarding Villa’s whereabouts. Pershing understood it was unrealistic to establish the truth by any means other than
concrete reconnaissance, which was unthinkable. Furthermore, Pershing had acquired disconcerting information at his post at
Fort Bliss from his own intelligent sources
dating back to September of 1915 regarding a possible attack on the United States
by Villa. His sources stated that Villa would attack El
Paso, Texas with a large force of fifteen thousand men if the United
States recognized Carranza as de facto President.
This inevitably led the General to view El Paso as Villa’s most likely
target.
All of these reports were additionally sent to Colonel Herbert J. Slocum who was the commanding officer of the 13th
Calvary at Columbus, the garrison adjacent to Villa’s
supposed whereabouts. However, Colonel Slocum was weary of these allegations
as well. This was because the reports coming in were so ambiguous and contradictory
that it was nearly impossible for Slocum to construct an accurate depiction of the circumstances. Nevertheless, new information emerged on March 7 and was soon reported to Slocum
by Juan Favela, the foreman of the Palomas Land
and Cattle Company, whose men allegedly observed Villa and his Villistas near the U.S.
and Mexico border. The four men, consisting of three Americans and one Mexican, witnessed Villa
and about four-hundred men making camp near Casas Grandes. McKinney
and Corbett, both Americans, confidently rode to the camp but were captured upon arrival. They
soon regretted their decision to approach the men they mistakenly presumed were regular Mexican soldiers. At the command of the Villista Colonel Hernandez, McKinney
and Corbett were pulled to their feet and removed of their clothing. The men
were pushed to a nearby tree to which their hands were bound before the Villistas proceeded to place ropes around their necks
and slowly strangle them. However, the other two men were able to successfully
escape and inform Favela of the situati
