Docket Number: 71694-3
Title of Case: The Boeing
Company
v.
Carl Heidy and the Dept of Labor &
Industries
08/08/2002
While employers are not required to compensate
workers' nonwork-related diseases and injuries, the fact a worker is a
certain age is irrelevant to establishing that any portion of his or her
injury or disease is not work-related. If it is determined that a worker's
disability is work-related and the employer can establish, on an
individualized basis, that the full amount or a portion of a worker's
disability is not work-related, the employer need not compensate that
worker for the portion of the worker's disease or injury that is not work-
related. However, the statutes do not allow an employer to establish that
a worker's disease or injury is not work-related simply by arguing the
worker is of a certain age and then showing that people of that age
generally suffer from the same or a similar disease. We find nothing in
the statutes that allows for a reduction based on age in an injured
worker's claim. Absent statutory authority to the contrary, we hold that a
worker's age is irrelevant to establishing the existence and extent of a
worker's disability, and the median-based allocation method cannot be used
to refute the existence or extent of an individual's disability.
Seattle Times 8/8/02
"A worker’s age is irrelevant to establishing the
existence and extent of a worker’s disability, and the median-based allocation
method cannot be used to refute the existence or extent of an individual’s
disability," Justice Charles Johnson wrote in the unanimous decision.
142 Wn.2d 801, COCKLE v. LABOR & INDUSTRIES
[NO. 68539-8. En Banc.]
Argued March 7, 2000. Decided January 18, 2001.
DIANNE L. COCKLE, RESPONDENT,
v.
THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES, Petitioner.
Nature of Action: An injured worker sought judicial review of an administrative decision denying her claim that the calculation of her time-loss compensation should include the reasonable value of her employer-furnished health insurance.
CONCLUSION
We hold that, just as "board, housing [and] fuel" were core, nonfringe benefits critical to protecting the basic health and survival of workers injured in the early 1900s, whose suffering such legislative language was originally designed to reduce, so also were the health care premiums paid by Cockle's employer in exchange for her labor in the late 1900s a nonfringe component of her lost "wages." The value of such premiums should have been included in the RCW 51.08.178 basis used to calculate her workers' compensation payments. We affirm the Court of Appeals, but modify its analysis for the reasons set forth above and reject its method for calculating the "reasonable value" of the benefit in question. We remand to the Department for recalculation of Cockle's compensation in accordance with our decision, and order the Department to pay her reasonable attorney fees pursuant to RCW 51.52.130.
139 Wn.2d 659, BRAND v. DEP'T OF LABOR & INDUS.
[No. 67319-5. En Banc.]
Argued May 27, 1999. Decided December 16, 1999.
CATHERINE BRAND, Petitioner,
v.
THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES, Respondent.
The very purpose of allowing an attorney's fee in industrial accident cases primarily was designed to guarantee the injured workman adequate legal representation in presenting his claim on appeal without the incurring of legal expense or the diminution of his award if ultimately granted for the purpose of paying his counsel.
138 Wn.2d 815, SEEBERGER v. BURLINGTON N. R.R.
[No. 67328-4. En Banc.]
Argued June 15, 1999. Decided September 2, 1999.
RAYMOND L. SEEBERGER, Respondent,
v.
BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY, Petitioner.
Nature of Action: A railroad worker sought personal injury damages from his employer for a work-related injury. The action was brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 U.S.C. 51-60), which creates a right of action against common carrier railroads for negligent conduct that causes damage to workers in their employ.
136 Wn.2d 550, DUSKIN v. CARLSON
[No. 65998-2. En Banc.]
Argued June 23, 1998. Decided October 1, 1998.
GORDON GARY DUSKIN, ET AL., Respondents,
v.
KENNETH CARLSON, ET AL., Petitioners.
Nature of Action: A worker who suffered an on-the-job injury while driving a company-owned vehicle that was involved in a two-car accident sought damages from the driver of the other car. The Department of Labor and Industries later intervened in the action.
134 Wn.2d 795, JOHNSON v. WEYERHAEUSER CO.
[No. 65131-1. En Banc.]
Argued October 28, 1997. Decided April 2, 1998.
DENNIS R. JOHNSON, Petitioner,
v.
WEYERHAEUSER COMPANY, Respondent.
Nature of Action: An injured worker sought judicial review of an administrative decision awarding time loss compensation and permanent partial disability benefits for low back impairment, but denying his claim for permanent total disability benefits for a psychiatric condition.
130 Wn.2d 580, CLAUSON v. DEP'T OF LABOR & INDUS.
[No. 63548-0. En Banc.]
Argued May 31, 1996. Decided November 7, 1996.
HENRY A. CLAUSON, Respondent,
v.
THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES, Petitioner.
Nature of Action: An injured worker sought judicial review of an administrative decision closing his claim for permanent partial disability without making an additional award. He had been denied the additional permanent partial disability award because he had already been awarded a permanent total disability pension on an unrelated second claim for a separate injury that postdated the present claim.
128 Wn.2d 224, ADAMS v. DEP'T OF LABOR & INDUS. [No. 62175-6. En Banc.]
November 22, 1995.
JAMES A. ADAMS, Respondent,
v.
THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES, Petitioner.
Nature of Action: A worker injured on the job sought judicial review of an administrative award of industrial insurance benefits for a permanent partial disability. The worker claimed that he was permanently and totally disabled by the injury.
Supreme Court: Holding that the worker's return to his preinjury occupation did not preclude the jury from considering whether he was permanently and totally disabled, the court affirms the decision of the court of appeals and the judgment.
127 Wn.2d 853, BIRKLID v. THE BOEING CO. Oct. 1995
[No. 62530-1. En Banc.]
October 26, 1995.
CERTIFICATION FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT IN
THERESA BIRKLID, ET AL., Appellants,
v.
THE BOEING COMPANY, Appellee.
Nature of Action: The plaintiffs sought damages from their employer for outrage and deliberate intent to injure. The case was later removed to federal court.
Supreme Court: The court holds that the plaintiffs presented sufficient facts to avoid summary judgment on the claim of deliberate injury and, to the extent they have presented evidence that the employer deliberately intended to inflict emotional distress, the facts presented are sufficient to avoid summary judgment on the claim of outrage.
117 Wn.2d 222, P.2d 194, LABOR & INDUS. v. ESTATE OF MacMILLAN [No. 57507-0. En Banc.]
August 8, 1991.
LABOR & INDUS.
v.
ESTATE OF MacMILLAN
THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES, Respondent,
v.
THE ESTATE OF DAVID E. MACMILLAN, Appellant.
THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES, Appellant,
v.
PEARL AALMO, Respondent.
Nature of Action: In separate actions, the Department of Labor and Industries sought judicial review of the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals' allowance of workers' compensation claims filed by the spouses of deceased workers. The Department alleged that the claims were untimely.
(Be aware of the difference of timely filing relating to:
RCW 51.28.050, Time limitation for filing application or enforcing claim for injury
and
RCW 51.28.055, Time limitation for filing claim for occupational disease -- Notice.)
1 Wn.2d 430, FRANK REID, Respondent, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES, Appellant
[No. 27647. Department One. Supreme Court November 27, 1939.]
FRANK REID, Respondent,
v.
THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
AND INDUSTRIES, Appellant. 1
[1] WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - REVIEW - APPEALS - SECOND APPEAL. An injured workman can not have two appeals pending at the same time in the same action involving the same injury - one, an appeal from the joint board's award for additional permanent partial disability raising the question of the sufficiency of that award, and one relative to the question of aggravation of the condition which previously existed, and which could not be reviewed if the first appeal were entertained.
[2] SAME - PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY - SUFFICIENCY OF AWARD - EVIDENCE - SUFFICIENCY. - On appeal by an injured workman from an award of the department of labor and industries for permanent partial disability, the finding of the superior court that claimant was entitled to an additional award can not be sustained, where the evidence did not overcome the prima facie correctness of the department's decision and, in fact, was overwhelming that the claimant had no permanent partial disability reasonably attributable to his injury.
[3] SAME - REOPENING CLAIM - AGGRAVATION OF DISABILITY - CONDITIONS PRECEDENT. The claim of an injured workman for aggravation of disability can not be entertained until there has been a final determination of the amount of the award to which he is entitled, since, under Rem. Rev. Stat., 7679, the standard by which to determine the award for such aggravation is the difference between the original award and the amount to which he would be entitled because of his subsequent condition; and where the claimant has appealed to the courts from the original award of the department for permanent partial disability, such appeal must be finally disposed of before the department can consider a claim for aggravation of disability.
1 Wn.2d 340, AIME DESTOOP, Respondent, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRIES, Appellant
[No. 27599. Department One. Supreme Court November 17, 1939.]
AIME DESTOOP, Respondent,
v.
THE DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR AND INDUSTRIES, Appellant. 1
[1] JUDGEMENT - WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - CONCLUSIVENESS OF ADJUDICATION - MATTERS CONCLUDED. On appeal by an injured workman to the superior court from an order of the department of labor and industries refusing to reopen his claim, the judgment of the superior court, in the absence of an appeal to the supreme court, becomes res judicata and binding upon the department; and where such a judgment directs the department to allow claimant compensation for such time loss as the claimant shall have suffered subsequent to the previous allowance for time loss, the department is bound thereby, and cannot successfully contend that it is precluded from awarding time loss for any period between the closing of the claim and the application for aggravation by Rem. Rev. Stat., 7686(c), which provides that "no increase or rearrangement shall be operative for any period prior to application therefor."
[2] WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - DECISION OF DEPARTMENT - REVIEW BY SUPERIOR COURT - SCOPE AND EXTENT. The jurisdiction of the courts over the administration of the workmen's compensation act is appellate only and not original; and where the issue raised by an appeal to the superior court was not how much temporary total disability claimant had suffered, but whether the department was correct in its determination that it was precluded by a prior judgment from awarding any such disability, the court, in resolving that issue against the department, should have remanded the cause to the department, with directions to act in accordance with the court's interpretation of such judgment; and it was error to grant claimant a specified sum for temporary total disability.
BLAKE, C. J., dissents.
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